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SUMMARY 
ISSUE 
California law is currently in substantial conformance with 
federal income tax law although there are major areas of 
difference. As each federal law change is made, the 
Legislature revises state law only as iti deems appropriate. 
Some state laws are enacted to suit particular state needs 
and have no federal counterpart. 
Should California adopt federal income tax law with automatic 
conformity to future federal law changes? 
QUESTIONS 
1. What are the major areas of non-conformity? 
2. To what degree would automatic conformity simplify 
state law and ease compliance for the average taxpayer? 
3. Which taxpayers stand to gain the greatest tax 
savings from full conformity? 
4. What are the state revenue implications of full 
conformity? What is the impact on future budgeting and 
revenue stability? 
5. What nature of tax shifts might result from the 
various degrees of full conformity? 
6. To what extent would state control over tax and 
economic policy be reduced under conformity? 
7. Does automatic conformity require a constitutional 
amendment? 
8. Is the federal collection of state taxes a desireable 
option under full conformity? 
LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS 
1. Retain current practice of "selective" or "piecemeal" 
conformity. 
ing: 
2. Modify current practice to do one or more of the follow-
a. Formalize Conformity Task Force(staff-agency group) 
b. Require introduction of bills embodying federal 
changes where comparable state law exists. 
i 
c. Require FTB regulations to be identical to IRS 
regulations where both state and federal law 
are the same. 
3. Adopt a form of automatic conformity at the level of: 
a. Federal adjusted gross income 
b. Federal taxable income 
c. Federal tax liability ("piggyback") 
These proposals may be adopted with or without 
special state and adjustments and with or without fed-
eral collection, auditing, enforcement and appeals. 
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PREFACE 
This report is designed to provide committee members and 
witnesses with a comprehensive background on the issue of 
California conformity of the personal income tax to federal 
individual income tax law.* 
During the 1979-80 legislative session, six separate 
measures proposing automatic conformity were considered by the 
Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee. A major review of 
automatic conformity has not been undertaken by the committee 
since 1964, so it was resolved to study all measures at one time 
a special interim hearing. 
Organization of this report is as follows: 
White Pages An overview of the concept of 
automatic conformity, and the 
pros and cons of various approaches 
compared to current practice 
Summary comparison of major 
differences between state and 
federal law, and detailed analyses 
of individual provisions 
*Bank and Corporation Tax provisions are not considered in this 
report. "Conformity" is usually associated only with the Personal 
Income Tax, and this was the focus of legislation before the 
committee. Further, the committee conducted interim hearings last 
fall on the four major areas of non-conformity in the Bank and 
Corporation Tax (Assembly Publication #751, Federal Conformity Issues: 
Bank and corporation Tax, Vol. I, Novemberl979) . 
...... 
Blue Pages 
Green Pages 
Pink Pages 
Tan Pages 
Buff Pages 
Basic income tax data, State 
and Federal law 
Legal analyses of whether or not 
automatic conformity must be 
accomplished by constitutional 
amendment 
Text of measures proposing 
automatic conformity 
Federal statutes allowing IRS 
collection of state income taxes 
Withholding exemptions issue, 
FTB regulation 
This report was prepared by Bob Leland, consultant to 
the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee, with contributions 
by David Doerr, Ellen Worcester and Gil Oster,committee consultants; 
Jim Patterson of the Assembly Office of Research; and Larry Counts, 
Jack Gordon, Paul Petrozzi, Marvin Hanely, Tom Margetich and Al 
Desin of the Franchise Tax Board staff. 
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What is Conformity? 
"Conformity" is tax jargon for the patterning of California 
Personal Income Tax law after the federal Internal Revenue Code. 
To many, the term "conformity" is synonomous with "automatic 
conformity", which can be achieved to a greater or lesser extent 
by a number of procedural approaches, three of which are examined 
in this report • 
California law is already largely in conformity with federal 
law, but not as the result of an automatic procedure. The 
current degree of conformity is a consequence of a determined 
effort by the Legislature since the mid-sixties to review federal 
law revisions as they occur and to make changes in comparable state 
codes as deemed appropriate. 
This approach to conformity is known as "selective conformity" 
(to its proponents} or "piecemeal conformity" (to its detractors) • 
Selective/Piecemeal Conformity 
Although this practice has been followed since the initial 
enactment of the California personal income tax law, it was 
formalized as a policy after extensive studies were conducted by 
the Revenue and Taxation Committees of both houses during the 
1960's. Table 1 summarizes major state conformity studies of 
the past 20 years and their conclusions. 
Under selective/piecemeal conformity, the Legislature attempts 
to achieve the highest degree of conformity to the extent 
practicable and desirable, but exercies its authority to modify 
6 
Year 
1961 
1961-63 
1964 
1968-69 
1969 
1969 
1975 
1979 
TABLE 1 
PUBLISHED STATE STUDIES ON 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY 
Report of Senate Fact 
Finding Committee on 
Revenue and Taxation: 
Conformity of California 
Personal Income and Bank 
Corporation Franchise 
Taxes with the Federal 
Internal Revenue Code 
Final Report of the 
Assembly Interim Commit-
tee on Revenue and 
Taxation 
Dr. Corrine Lathrop 
Gilb's Report for the 
Assembly Interim 
Committee on Revenue 
and Taxation: Conformity 
of State Personal Income 
Tax Laws to Federal 
Personal Income Tax 
Laws 
California Advisory 
Commission on Tax Re-
form (Flournoy Commis-
sion) 
Staff Report to Senate 
Committee on Revenue and 
Taxation on Bills and 
Constitutional Amend-
ments Referred in 1968 
to the Committee for 
Study 
Preliminary Report of 
the Legislative-Execu-
tive Tax Study Group 
Franchise Tax Board 
staff report: Should 
California Abandon its 
Current Selective Con-
formity Policy for 
Automatic Conformity? 
Final Report of the 
Commission on Govern-
mental Reform (Post 
Commission) 
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Recommendation 
Adopt policy that conformity 
be achieved wherever 
practicable and desirable. 
(Pg. 233) 
Continue policy of attempting 
to achieve highest degree 
of conformity between federal 
and state laws as may be 
practical and desirable. 
(pg. 56) 
Adopt method which provides 
the maximum conformity for 
the convenience of the tax-
payer consistent with needs 
for predictability and 
control over revenue by the 
state. (Vol. 4, No. 10, 
Part 3, pg. 8) 
No specific recommendation 
but opposed blind conformity 
as optimum objective. 
(Vol. I, pg. 6) 
Continue policy recommended 
in 1961 report. 
Full conformity contains 
"grave flaws" (pgs. 102-104) 
Continue policy of selective 
conformity while seeking 
simplification of state law 
and promoting greater tax 
equity (pg. 11) 
Opposed full "piggybacking" 
but recommended "use of a 
modified form of piggyback-
ing ..• by specific adjust-
ments to the "adjusted 
gross income" reported to 
the U.S." (Pg. 60) 
• 
I 
or reject federal changes through the regular legislative process. 
In addition, the Legislature maintains the freedom to adopt 
provisions which have no federal counterpart in order to meet 
special state needs. 
This state action necessarily follows federal action 
and considers provisions on an individual basis. In years past, 
a time lag of 1-3 years often ensued between federal change and 
state reaction. Since 1976, however, a task force of legislative 
and agency staff operating under the auspices of the Assembly 
Revenue and Taxation Committee has immediately reviewed federal 
changes to laws with a state counterpart and recommended to the 
Committee full, partial or no conformity. 
This procedure has improved response time and provided a 
forum for review of all changes, but the decision on whether or 
not to amend the state code still rests with the Legislature. 
Automatic Conformity Proposals 
Automatic conformity has been under active discussion in 
California since 1959, and at least one legislative proposal 
in this area has been made in every legislative session from 
that year through the present. 
There are three basic approaches to automatic conformity: 
1. Adopt Federal Adjusted Gross Income. This approach 
adopts by reference the current definition of federal 
"adjusted gross income" {AGI) , and automatically incor-
porates all future changes affecting the federal AGI 
definition for California income tax purposes. Table 2 
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TABLE 2 
PRESENT DETERMINATION OF CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX 
MINUS 
EXEMPT INCOME 
Social ecurity and ailroad etirement Insurance proceeds 
Public assistance 
Bequests and gifts 
Interest on government obligations 
Scholarships and fellowships 
Salaries & wages 
Partnership income 
Estates & trusts 
EQUALS 
GROSS INCOME 
Dindends 
Interest 
Capita 1 Gains 
MINUS 
ADJUSTMENTS TO GROSS INCOME 
Employee business expenses Military exclusion 
Moving expenses & sick pay Forfeited interest 
EQUALS 
MINUS 
Proprietorship income 
Rents & royalties 
Annuities & pensions 
Retirement plans 
Alimony 
DEDUCTIONS-Standard or itemized 
Contributions Interest 
Property/Gas Taxes 
Child adoption expenses 
Personal 
Low income 
EQUALS 
'~+~ 
TIMES APPROPRIATE 
TAX RATE, OR BY 
REFERENCE TO 
TAX TABLES, EQUALS 
MINUS 
TAX CREDITS 
Net income taxes paid Income Averaging 
other states 
EQUALS 
' TAX LIABILITY 
9 
Med~cal expenses 
Bad debts 
Casualty losses & 
Blind 
Solar energy 
Conservation 
Dependents 
Child Care 
thefts 
Adapted from Franchise Tax 
Board chart, p. 10 of 1978 
shows the basic items of income determination which would 
be the same for both federal and state law. The state 
would be left with its own set of itemized deductions, tax 
credits, and tax rates. 
In its "pure" form, such AGI conformity would be total, 
but this approach does leave open the possibility for various 
adjustments to be made by the state. Of course, the more 
adjustments, the greater the complexity. 
In the past legislative session, there was no measure 
which specifically provided for this approach, although this 
option could have been chosen under SCA 31 (Mills) • The text 
of that SCA is contained in Appendix J. 
2. Adopt Federal Taxable Income. The effect of the 
"taxable income" {TI) approach is similar to automatic AGI 
conformity, except that it goes one step further. As Table 2 
shows, TI conformity provides that itemized deductions would 
also be the same for state and federal law. The state would 
retain its own tax rates and credits. 
As with the AGI approach, adjustments can be made. 
AB 3209 (Naylor) and SB 1931 (M. Garcia) , identical 
measures from the last legislative session, both provided 
6 separate adjustments to federal TI. The resulting process 
of computing the state tax is illustrated by Table 3 • 
Again, the more adjustments, the greater the re-introduction of 
complexity into the state income tax. 
3. Piggyback Conformity. Here, the state tax becomes simply 
a percentage of the federal income tax liability as determined 
10 
TABLE 3 
TAXPAYER'S CALCULATION OF CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX 
UNDER AB 3902/SB 1931 
Federal Taxable Income 
minus 
Interest on U.S. Gov't Bonds 
Other (i.e., previously taxed 
income) 
l 
Tax Tables 
to 
Determine Tax 
l 
minus 
Credits 
1 
I California I Tax 
itemizers 
... 
11 
add 
State Income Tax 
Deducted 
Test if Federal 
Deduductions are 
Less than Calif. 
Standard Deduction. 
If so, Deduct 
Additional Amount. 
by the state (either at a single fixed rate or a graduated 
rate schedul~ • "Piggybacking" is the simplist approach from 
the taxpayer's perspective, and is what most lay persons have 
in mind when they refer to "conformity" to federal income 
tax law. 
If the state chose, it could still tack on credits to 
give further tax reductions for various taxpayer attributes 
or behavior, although the federal tax liability is already 
net of exemptions and credits offered by federal law. 
SCA 31 (Mills) was broad enough in drafting to include 
this option, as well as the AGI or TI approaches. ACA 42 
(Naylor) also appeared to embrace this approach. 
Practice In Other States 
As noted above, the term "conformity" describes a wide 
range of possible relationships between state and federal income 
tax laws. 
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) 
considers states to be in some degree of conformance with federal 
income tax laws if they refer by statute to the Internal Revenue 
Code as a starting point for computing the state's income tax. 
Table 4 classifies the 42 states (including District of 
Columbia) which presently have a broad-based income tax according 
to the extent to which they conform by reference to federal 
income tax laws (as of October 1, 1978). The table also shows 
the level and significance of the income tax collections of these 
states as a percentage of general revenues. 
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TABLE 4 
Current Federal Conformity Status and Income Tax Collections 
States With Broad-Based Income Tax 
1977-78 Income Tax Collections 
Currenta Percent of 
Conformity to Amount General 
Federal Law (Millians) Rank Revenues Rank 
Alabama 
ask a 
zona 
Arkansas 
ifornia 
Colorado 
aware 
District of Columbia 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
I 11 i noi s 
Indiana 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
ouisiana 
ne 
Mary1 and 
Massachusetts 
ichigan 
innesota 
ississippi 
M ssouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Jersey 
New Mexico 
York 
Carolina 
Dakota 
gon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
Carolina 
ah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
sconsin 
No 
TI 
No 
No 
No 
AGI 
AGI 
No 
AGI 
TI 
TI 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
No 
AGI 
AGI 
TAX 
No 
TI 
AGI 
No 
TI 
AGI 
TI 
TI 
No 
TAX 
No 
TI 
TAX 
AGI 
AGI 
AGI 
$ 318 
145 
223 
203 
4,632 
375 
190 
220 
643 
227 
138 
1,594 
538 
490 
241 
390 
192 
103 
884 
1,433 
1,696 
1,075 
158 
439 
124 
173 
779 
46 
4,506 
848 
69 
775 
252 
686 
1,328 
112 
351 
189 
66 
875 
183 
1,325 
22 
35 
26 
28 
1 
20 
30 
27 
15 
25 
36 
4 
16 
17 
24 
19 
29 
39 
9 
5 
3 
8 
34 
18 
37 
31 
12 
42 
2 
11 
40 
13 
23 
14 
6 
38 
21 
31 
41 
10 
32 
7 
20% 
26 
17 
22 
31 
31 
42 
26 
29 
30 
33 
28 
22 
35 
23 
21 
10 
20 
37 
43 
32 
39 
14 
25 
37 
46 
23 
6 
41 
33 
22 
19 
19 
59 . 
21 
24 
26 
31 
28 
37 
19 
43 
35 
24 
39 
31 
17 
16 
5 
22 
19 
18 
13 
21 
30 
11 
28 
33 
41 
34 
10 
4 
14 
7 
40 
25 
9 
2 
27 
42 
6 
12 
29 
38 
37 
1 
32 
26 
23 
15 
20 
8 
36 
3 
Sources: Current conformity--Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations (ACIR), Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1976-77 
Edition; Income tax collections--U.S. Department of Commerce, State 
Government Tax Collections in 1978. 
cli'TI" signifies conformance at level of federal taxable income, 11AGI" at level 
federal adjusted gross income, and "TAX 11 at level of federal tax. 
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California is one of 10 states which is not considered to 
be in substantial conformance with federal income tax law. Of the 
remaining 32 states, 21 conform to federal AGI, eight conform to 
federal TI, and only three (Nebraska, Rhode Island and Vermont) 
base their state tax on a percentage of the federal tax 
("piggyback") . However, what Table 4 does not show, and which 
is of great importance, is the number and magnitude of state 
adjustments to federal AGI or TI. For example, New York has some 
30 adjustments, and at that level it could be argued that these 
adjustments defeat the entire purpose of simplicity as advocated 
by conformity proponents. 
Further, during the past several years about one-third of the 
32 states have "frozen" the federal law as of a specific date for 
purposes. Ten states* now "freeze" the federal law as of a 
ific date and require legislative action for the adoption 
new federal changes. The "freezing" approach is not unlike 
ifornia's "selective conformity" approach, in that new federal 
changes are made subject to legislative review to determine their 
impact on tax policy, tax shifts and state revenues. 
Rationale for Automatic Conformity 
The main organized push for automatic conformity has been 
from the legal and accounting professions, which express dissatis-
faction with the end product of the current "selective/piecemeal" 
*Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Utah, and West Virginia. Also, Michigan and 
Wisconsin allow their taxpayers to elect being taxed on the basis 
of the federal law in effect for the current year or earlier law. 
Alaska, which until 1975 based its tax as a percentage of the federal 
tax, used the federal tax rates as of December 31, 1963. (Information 
as of Fall, 1975 -- does not reflect subsequent law changes.) 
14 
conformity approach. Their dissatisfaction may be summarized 
as follows: 
1. The current approach does not result in total conformity, 
and the differences between the two tax laws cause increased 
complexity and compliance costs for taxpayers and tax 
practioners. Total conformity would allow the taxpayer, 
at the extreme of piggybacking, to file an IBM card for a 
state tax return. Even at AGI or TI conformity, the state 
return could be reduced to only 1 to 4 pages or so. 
2. Even when conformity is forthcoming, there is the time 
~ between federal action and state reaction. This is es-
pecially burdensome when it results in different cost bases 
under state versus federal law, for depreciation or capital gains. 
3. Taxpayers pay more state taxes now than they would under 
total conformity, because the federal law is far more lenient 
in the aggregate than is current state law. 
4. The current extent of non-conformity requires separate 
administrative procedures which entail greater administrative 
time and expense for the state than would be the case under 
total conformity. 
In the abstract, these points would appear to advance a 
good case for automatic conformity. Why then, when the voters 
had the opportunity to approve automatic conformity by constitu-
tional amendment in 1966 and again in 1968, did they reject it 
both times, and by a larger margin on the second occasion?* 
*Proposition 14 of 1966 failed by a vote of 2,536,770 to 2,709,071 
(48.4% - 51.6%) and Proposition 4 of 1968 went down by a margin of 
2,881,249 - 3,190,542 (47.4% - 52.6%). The ballot arguments and 
text for each are included in Appendix I. 
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There were, in fact, a range of concerns raised in those 
two campaigns, and if anything they are more valid today, as more 
revenue is at stake. These concerns are discussed generally 
below and their varied application to the three different auto-
matic conformity approaches is noted. 
Increased Taxpayer Simplicity: A Matter of Degree 
Simplicity is the cornerstone of the case for automatic 
conformity. 
A distinction must be made here, however. No one is 
suggesting that the federal law itself is simple. Hardly. Rather, 
proponents of automatic conformity argue that simplification is 
promoted by reduced paperwork and by having to learn only ~ 
tax law, rather than two, even if that one tax law is as complicated 
as is the federal Internal Revenue Code. 
Obviously, simplicitycould be promoted just as easily by 
virtue of a state tax that conformed to federal gross income only, 
with no further deductions, exclusions, exemptions or credits. With 
much lower rate structure this approach would allow, many tax-
payers would still have lower taxes, although the taxes on upper-
income individuals would be greatly increased. Such a plan has 
virtually no likelihood of passage, despite its ultimate simplicity, 
because of a basic tenet of taxation: When forced to choose, 
taxpayers don't want simple taxes; they want lower taxes. 
Well then, to what extent will reduced paperwork and one tax 
law simplify life for the average California taxpayer? Probably 
not very much, for the following reasons: 
16 
• One-third of California returns were already of the 
single page variety in the 1978 taxable year. About 
60 percent of all taxpayers take the standard deduction, 
instead of itemizing. The compliance effort required 
of these taxpayers is minimal at present. This is 
especially the case since these taxpayers will have first 
filled out their federal return, and must only transfer 
previously-computed figures to the state return. 
• The only two differences in deductions affecting the bulk 
of the 40 percent who do itemize are the deduction for 
gas taxes allowed only by the state, and the deduction for 
state income taxes allowed only by the feds. Both of 
these provisions are straight forward. 
• In addition,there is the difference of the zero-braket 
amount and tax computation procedures, but these simply 
involve additional arithmatic manipulation of the same 
basic figures on the federal return; the present state 
return actually involves fewer computations. 
• The more esoteric differences are contained in provisions 
of law that generally affect relatively few taxpayers. 
The "typical" taxpayer is not affected. For example, 
the percentages of returns involving the more complex 
areas of income are: partnerships (4.8%), estates and 
trusts (1.0%), farms (1.2%), rents and royalties (10.1%), 
employee business expenses (8.3%), sick-pay (0.3%}, IRA s 
(2.5%), capital gains and losses (10.8%), dividend 
exclusion (14.~/o}. 
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• The biggest complexities are in provisions that affect 
primarily high-income taxpayers, who are already putting 
up with the complexities of the federal law. Wealthy 
taxpayers are more savvy on tax matters, and have money 
to hire accountants or tax attorneys to assist them. 
These persons will continue to retain professional tax 
assistance even under full conformity, in order to figure 
out the federal law. 
Some tax preparation savings may well accrue to 
California taxpayers from conformity, but it will be 
concentrated among those high income taxpayers whose 
accounting involves elaborate tax preference items, not 
the middle-income taxpayer who has his/her taxes done by 
one of the large tax services largely as a matter of 
convenience, because the same law will generally apply to 
this latter group both before and after full conformity. 
• Whether professional tax preparers are used or not, 
the taxpayer must assemble the same materials he/she 
does at present for the federal return, even under 
conformity. In some cases alternate cost basis figures 
can be dropped, which is certainly a relief to those 
taxpayers involved, but again, this group of taxpayers 
is quite limited in size. 
• To the extent adjustments are made to a TI or AGI con-
formity scheme, taxpayers may have the current, familiar 
18 
complexity, replaced by a different, unfamiliar 
complexity. This has been demonstrated every time the 
state returns are modified to improve simplicity: 
initially at least, many taxpayers get confused. Further, 
to the extent that the present credits present complexity, 
neither the AGI or TI plans will reduce such complexity, 
as both retain present credits. 
• The TI plan presents some element of confusion not 
inherent in the AGI approach, because the federal 1040 
form has no "taxable income" designation, whereas 
"adjusted gross income" does appear on line 31. "Taxable 
income" does appear on line 3 of Schedule TC (Tax Compu-
tation) 1 but this schedule may be used by only certain 
taxpayers (e.g. those with incomes in excess of the tax 
table amounts) 1 thus leaving the others in limbo. 
Table 5 below graphically illustrates the comparative rankings 
of all four conformity approaches in terms of simplicity. (In this 
and all subsequent such tables "High" rankings are deemed desired 
characteristics; rankings are subjective, but do illustrate magnitude.) 
TABLE 5 
Approach Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity to a ... 
Low Degree High Degree 
Selective/Piecemeal 
AGI 
TI 
Piggyback 
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The question raised by the next four sections is whether 
the value of the degree ofsimplicityobtainable from automatic 
conformity offsets the attendent drawbacks of such a procedure. 
Loss of State Control Over Tax Policy 
Often referred to as the "State Sovereignty" issue, the 
concern raised is that the state is surrendering its control 
over tax policy to the U.S. Congress and IRS. It was this reason 
that led the Post Commission to recommend against full piggybacking. 
The significance of this factor of course depends on the extent 
to which the income tax is considered to be an important state 
policy tool--i.e., for purposes of stimulating certain activities, 
subsidizing particular groups, or redistributing income--and not 
just a source of revenue. 
Adoption of conformity with the present u.s. Internal 
Revenue Code would imply that all of the present features of the 
federal income tax structure are desirable and equitable for 
California's economy and its taxpayers. This may not in fact be 
true with respect to the present structure, because Congress does 
not legislate with only California's unique interests in mind . 
What is good for the nation is not necessarily good for 
California on an individual basis. 
Conformity would also centralize income tax decision-
making in Washington D.C., and make it more difficult for the 
individual California taxpayer to make his/her voice heard on 
these matters. 
There are a number of policy decisions that ordinarily go 
into a state's determination of what should constitute 
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taxable income. Prof. Schwartz of UCLA Law School* cites four 
such decisions: 
• "Pure tax logic", as described by Prof. Schwartz, is 
illustrated by capital gains. For various reasons, 
long-term gains are accorded preferential tax treatment. 
But while federal law provides that one year of ownership 
of capital gain for special long-term treatment, Cali-
fornia lawmakers have concluded that five years of 
ownership should be required to merit full long-term 
treatment. Likewise, California has not adopted any 
provisions relative to net operating loss carryover/backs, 
asset depreciation range, and DISC, to name a few. 
California's opportunity to render its own decisions on 
pure tax matters of this sort would be eliminated if it 
opted for complete conformity. 
• "Economic stimulus" or "macroeconomic planning" is best 
and most frequently undertaken at the federal level. But 
a state's perspective on the control of the general 
economy may well be different from that of the federal 
perspective, and if that state accepts complete conformity, 
it would be depriving (or limiting) itself of the 
opportunity of influencing macroeconomic policy within its 
own boundaries by way of many state income tax rules it 
might otherwise enact or amend. 
• "Tax expenditure policy" will be subject to limitations. 
Although the state is of course free to continue to 
*See report in green pages, Appendix H 
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enact credits, it no longer could make independent 
determinations relative to deductions and non-taxability 
of certain forms of income. There are even ramifications 
for credits. For example, .both state and federal law 
provide for a solar tax credit. But suppose the state 
wishes to require adjustment in basis for the amount of 
credit taken, and that either a deduction or credit be 
taken (but not both). If federal law is to the contrary, 
then California's opportunity to make up its own mind on 
matters of this sort would be eliminated by a complete 
conformity policy. 
• State law deviates from federal law for many "equity 
considerations", relative to deductions and non-taxability 
of income (e.g., the adoption deduction, military pay 
exclusion, and non-taxability of unemployment compensat 
A major equity item is indexing. This is an area of non-
conformity where California law is far more equitable than 
federal law. California's opportunity to render equity 
judgments of this sort would be expunged were it to 
elect full conformity, especially under the "piggyback" 
approach. 
None of the automatic conformity proposals preclude the state 
from enacting additional credits designed to promote taxpayer 
equity or certain behavior in the marketplace. As previously 
noted, however, under a piggyback approach it wouldn't make sense 
to re-enact credits comparable to existing federal provisions which 
2/ 
are already embraced within the state's piggyback tax. Table6 
ranks the four proposals in terms of state control over tax 
policy. 
TABLE 6 
Approach Maximiz 
Selective/Piecemeal 
AGI 
TI 
Piggyback 
Significant Shifts in Tax Burden 
It is unavoidable that under total conformity there will 
be tax shifts, some of them substantial. The severity of shift 
can be mitigated by the approach to automatic conformity chosen, 
as will be discussed later. But whatever approach is taken, 
many Californians will pay increased state taxes, even if the 
majority pay less. 
A number of tax shifts can ensue under total conformity, 
chief among them: 
• A shift from higher-income taxpayers to lower-income 
taxpayers. This shift occurs because the state tax is 
considerably more progressive than the federal tax for 
most state taxpayers. 
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• A shift from single to married taxpayers. This 
is due to the "marriage penalty" which is imposed 
federal law but not at the state level. 
• A shift from taxpayers claiming the standard deduction 
to those itemizing deductions. This shift occurs 
the federal "zero bracket" is much larger the 
equivalent, the standard 
• A shift from taxpayers claiming more dependents to those 
claiming fewer. This shift results from 
the $1,000 federal personal exemption for the state' 
constant dependent tax credit ($9 in 1979). 
It is important to note that these 
piggyback approach, and most can be 
eliminated by utilizing AGI or TI 
fts are 
al 
However, whatever approach is used, 1 
the greatest benefits to upper-income taxpayers. 
Table 7 on the following page shows the e 
effect of full conformity, by AGI c s. The bulk of 
relief goes to taxpayers with an AGI in excess of $30,000 
Whi the average tax reduction is $159 tax return, 
the 125,000 taxpayers with $100,000 AGI or 
a tax savings of $3,336, and the for all 
excess of $50,000 AGI is $1,243. By contrast, the aver-
age relief for all taxpayers under $20,000 AGI is only 41. 
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TABLE 7 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
EFFECT OF CONFORMITY BY INCOME CLASS 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
(data in Millions) 
Adjusted Gross 
Income Class Non 
At But Less Tax Model Tax Model Net Revenue 
Least Than Items Items Chan8e 
$10,000 $9 -$10 -$1 
$10,000 - 20,000 
-68 -21 -89 
20,000 - 30,000 -172 -9 -181 
30,000 - 50,000 -379 -18 -397 
50,000 - 100,000 -366 -24 -390 
100,000 
Totals 
and Over -383 -34 -417 
-$1,359 -$116 -$1,475 
*The Franchise Tax Board has constructed a "Tax Model" 
which simulates impacts on state revenues and taxpayers 
from given changes in the state tax laws. The FTB Tax 
Model includes all major interactions between state and 
federal· law except (1) net operating loss carryover/back, 
(2} Subchapter S, (3) mutual fund dividend taxation, and 
(4) elderly tax credits. 
Source: Franchise Tax Board 
Research & Statistics 
10/3/80 
Even within each AGI class, there are "winners" and 
"losers". Table 8A shows the tax impact by AGI class, 
type of return and by net tax decrease versus net tax 
increases, with respect to the tax model provisions only 
(see footnote to Table 7). In summary, 6,683,000 tax 
returns will collectively realize $1.41 billion in tax 
savings ($211 average decrease) and 2,583,000 tax returns 
will pay an increase of $50.2 million ($19 average increase). 
Table 8A assumes that under full conformity a deduction 
will be allowed for the state income taxes paid. However, 
if such a deduction is not allowed, Table 8B shows the same 
tax impact without the deduction. That table shows that 
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Class 
But Less 
Than 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
l'tO,OOO 
50,000 
- 100,000 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
and Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
- 100,000 
and Over 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
and Over 
Totals 
than 500 
TABLE 8A 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
FULL CONFORMITY 
(Deduction Allowed for State PIT) 
Tax Decrease Tax Increase 
No. of . Amount of No. of Amount of 
Returns Change Returns ,; Change 
2 
735 
1,257 
486 
123 
38 
42 
12 
2,696 
1 
1 
471 
1,207 
964 
506 
468 
109 
3, 727 
0 
0 
82 
121 
36 
9 
9 
3 
259 
4 
736 
1,809 
1,814 
1,123 
554 
519 
124 
6,683 
( t h o u s a n d s ) 
Single Taxpayers and Married Filing Separate 
$29 
11,230 
77,445 
76,030 
42,958 
21,368 
41,708 
44,395 
$315,163 
Joint Taxpayers 
$8 
8 
11,363 
86,927 
151,913 
148,609 
318,558 
331,591 
$1,048,976 
Unmarried Head 
0 
0 
$2,301 
11,669 
10,910 
4,150 
7,462 
8 999 
All Taxpayers 
$38 
11,237 
91,110 
174,626 
205,781 
174,127 
367,728 
384,985 
$1,409,631 
26 
517 
404 
44 
3 
* 
* 
* 
* 968 
--
and Surviving 
26 
294 
646 
88 
9 
2 
4 
1 
1,070 
of Household 
17 
219 
301 
7 
* 
* 1 
* 545 
--
561 
917 
992 
98 
9 
2 
5 
1 
2,583 
$4,420 
3,277 
911 
35 
39 
209 
338 
12 
Spouse 
052 
5,556 
13,501 
2,399 
517 
158 
1,518 
$100 
5,976 
9,028 
161 
7 
* 121 
1 
,573 
14,810 
23,447 
2,595 
563 
367 
1,977 
848 
FTB R&S 
AGI Class 
At 
~east 
But Less 
Than 
$5' 000 
$5,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
.00, and Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
- 10,000 
10, 20,000 
20, 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
50 - 100,000 
100 and Over 
Toto.ls 
- $5,000 
10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 and Over 
Totals 
- $5,'000 
$5,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 and Over 
Totals 
than 500 
TABLE 8B 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
FULL CONFORMITY 
(No Deduction for State PIT) 
Tax Decrease Tax Increase 
No. of Amount of No. of fomount of 
Returns Change Returns Change 
2 
734 
1,236 
484 
123 
38 
42 
12 
2,672 
1 
1 
463 
1,178 
959 
506 
467 
109 
3,684 
0 
0 
77 
120 
36 
9 
9 
3 
253 
4 
735 
1, 776 
1,782 
1,117 
553 
518 
123 
6,609 
( t h o u s a n d s ) 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
$29 
11,225 
74,339 
58,945 
24", 848 
11,523 
19,915 
18,047 
$218,871 
518 
405 
61 
4 
* 
* 1 
* 989 
$4,421 
3,303 
1,065 
66 
57 
236 
374 
37 
$9,559 
Joint Taxpayers and Surviving Spouse 
$8 
7 
11,118 
76,951 
119,642 
104,577 
185,613 
139,754 
$637,670 
26 
294 
655 
112 
13 
2 
4 
1 
1,108 
$1,052 
5,557 
13,756 
2,699 
597 
177 
1,806 
1,384 
$27,028 
Unmarried Head of Household 
0 
0 
$2,052 
8,915 
7,498 
2,320 
3, 770 
3,463 
$28,018 
All Taxpayers 
$37 
11,232 
87,509 
144,810 
151,988 
118,420 
209,298 
161,264 
$884,559 
27 
17 
219 
306 
7 
* 
* 1 
* 
= 
561 
918 
1,022 
123 
13 
3 
6 
2 
2,647 
$100 
5,976 
9,124 
173 
8 
* 148 
15 
$15,545 
$5,573 
14,836 
23,945 
2,938 
661 
413 
2,328 
1,437 
$52,132 
FTB R&S 10/3/80 
Net Tax 
Change 
$4,391 
-7,922 
-73,274 
-58,879 
-24,791 
-11,287 
-19,541 
-18,010 
-$209,312 
$1,044 
5,550 
2,638 
-74,251 
-119,045 
-104,400 
-183,807 
-138,370 
-$610,642 
$100 
5,976 
7,072 
-8,743 
-7,490 
-2,320 
-3,622 
-3,448 
-$12,473 
$5,536 
3,604 
-63,564 
-141,873 
-151,326 
-118,007 
-206,970 
-159,827 
-$832,427 
while slightly fewer returns share $525 million less 
net savings, slightly more persons pay $2 million more 
in taxes. The tax benefit from deducting state income 
taxes is obviously centered on the higher- tax-
payers. 
Finally, there are varying degrees of tax savings 
increases among the "winner" and "loser" categories. 
Table 9 is based on aTax Model run made earlier this year on 
AB 3209, and shows that while the bulk of taxpayers would 
have little or no change under that bill (plus or minus $50) 
thousands of taxpayers would have experienced tax cuts 
or increases of up to $1,000 or more. 
TABLE 9 
Distribution of Absolute Change in Tax Liability 
All Returns 
r-- Total Increases 
I $ +1000 or more 
Ill 
Gl 
Ill 
Ill 
Gl 
~ 
0 
c 
H 
+ 500 - 1000 
+ 250 - 500 
+ 100 - 250 
Number of 
Returns 
2,626,114 
904 
1,143 
2,299 
5,021 
~ + 50 -
Eo< 
+ 0 -
No Change 
$ - 0 -
100 
50 
20,161 
2,596,586 
----- 4,386,898 
50 -
- 100 -
- 250 -
50 
100 
250 
500 
>< - 500 - 1000 
Ill 
2,886,675 
Aggregate 
Tax Change 
Ave. Tax 
Change 
$27,012,244 $ 10 
2,293,601 2,538 
918,339 
828,076 
754,606 
1,312,452 
20,905,170 
0 
($14 ,540, 389} ($ 
12,542,806) 
34,116, 553) 
24,750,036) 
803 
360 
150 
65 
164) 
349) 
686) ~ 
Eo< 
L -lOOOor more Total Decreases 
173,194 
208,437 
70,929 
40,554 
20,092 
3,399,881 
27 ,833,329) { 
53,826,411} 
($167,609,524) ($ 
2 ,679) _jE-< 
49) 
GRAND TOTALS , 
ALL RETURNS 10,412,893 ($140,597,280) ($ 14) 
source: FTB Tax Model. Tax change 2xcludes 
effect of all non-TA:c EODEL 
28 Based on ear data avai 
Based on the foregoing points, Table 10 illustrates the 
approximate rankings of the 4 approaches in terms of inherent 
tax shifts. 
TABLE 10 
Approach Minimizes Tax Shifts to a •.• 
Low Degree High Degree 
Selective/Piecemeal 
AGI 
TI 
Piggyback 
State Budget and Revenue Instability 
With state conformity to federal law, major federal law 
changes could have a substantial impact on state income tax 
revenues, especially if such changes v!ere enacted very late in the 
year, thereby precluding offsetting state tax rate adjustments. 
Concern about the lateness of federal action appears warranted: 
two of the last three major tax revisions--the Tax Reform Act of 
1976 and the Revenue Act of 1978--were enacted on October 4 and 
October 14, respectively. Both dates fall beyond the close of the 
state legislative session. 
The implications of such revenue disruptions depend on the 
state's fiscal condition, i.e., whether or not a surplus of ade-
quate proportions exists at the time to preclude the state falling 
into a budget deficit situation, which is prohibited by the 
California Constitution. 
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States that have a large degree of conformity are 
constantly faced with the prospect of raising their income tax 
rate to compensate for the shrunken tax base resulting from the 
federal action. 
The most"celebrated11 case is that of Oregon, which had adopted 
automatic conformity in 1969 only to encounter immediate budgetary 
problems when the federal Tax Reform Act of 1969 was enacted on 
December 30, 1969. The problems were solved by the Governor reducing 
state expenditures and adjusting liquor prices to balance the 
68-70 budget. After drastically adjusting its 1971-73 budget 
because of expected revenue reductions stemming from the '69 Act, 
experienced a problem of even greater magnitude when the 
federal Revenue Act of 1971 was enacted. The Legislature was 
led into special session to resolve the crisis which 
culminated in reduced programs and increased cigarette taxes. 
remaining deficit was overcome by modifying its automatic 
conformity. 
A more recent illustration is the experience of Utah 
Nebraska, both of which were forced to increase tax rates in 1975 
to cope with reduced collections due to federal changes. 
Automatic conformity proponents have pointed to the fact that 
over 30 states out of 42 income tax states have adopted a form 
of conformity, and they have been able to cope with the budgetary 
and fiscal problems. The primary reason these states have been 
to maintain budget~ry and fiscal stability in the past has 
been because the federal law was relatively stable until 1968. 
Since 1968, however, seven massive federal changes have occurred 
at accelerated pace. 
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Another reason some states have been able to cope with 
these changes is that their tax rates can be easily changed. In 
Nebraska, for example, the Board of Equalization can recommend 
rate changes within 30 days of any reform. 
The task is not so easy in states where the Legislature must 
vote on rate increases, which is both inconvenient and politically 
difficult. In California there are additional limitations 
to recouping revenues lost via federal law changes, because any 
increase in rates or decrease in credits under Proposition 13 
requires a 2/3 legislative vote. 
Further, the experiences of other states with automatic 
conformity suggest that rate or other adjustments may be preceived 
by taxpayers as tax increases, even though such rate changes are 
intended only to avoid a state revenue loss. 
Even timely rate adjustments may not fully offset the effect 
of federal changes, as there is presently a very limited ability, 
at the federal or state level, to estimate accurately the revenue 
effects of major federal tax changes. This is primarily due to 
such factors as basic data limitations, the interaction of complex 
tax provisions, and the unknown "secondary" economic and behavioral 
effects of tax law changes. 
Finally, there are significant administrative costs and limita-
tions associated with late-year income tax rate changes. For 
example, the Franchise Tax Board typically completes the process 
of designing and printing tax return forms well in advance of 
mailing these forms in December. Thus, changes near the end of 
the year likely would involve substantial administrative dupli-
cation and delays. 
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In general, it is expected that state revenues from a tax 
based on federal TI would tend to be less affected by federal 
tax law changes that would piggyback revenues based on a f 
percentage of the net federal tax. This is because across-the-
board federal tax rate or credit revisions (neither of which af 
the taxable income base) are used more often for economic policy 
and stablization purposes than are specific changes in federal 
deductions, exclusions and exemptions. These latter changes 
typically are intended to further tax equity and distributional 
goals. 
Table 11 shows an estimate by the Assembly Office of Research 
comparative revenue effects on the state under both a f 
piggyback and TI conformity plan (no AGI estiamte was made) 
1976 through 1978 federal acts: 
PROJECTED 1980-81 CALIFORNIA 
REVENUE EFFECT OF 
FEDERAL LAW CHANGES 
(in millions) 
Piggyback Conformity 
% of 
General Fund 
TI Conformity 
1 Act Amount 
Revenue Act of 
1978 (P.L. 95-600) $-280 
Tax Reduction and 
Simplification 
Act of 1977 
(P.L. 95-30) -530 
Tax Reform Act of 
1976 (P.L. 94-455) -525 
Revenues 
-1.5% 
-2.8 
-2.7 
% of 
General 
Amount Revenues 
$-375 9 9-• 0 
-260 -1.4 
-130 -0.7 
rate 
SOURCE: Assembly Office of Research: An Analysis 
of the Tax Burden and Revenue Effects of 
California's Personal Income 
However, the 1978 federal act--where the impact under TI 
was greater than for piggyback--may represent a change in the 
trend of recent years, as the 78 Act did place reliance on taxable 
income changes to achieve economic stimulus. Recent debate in 
Congress has also included proposed massive cuts in capital gains 
taxes, which under conformity would have a negative effect on state 
revenues. And the just-enacted Windfall Oil P ts Tax Bill expanded 
the dividend/interest exemption, which affects taxable income. 
On this basis, Table 12ranks the four approaches for their 
impact on revenue instability. 
TABLE 12 
Approach Minimizes Budget/Revenue I 
Low Degree 
Selective/Piecemeal 
AGI 
TI 
Piggyback 
Revenue Loss To The State 
lity to a ••. 
High Degree 
Full conformity, in addition to bringing instability to the 
state's budgetary process and revenue structure, necessarily 
results in a net state revenue loss under the present state tax 
structure. This is due to the greater level of tax preferences 
within the federal tax base. This revenue loss will vary depending 
on the approach to automatic conformity chosen. If tax rates are 
increased, however, the revenue loss could be reduced or offset 
completely. 
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However, as tax rates are increased the tax shifts 
previously noted will be exacerbated. Also, as rates go 
many persons with initial net tax reductions will move 
to tax increases. 
The Franchise Tax Board estimates the state revenue 
from full conformity (including deductibility of the 
state tax against itself) of $1.475 billion. This impact, 
net of interaction, is shown in Table l3on the following page. 
The total impact of conformity, including tax credit 
and structural changes, is about $2.9 billion. However, if 
indexing were first totally eliminated and the brackets 
led back to 1977 levels, there would be an offsetting 
savings of $2.9 billion. Although this appears to be a net 
wash of revenues, at the higher tax rates the revenue losses 
be magnified, creating a new imbalance. Further, 
would be a large shift in tax burden from upper-income 
middle-income taxpayers (see discussion of indexing on 
s 168-175). 
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TABLE 13 
Tax Model Provisions 
1. Capital Gains Liberalized 
2. Dividend/Interest Exclusion 
3. $10,000 Preference Tax Exclusion 
4. Military Exclusion Disallowed 
5. State PIT Deductible 
6. Personal/Dependent Credits to $1000 
Exemption 
7. Standard Deduction Increased 
8. Charitable Contribution Limit Increased 
9. Political Contribution Deduction 
to Credit 
10. Gas Tax Deduction Disallowed 
11. Federal Income Averaging Used 
12. Low Income Credit Disallowed 
13. No Other Changes Made to Credits 
Total Tax Model Provisions 
Inter action 
Net Tax Model Effect 
Additional Provisions 
1. Mutual Fund Dividends 
2. Subchapter S 
3. Net Operating Loss 
4. Federal Age Exemption 
Total Additional Provisions 
Interaction 
Net Effect of Full Conformity 
Revenue Effect 
(in millions) 
-$204 
77 
20 
+ 4 
- 582 
- 429 
- 110 
25 
12 
+ 29 
26 
+ • 5 
-$1,451. 5 
+ 92.5 
-$1,359.0 
20 
20 
50 
23 
-$ 113 
3 
-$1,475 
Source: Franchise Tax Board 
10/6/80 
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None of the 6 proposals heard by this committee in 
1979-80 specifically proposed modifying state tax rates 
to offset revenue losses from conformity. Three measures 
were too general in nature to cost out; the other 3 
received cost estimates as shown in Table 14. The Naylor 
or M. Garcia measures stopped short of modifying tax 
credits and the tax rate structure, so the loss was not as 
great as shown previously in Table 13. 
TABLE 14 
Revenue Loss 
(in millions} 
Measure (Version) 1980-81 1981~81 1982~82 1983-84 
(a) 
(b) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(d) 
AB 1445-Naylor 
(3/29/79) 
----------- undetermined -----------------
AB 3209-Naylor $-350 
(4/14/80) 
SB 1931-M. Garcia -350 
(6/25/80) 
AB 3209-Naylor 
(proposed revision) 
$-420 
-420 
-340 
n.a. n a. 
n.a. n.a. 
$ -355 $ -410 
ACA 42-Naylor 
(3/29/79) 
----------- undetermined -------------------
SCA 31-Mills ----------- undetermined -------------------
(1/23/80) 
n.a. Estimate not available 
(a) Piggyback approach--bill never contained a tax 
rate (Appendix K ) 
(b) Identical bills (Appendices M and o ) 
{c) Appendix N 
(d) Authorized conformity generally--no specific 
approach. Cost represents range of impact 
from increased rate to fully offset cost to 
maximum piggyback revenue loss (Appendices J 
and K ) . 
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Constitutional Question 
Aside from the previous issues raised on the merits of 
conformity, there is a procedural question that has lingered 
since 1959. The question is whether automatic conformity 
must be achieved via constitutional amendment, or may be enacted 
by statute alone. The question is yet to be resolved. 
On October 19, 1959, the Office of Legislative Counsel 
issued an opinion to the effect that automatic conformity of the 
California law to future federal law would be an unconstitutional 
delegation of the state's legislative power to Congress. And 
this last September 30, an updated opinion was requested, and the 
conclusion was the same--prospective conformity requires a 
constitutional amendment. (See Appendices F and G , respectively.) 
A countervailing opinion is held by Prof. Gary T. Schwartz 
of the UCLA Law School, who argues in a recent 70 page analysis 
(Appendix H) that there is "very good reason to believe that an 
open-ended conformity statute would be held constitutional by 
the California Supreme Court", based on a review of case law, much 
of it since the 1959 Counsel's opinion. He states that whatever 
doubt still exists, however, would be cured by an appropriate 
amendment to the state constitution. Schwartz and Counsel do 
agree that conformity to federal law at a given point in time 
can be enacted statutorily. 
All of the measures considered by this Committee in the 1979-80 
session were, or were linked to, constitutional amendments. 
Federal Collection Option 
A final issue of conformity to be examined is that of 
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TABLE 15 
Federal-State Collection Act of 1972 
(Internal Revenue Code Sections 6361-6365) 
Required and Permitted Adjustments 
State Tax Based on Percentage of Federal Tax 
Required adjustment: 
1. Subtract tax due to interest on U.S. Government obligations. 
Permitted adjustments: 
1. Add tax due to any interest on state or local obligations which 
~currently subject to the state inco~e tax. 
2. Add tax due to state income tax deductions. 
3. Add tax due to state or local sales tax deductions, if a credit 
~a1lov1ed for such taxes (see below). 
4. Subtract credits for taxes paid to other states. 
5. Subtract credits for state or local sales taxes. 
State Tax Based on Federal Taxable Income 
Required adjustments: 
1. Subtract interest on U.S. Government obligations. 
2. Add state income tax deductions. 
3. Add interest on state or local obligatio~s which currently 
is subject to the state income tax. 
4. Add state or local sales tax deductions, if a credit is allowed 
for such taxes (see below). 
Permitted adjustments: 
1. Add an additional tax on federal tax preference items (items 
subject to the "minimum tax"). 
2. Subtract a credit for taxes paid to other states. 
3. Subtract a credit for state or local sales taxes. 
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federal collection of California's income tax. 
Under Title II of Public Law 92-512, the Federal-State 
Collection Act of 1972 (Internal Revenue Code Sections 6361-6365) ,* 
the federal government will administer and collect a state 1 s income 
tax at no charge, if the state tax laws meet certain requirements 
and if the state so elects. In general, to qualify for federal 
collection a state's income tax must be either (1) based on a 
flat percentage of the federal tax, or (2) based on federal taxable 
income. Under each of these options, there is a limited number 
of required and permitted adjustments. Tablel5 summarizes these 
adjustments. 
The Act can become operative only if at least two states 
residents who in the aggregate filed 5 percent or more of 
federal income tax returns filed during 1972 apply for 
federal collection. As yet,no state has applied for federal 
collection under the Act. 
Based on a 1980 survey by the Assembly Office of Research, 
to which 36 of the 42 income tax states replied, only 6 commented 
that they had "seriously" considered federal collection, and all 
expressed various reservations, along the lines of the issues 
previously discussed in this report. The results of that survey 
are summarized in Table 16 . 
Conclusion 
One cannot easily conclude that increased conformity is not 
a worthy goal. But one can conclude that there are major drawbacks, 
of varying significance, to the three basic approaches to automatic 
* See Append1x P (tan pages) 
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TABLE 16 
State Survey Results 
Federal Collection of State Income Taxes 
Serious Con- Major Concerns With Federal 
zona 
ansas 
California 
aware 
District of Columbia 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
llinois 
iana 
ne 
and 
sachusetts 
i nnesota 
Mississippi 
ana 
Nebraska 
Jersey 
Mexico 
York 
h Carolina 
Dakota 
gon 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Virginia 
sconsin 
Total 
(Percent of Total) 
Respondents 
sideration or 
Discussion 
of Federal 
Collection 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
6 
(17%) 
Loss 
of Tax 
Revenue Policy 
Disruptions Control 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
XI 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
29 
(81%) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
33 
(92%) 
robable constitutional change required. 
nown. 
Tax 
Burden 
Shifts 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
13 
(36%) 
Collection 
Consti-
tutional 
Change 
Required 
X 
X 
X 
xa 
b 
X 
X 
xa 
xa 
xa 
xa 
X 
xa 
X 
X 
X 
X 
xa 
xa 
xa 
X 
X 
X 
xa 
23 
(64%) 
Source: Assemb Office of Research 
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conformity. Whether these drawbacks collectively outweigh the 
advantages of simplicity must be judged by the Legislature. 
Table 17summarizes the rankings of the four conformity 
approaches on the five issues raised--simplicity, state 
sovereignty, tax shifts, revenue instability, and revenue loss. 
The Legislature has the option to adopt any one of the 
automatic conformity approaches, with or without adjustments. 
If adjustments ~made, the Legislature must judge whether the 
hybrid result is more or less complex then our present system. 
If automatic conformity is to be tried, a constitutional 
amendment appears desirable to reduce legal doubt. It would 
appropriate to defer action on federal collection until 
some experience with full automatic conformity is gained. 
The selective/piecemeal conformity system utilized at 
present could be enhanced somewhat in three ways. First, the 
Conformity Task Force could be elevated to formal status by 
Assembly Resolution, and permanent members designated. Membership 
could be expanded to include tax professionals, as well as 
state and legislative staff, but the members should be technicians, 
well versed in tax policy and administration. 
Second, a statute could be enacted requiring introduction 
all federal income tax changes for which there are comparable 
state codes, immediately following their enactment by Congress. 
Such "conformity bills" would be similar to the local government 
claims bills under SB 90. They could be introduced initially 
by the Revenue and Taxation Committee chairmen of both houses. They 
could then be reviewed first by the task force, then the Rev. & Tax 
Committees. Subsequent enactment would be up to the Legislature. 
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I 
This procedure would help reduce "lag time", and in conjunction 
with the Task Force would ensure a forum for each federal law 
change. 
Third, where both state and federal law are comparable, 
regulations of the Franchise Tax Board could be required to be 
comparable to IRS regulations. Although this is generally the 
case, it is not always so. Appendix Q gives an example of 
such regulatory non-conformity, involving employer reporting of 
excess withholding exemptions claimed by employees (buff-colored 
pages). 
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TABLE 17 
COMPARISON OF FOUR CONFORMITY APPROACHES 
e SELECTIVE/PIECEMEAL 
Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity 
Maximizes State Tax Policy 
Control 
Minimizes Tax Shifts 
Minimizes Budget/Revenue 
Instability 
tt AGI CONFORMITY 
Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity 
Maximizes State Tax Policy 
control 
Minimizes Tax Shifts 
Minimizes Budget/Revenue 
Instability 
II TI CONFORMITY 
Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity 
Maximizes State Tax Policy 
control 
Minimizes Tax Shifts 
Minimizes Budget/Revenue 
Instability 
11 PIGGYBACK CONFORMITY 
Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity 
Maximizes State Tax Policy 
control 
Minimizes Tax Shifts 
Minimizes Budget/Revenue 
Instability 
RANKING* 
Low 
*As with preceding Tables 5,6,9 and 11, these rankings 
are quite subjective, and are intended only to convey 
an order of magnitude. 
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APPENDIX A 
Provision I Federal Law State Law 
Gross Income Exclu-~ 
sions and Ad'ustments 
Dividends 
Military Pay 
Government Bond 
Interest Income 
,.!:::>. 
,.!:::>. 
Capital Gains and 
Losses 
Gain on Sale of 
Personal Residence 
Mutual Fund 
Dividends 
Unemployment com-
pensation 
Excludes up to$100 on single 
return and $200 on joint 
return allows certain mutual 
fund d vidends to be treated 
as cap tal gains. 
Has no comparable provisions; 
treats such income as ordinary 
income. 
No general exclusion, but 
special exclusions. 
som~Generally excludes up to 
$1,000 of al~. military compen-
sation; for reservists and 
retirees, exclusion is phased 
out between $15,000 and 
$17,000 AGI. 
Exempts interest on obliga-
tions of any state or local 
government. 
Exempts interest on U.S. 
Government and California 
state and local obligations; 
taxes interest on obligations 
of other states and non-
California local governments. 
Allows deduction of 60 percen1Allows deduction of 50 percent 
of excess net long-term gains of net long-term gains (5 
(1 year or more) over net years or more) and 35 percent 
1short-term gains;capital loss of net medium term gains 
ideductions are limited to (1-5 years) ;capital loss 
j$3,000 in any one year. deductions are limited to 
Provides taxpayers 55 and 
older a once-in-a-l~fet~me 
~000 exclusion of the 
gain on the sale of a per-
sonal residence. 
Allows certain mutual fund 
dividends to be treated as 
capital gains. 
Includes as taxable income up 
to 100 percent of unemploy-
ment compensation received 
by taxpayers with AGI above 
$20,000 ($25,000 on a joint 
return). 
$1,000 in any one year. 
Provides all taxpayers a once 
in-a-lifetriiie $100,000 exclu-
sion of the gain on the sale 
of a personal residence (for 
taxpayers 65 and older, 
this is in lieu of an exclu-
sion of the first $35,000 of 1 
such sale). 
'trreats such dividends as 
ordinary income. 
,Exempts all unemployment 
compensation from taxation. 
Laws 
1979 Returns Affected 
Number I % of Total 
1.5 million 16% 
120,000 1% 
-unknown-
1 million I 10% 
-unkno;m-
1 
-unknown-
! 
300,000 13% 
I 
i 
1981 Revenue 
Effect of Confor-
mity (in millions) 
$-77 
+3.6 
Unknown loss 
-204 
-minor gain 
... 20 
+5 
Federal IRC 
Sections 
116 
112,113,122, 
217,692,3401 (a) 
(1) 
103 
1202, 1211, 
1223 
121 
852 
85 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
California 
R&TC Sections 
17146-17146.8 
17137 
18152, 
18162.5 
17155 
17071 
-
AJnortization of 
Alternative 
Energy Equipment 
Lann Clearing 
Expense Associated 
With Farming 
comparable 
of clearing land may be 
sed in year cost is 
incurred, rather than cap-
italizing cost. 
Allows amorti-
zation of cogeneration or 
alternate en 
and 36 month 
solar or energy conservation 
devices 
No comparable provision unknown, probably 
minor 
-minor cash flow 
loss-
182 
17:208,17208 ' 
11:226 
• 
APPENDIX A (cont.) 3. 
1981 Revenue 
Provision 
1979 Returns Affected Effect of Confer- Federal IRC Californi~ 1 
1 Federal Law ·I State Law I N\llllber % of Total I mity (in millions) ·I Sections ! _R~l'~-~e<;:j:~ 
Deductions From 
Adjusted Gross 
Income 
Personal and Depen-~Allows deduction of $1,000 Allows personal exemption I 9.5 million 
dent Exemptions per family member. credit of $27 ($54 on a joint 
return) and dependent exemp-
tion ~of $9. Indexed. 
Blind Exemption Allows additional $1,000 
exemption for blindness. 
Allows additional $9 credit I 8,000 
for blindness. Index~ 
Old-Age Exemption Allows additional $1,000 
exemption for taxpayers 65 
or older. 
Allows no additional credit 
or exemption for old age. 
700,000 
Standard Deduction !Incorporates "zero bracket" 'Provides a standard deduction I 5.7 million 
in tax rate schedule: $2,300 of $1,100 for single and 
for single1 $3,400 for joint. $2,200 for joint. Indexed. 
Charitable Contri- !Limits most charitable contriiLimits charitable contribu- I 3.5 million 
butions butions to 50 percent of AGI. tions to 20 percent of AGI. 
Political Contribu-,Permits no deduction for 
tions politicar-contributions; 
allows a credit equal to 50 
Allows a deduction for politi-1 160,000 
cal contributions of up to 
~ !percent or-such contributions 
~ up to $50 ($100 on a joint 
return). 
$100 ($200 on a joint return). 
State and Local 
Gasoline Taxes 
Contributions to 
Self-Employed Retir· 
ment Plans ("H.R. 
10" or "Keogh" 
plan) 
No such deduction. Allows a deduction for state 
gasoline taxes. 
Allows self-employed person 'Allows self-employed person t 
- to make deductible contri- make deductible contributions 
butions to a qualified retire-to a qualified retirement plan 
ment plan of at least $750 'of up to the lesser of 10 
(if income exceeds $1,500) up percent of earned income or 
to the lesser of 15 percent $2,500. 
of earned income or $7,500. 
3.7 million 
110,000 
100% 
Under 1/10 
of 1% 
7% 
60% 
37% 
2% 
39% 
1% 
} ,_., 
-23 
-no 
-25 
-12 
+30 
-15 
151-153 17054 
151 
151 
I 
I 63 17171 
170 17214 -
17216.2 
41 I 17234 
17204 
401 17524 
Provision 
Adoption Expenses 
Expense to Repair/ 
Remodel Premises 
for Handicapped 
A • ) 
Federal Law 
No such deduction. 
Allows $25,000 max. deduction 
for repair/remodel costs to 
buildings to permit easier 
access to handicapped or 
elderly. Limited to business 
related expenses; does not 
apply to residences. 
State Income Taxes !Allows deduction for state 
income taxes. 
5~i~~l 
State Law . 
Tax payers adopting a child 
may deduct expenses incurred 
in process of adoption, 
limited to 3% of AGI up to 
$1000. 
Allows $25,000 max. deductio 
for repair/remodel costs to 
building or vehicle to permit 
easier access to handicapped 
or elderly. Applies both to 
individuals and businesses. 
1979 Returns Affected 
Number \ of Tota+ 
4,200 I Under l/20 
of 1% 
-unknown-
Allows no deduction for I 4 million 42% 
California state income taxes; 
allows credit for other 
states•-rncome taxes. 
Personal, Dependent 
and Blind Exemption 
Credits 
(See Deductions fr~m Adjusted Gross Income) 
Earned Income 
Credit 
.t::> 
-1 
Low-Income Credit 
Allows a refundable credit 
equal to 10 percent of earned 
income. Credit may not exceed 
$500, is phased out between 
$6,000 and $10,000 of AGI and 
is available only to joint 
taxpayers, heads-of-household 
and surviving spouses claim-
ing one or more dependent 
exemptions. 
Has no provision allowing a 
credit to all low~income 
taxpayers.----
Has no provision allowing an 
earnea income credit. (See 
Low-Income Credit) 
Allows a nonrefundable credit 
of $44 ($88 o~ joint returns) 
which has the effect of elim-
inating the entire tax lia-
bility for taxpayers below 
$5,000 AGI ($10,000 joint); 
the credit is rapidly phased 
out above $5,000 AGI 
($10,000 joint). 
750,000-
1 million 
730,000 
8-10% 
8% 
4 
1981 
+0. 25 17238 
-582 164 18001,18002 
-180 43 
.+0. 5 17069 
APPENDIX A (cont.) 
1979 Returns Affected 
Provision L_ Feder11l Law State Law Number \ of Total 
Political Contri-
butions Credit 
(See Deductions fromiAdjusted Gross Income) 
Child Care Credit 
Renter's Credit 
Credit for Taxes 
Paid Other States 
Employment Credits 
·""" (X) 
Elderly Credit 
Allows credit equal to 20 
percent of employment-related 
child-care expenses. Maximum 
credit is $800, with no AGI 
limit. 
Has no provisions allowing 
a renters' credit. 
Allows deduction for all 
state and local taxes. 
Allows employers tax credits 
of up to $3,000 per employee 
for wages paid under the Work 
Incentive (WIN) program and 
to certain target groups 
(e.g., handicapped, welfare 
recipients, Vietnam veterans) 
Allows credit of 15 percent 
of a specified income base, 
disregarding community 
property rules. 
Allows tax credit equal to 3 
percent of employ~nt-related 
child-care expenses; credit 
may not exceed $120 and is 
phased out between $15,000 
and $20,000 AGI. 
Allows a refundable credit 
for qualified renters of $60 
($137 on joint returns). 
Allows credit for taxes paid 
other states (see Deductions 
From Adjusted Gross Income). 
90,000 
3. 9 million 
27,000 
1% 
41% 
Under 1% 
Allows employers a tax credit 
of up to $300 per employee 
for wages paid to welfare 
recipients. 
-unknown, probably 
minor-
Allows a 15 percent credit ofi 35,800 
a specified income base. 
Community property rules 
observed. 
Under 4/10 
of 1% 
., 
1981 Revenue 
Effect of Confer- Federal IRC 
mity (in millions) .1 Sections 
$-75 
+420 
-Unknown-
-tens of millions-
-loss of few 
milli?n-
44A 
164 
51-53 
37 
5. 
California 
R&TC Sections· 
17052.6 
17053.5 
18001,18002 
17(}53. 7 
17052.9 
APPENDIX A (cont.) 
Provision 
Solar and Alterna-
tive Energy Credit 
Energy 
Credit 
Irrigation 
Equipment 
t.ion 
[other Pro~S] 
Income Averaging 
.!» 
1.0 
Minimum Tax on 
Preference Income 
Federal Law State Law 
Residential:Credit of 40%, Residential! CreolE of 55\, 
not to exceed $4,000 for sola not to exceed $3,000 for solai 
geothermal and wind systems. and wind systems. Swimming 
Business: 10-15% energy in- pools phased down 10% per 
vestment credit for solar, year to 25% level. Noh-resi-
geothermal,wind,ocean thermal dential: 25% credit with no 
hydro-electric,and biomass, upper limit. Federal credit 
not to exceed $25,000 plus must be subtracted from state 
% of tax liability above. claim. 
Residential: Credit of 15%, 
not to exceed $300 for energy 
conservation expenditures. 
Business: No credit. 
Allows farmers to deduct as 
current year operating 
expenses certain expenditures 
for water conservation equip-
ment. 
Allows income averaging (and 
reduced tax rates) if income 
is at least $3,000 higher 
than 120 percent of base 
period income. 
Provides for a supplementary 
tax of 10 percent to 25 per-
cent of certain tax preferenc 
items (accelerated deprecia-
tion, depletion, excluded 
capital gains, excess itemize 
deductions,etc.); tax applies 
only to total amount of such 
items exceeding higher of 
$10,000 or other specified 
amounts. 
Residential: Credit of 40%, 
not to exceed $1,500 for 
energy conservation expendi-
tures. Non-residential: 25% 
credit with no upper limit. 
Allows a credit of up to $500 
($1,000 on joint returns) for 
cost of irrigation equipment 
which conserves water. 
Allows income averaging (and 
reduced tax rates) if income 
is at least $3,000 higher 
than 133-1/3 percent of base-
period income. 
Provides for a graduated tax 
of 1/2 percent to 5-1/2 per-
cent on tax preference items 
(some differences from 
federal); tax applies only 
to total amount of such item~ 
exceeding net business losses 
plus deduction of $4,000 
($8,000 joint). 
1979 Returns Affected 
Number I \ of Total 
25,000 
240,000 
300 
290,000 
70,000 
3/10 of 
1% 
2.5% 
3% 
1% 
1981 Revenue 
Effect of Confor-
mity (in millions) 
-10 
-25 
.-minor loss-
-26 
.-20 (offset only; 
full conformity 
impact is unknown) 
Federal IRC 
Sections 
44C, 46 
44C 
175 
1301-1305 
56-58 
6. 
California 
R&TC Sections· 
17052.5 
23601 
17052.8 
23601.5 
17052.7 
18241-18246 
17062-
17064.7 
APPENDIX A (cont.) 
Provision I Federal Law ·I State Law 
['!:'ax Rate Schedulesjl 
Zero Bracket Incorporates "zero bracket'' 1Provides no "zero bracket"; 
($2,300 single, $3,400 joint) standard aeduction ($1,100 
in schedule; thus, zero brae- single, $2,200 joint), or 
ket amount is included in tax full amount of itemized deduc-
able income both for taxpayer tions, is subtracted from 
claiming "standard" deduction taxable income before it is 
and taxpayers itemizing applied to schedule 
116Xcess" deductions. 
Range of Marginal 
Tax Rates 
Maximum Tax on 
Earned Income 
·Taxable Income 
Brackets: 
Single 
lJl 
0 
Joint 
Separate 
Imposes minimum marginal rate !Imposes minimum marginal rate 
of 14 percent; maximum rate of l percent; maximum of 11 
of 70 percent. Tax tables percent. Tax tables provided. 
provided. 
Limits tax on "personal ser-
vice income" (primarily wages 
salaries and professional 
fees) to 50 percent, rather 
than maximum federal marginal 
rate of 70 percent. 
Has no provision limiting tax 
on earned income. 
Appli•• minimum r•t• b•low 1Appli•• minimum r•t• bolow 
$3,400, maximum above $108,30 $2,240, maximum above 
sixteen brackets vary in $17,430; eleven brackets 
width from $1,000 to $26,500. vary in width fcom $1,690 to 
$2,240. 
Applies minimum rate below 1Avoids federal "marriage 
$5,500, maximum above $215,40 penalty" by allowing income 
fifteen brackets vary in splitting; i.e, provides 
width from $2,100 to $53,000. brackets for joint which are 
Prevents circumvention of 
"marriage penalty" by requir-
ing separate filers to use 
brackets which are one-half 
the size of those applicable 
to joint returns. 
twice the size of those for 
single. 
Allows separate filers to use 
same rate schedule as single 
taxpayers. 
1981 Revenue 
1979 Returns Affected jr:ffect of Ccmfor-
Nurnber I % of Total mity {in millions) 
9. 5 million 100% 
9. 5 million I 100% 
-unknown, probably 
minot-
1 3.9 million I 41% 
4. 7 million 49% 
150,000 2% 
iJ 
I i 
-Unknown-
Comparison is 
meaningless, 
e.g. state tax 
rates will not 
be increased 
to 70%. 
I 
Federal IRC 
Sections 
63 
1,3 
1348 
1 
1 
1 
7. 
California I f R&TC Sections· 
I 
I 
- l 
17041, 
17048 
17041 
17041 
17041 
APPENDIX A. (cont.) 
Provision 
Head-of-House 
hOJ.u 
Indexing 
U1 
I-' 
Federal Law 
Applies minimum rate below 
$2,300 (same as single), maxi 
mum above $161,3001 fifteen 
brackets vary in width from 
$2,100 to $53,0oo· (same as 
joint). 
Provides no automatic infla-
tionary adJustment of rate 
schedules, exemptions, 
deductions or credits. 
State Law 
Applies m1n1mum rate 
$4,500 maximum above 
!eleven brackets vary 
~idth from $1,690 to 
below 
$20,240; 
in 
$4,500. 
1979 Returns Affected 
Number % of Total 
790,000 8% 
Provides automatic annual I 9. 5 million 100% 
inflationary adjustments. For 
1978 and 1979, rate schedule 
'brackets are increased by per-
,centage change in California 
Consumer Price Index(CCPI) 
above 3 percent. For 1980 and 
1981 brackets are increased by 
full change in CCPI. For 1982 
and thereafter brackets index 
ing goes back to CCPI in 
excess of 3%. For 1978 and 
thereafter, the standard de-
duction and personal dependen~, 
blind, and low-income credits 
are increased by full change 
in CCPI each year-.---
1981 Revenue 
Effect of Confer- Federal IRC 
mity (in millions) I Sections 
1,2 
* I .$+2 I 900 I -
I 
I I I 
I 
*See 
Indexing 
Discussion 
pages 168-
175. 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
8. 
California 
R&TC Sections· 
17041 -
17043 
17041 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX B 
ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 
WHERE CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX LAW DIFFER 
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• 
INTEREST AND DIVIDEND EXCLUSION 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Federal law allows a limited exclusion for interest and 
dividends. California law contains no such sions although some 
interest is exempt from taxation. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Full conformity to the federal provisions would result in a 
revenue loss of $77 million for 1981. 
For tax effect by income class and type of return, see tablel8 
on page 56. 
FEDERAL LAW 
The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-223) 
provided that gross income of an individual does not include divi-
dends from a domestic corporation or interest. The aggregate amount 
which may be excluded for any taxable year may not exceed $200 ($400 
in the case of a married couple filing a joint return~ Formerly 
only $100 ($200 for married) of dividend income was exempt. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
Existing California law taxes dividends and most interest in 
full. 
Interest on the following obligations is exempt from 
California tax: 
1. Bonds and other obligations of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, territories of the United States, and Puerto Rico. 
(Interest on Phillipine Islands' obligations issued on or after 
March 24, 1934, is not exempt.) 
2. Bonds (not including other obligations) of the State of 
California or of political subdivisions thereof, issued after 
November 4, 1902. 
Interest on bonds issued by a territorial government 
(e.g., Alaska or Hawaii) continues to be exempt after the territory 
becomes a state. 
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for Federal Law - The dividend exclusion 
provision was orig~nally enacted ~nto law to somewhat mitigate the 
so-called double taxation of dividends, i.e., first at the corporate 
level as earnings and again at the shareholder level when declared. 
The committee reports on P.L. 96-223 do not reveal the reason for 
addition of the interest exclusion to the law but the reason 
usually given by writers on the subject is to encourage saving. 
2. Rationale for California Law 
rate makes the exclusion of income from 
tive matter than at the federal level. 
conformity would be a costly matter. 
- The smaller state tax 
taxation a much less impera-
In addition, as noted above, 
3. Equity Considerations - An exclusion from gross income 
provides the greatest benefit to taxpayers in the highest income 
bracket. For example, a $400 exclusion saves a taxpayer in the 
11 percent bracket $44, while the same exclusion only means $16 to 
a taxpayer in the 4 percent bracket. 
4. "Small Saver'' Incentive - While this provision has 
been billed as a tax incentive for "small savers," an analysis 
of the impact of the federal provision in Tax Notes (1/7/80) 
concluded just the contrary: 
" ... Currently approximately 95% of interest and 
dividends are earned by taxpayers whose interest 
and dividend income exceed the exclusion's 
dollar limit ... Moreover, because the measure 
is structured as a deduction rather than a 
credit, it provides more incentive for those in 
the upper tax brackets--just those people who 
are already likely to exceed the $200 limit--
and virtually no incentive for the "small savers" 
in the lower brackets." 
5. Other Savings Incentives - A recently enacted federal 
law allows gradual phasing out over the next six years of the 
ceilings on interest rates which banks and savings and loans 
may pay on savings accounts. This may be a more effective 
savings incentive than the interest and dividend exclusion. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
1. AB 181 (Young), 1979 - Would permit, under specified 
conditions, an individual to create a tax-exempt savings account. 
Died in Senate Finance. 
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2. AB 1124 (Bane), 1979 - Provides for a $100 state income 
tax exclusion ($200, for married taxpayers filing jointly) from gross 
income for interest from a savings account. Failed passage in 
Assembly Revenue and Taxation. 
3. AB 2039 (Bane), 1980 - Same as AB 1124. 
4. A.H 20..74 Cb.Bo;own.L, 1980 - Provides for the exclusion of 
up to $201 received by a single taxpayer C$400 for :rn.a.rried persons 
filing jointly, heads of households and surviving spouses} earned 
as interest from savings accounts or time deposits. Failed passage 
in Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee. 
5. AB 2542 (Robinson), 1980 - Same as AB 2074. Failed 
passage in Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee. 
6. SB 1399 (Keene), 1980 - Same as AB 2074. Died in 
Assembly Ways and Means Committee. 
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AGI Class 
At Least 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
FTB/R&S 
But Less 
Than 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
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TABLE 18 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Dividend and Interest Exclusion 
Tax Decrease 
No. of Returns Amount of Tax Decrease 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
4,488 
349,435 
601,405 
341,438 
105 '727 
37,050 
40,315 
11,459 
1,491,317 
$6,377 
1,526,439 
5 '138,511 
4,926,660 
1,962,068 
739,372 
843,809 
244,607 
$15,387,843 
Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse 
2, 716 
5,259 
496,078 
829,010 
757,901 
443,309 
441,814 
107,542 
3,083,631 
$6,141 
12,944 
4,122,366 
9,951,194 
13,521,878 
11,246,201 
15,836,158 
4,535,541 
$59,232,423 
Unmarried Head of Household 
236 
236 
106,200 
64,504 
25,557 
8,927 
8,238 
2,522 
216,421 
7,440 
354,931 
1,203,683 
1,234,953 
889,185 
489,286 
490,367 
121,526 
4,791,368 
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All Taxpayers 
$236 
236 
577,220 
683,932 
409,565 
173,216 
165,690 
54,230 
$2,064,325 
$12,755 
$1,539,619 
9,838,097 
15,561,786 
15,893,511 
12,158,789 
16,845,657 
4,834,378 
$76,684,591 
• 
MILITARY PAY EXCLUSION 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
State law excludes from taxable income up to $1,000 of 
military active duty pay and retirement compensation. 
Federal law provides no comparable general exclusion, 
but does allow various specific military income exclusions 
(e.g., combat-related pay and mustering-out payments), to 
which California substantially conforms. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Repeal of California's general military pay exclusion 
would increase state revenues by an estimated $3.6 million for 
the 1981 tax year. 
For tax impact by income class and type of return, see 
table on page60. As shown in this table, elimination of the 
military pay exclusion would increase state income taxes for 
about 100,000 recipients of military income. The average 
increase for these taxpayers would be approximately $35 per 
year. 
FEDERAL LAW 
Federal law exempts from taxation mustering out pay, 
pay for duty in specified combat zones, pay received while 
hospitalized as a result of combat duty, terminal leave pay 
and specified G.I. educational benefits. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
California substantially conforms to the specific 
federal military income exclusions listed above. In addition, 
the state provides a general military pay exclusion of up to 
$1,000, as follows: 
1) Military personnel on extended active duty (90 days 
or more) may exclude a maximum of $1,000 in salary, wages, 
bonuses, allowances and other compensation. This $1,000 
maximum exclusion is available to all enlisted personnel, 
regardless of the level of their total income. 
2) Military retirees and reservists are also entitled 
to exclude compensation of up to $1,000, but this maximum 
exclusion is reduced by 50 cents for each dollar of total 
adjusted gross income in excess of $15,000. The effect of 
this phase-out formula is to eliminate the exclusion entirely 
for retirees and reservists whose total incomes exceed 
$17,000. 
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POLICY 
enacted in 1952, the maxi-
applied only to personnel on 
the exclusion was broadened to 
ect to income-related 
it is assumed that active 
, do not have sub-
~-r-e_s_o~u-r~c~es than Californians 
tenets of tax ity offer no obvious 
exclusion of regular military 
so is not clear that the 
to further broad social or economic 
state and federal exemptions allowed 
of military income (e.g., for combat-
other hand, are assumed to reflect 
ive concern for the unusual 
military personnel. 
Repeal of the military 
e in substantial tax 
As indicated above, the 
increase would be about $35. Based on the 
inal tax rate of 11 percent, the largest 
would $ 0 per year. Because the $1,000 
not been revised since the exclusion was 
in 1952, its "real" value (in terms of the 
prov by the dollar tax savings to 
fallen dramatically over the years. Based on 
inflationary price changes over the past 28 
years, current $1,000 ceiling would have to be raised to 
over $3,000 to restore its original value. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
1. 
exclus 
compensation 
reservists. 
Replaced the flat $1,000 
percent exclusion of all military 
removed income restrictions for retirees and 
in Assern. Rev. and Tax. 
1 
2. SB 1393 (Robbins), 1980. 
it to $5,000 for retirees only. 
Increased the exclusion 
Failed in Sen. Rev. and 
Tax. 
3. SB 171 (Campbell), 1979. Removed the $1,000 
exclusion limit and all income restrictions for retirees and 
reservists. Failed in Sen. Rev. and Tax. 
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4. AB 2852 (Kapiloff), 1978. Increased the exclusion 
limit to $5,000 for retirees and reservists only. From 
Assem. Ways and Means without further consideration. 
5. AB 2937 (Lewis}, 1978. With respect to retirees 
only: increased the exclusion limit to $9,000, raised the AGI 
phase-out limit to $25,000, restricted the exclusion to those 
age 60 and over, and eliminated the AGI limit entirely for 
those age 62 and over. From Assern. Rev. and Tax. without 
further consideration. 
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AGI Class 
But Less 
At Least Than 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
FTB/R&S 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
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TABLE 19 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Military Exclusion 
Tax Increase 
No. of Returns Amount of Tax Increase 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
60 
835 
22,144 
11,451 
3,281 
29 
29 
0 
0 
37,769 
$14,100 
629,149 
602,895 
191,209 
3,238 
147 
0 
0 
$1,440,738 
Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse 
236 
565 
37,126 
18,503 
5,612 
1, 972 
988 
37 
65,038 
$1,299 
4,467 
981,402 
649,063 
279,952 
136,503 
92,351 
2,711 
$2,147,750 
Unmarried Head of Household 
0 
417 
775 
59 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1,251 
1,071 
23,126 
49,352 
21,843 
5,641 
2,001 
988 
37 
104,059 
All Taxpayers 
$0 
8,188 
25,349 
3,503 
0 
0 
0 
0 
$37,040 
$15,399 
641,804 
1,609,646 
843,775 
283,190 
136,650 
92' 351 
2,711 
$3,625,528 
• 
GOVERNMENT BOND INTEREST INCOME 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Except for the exemption for interest on California 
State and local government bonds, California law and federal 
law are basically incompatible with respect to interest 
income from government bonds. The major differences between 
the two laws are as follows: 
1. The federal government exempts .interest income 
from bonds issued by all states and their political subdivi-
sions. In California~he income from bonds issued by other 
states (other than California) and their political subdivisions 
is taxable. (Interest on bonds issued by District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico and U.S. territories is tax exempt at both state 
and federal level.) 
2. Interest on "arbitrage bonds" issued after 
October 9, 1969, is taxable by the federal government. In-
terest on any "arbitrage bonds" issued by California or any 
political subdivision thereof would be exempt under California 
law. 
3. Interest on U.S. government bonds is taxed by the 
federal government. Such interest is exempt from the 
California income tax. The u.s. Constitution prevents states 
from taxing federal debt. 
FISCAL IMPACT OF PARTIAL* CONFORMITY 
The Franchise Tax Board states that the revenue 
effect is "unknown". 
*See Policy Issues Comment #1 
FEDERAL LAW 
Interest on u.s. government bonds is taxable by the 
federal government. 
Interest on state and local government obligations is 
exempt from federal taxation, except that "arbitrage bonds" 
issued after October 9, 1969 are subject to tax and indus-
trial revenue bonds over $10 million (and over $1 million 
in certain situations) issued after April 30, 1968, are 
subject to tax. (An "arbitrage bond" is an obligation 
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issued by a state or local government for the purpose of 
investing the proceeds therefrom in high-yielding securities 
or obligations generating taxable interest.) 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
California law exempts interest on: 
a. U.S. Government Bonds (Federal National 
Mortgage Association obligations taxable). 
b. Bonds of U.S. territories, Puerto Rico and 
District of Columbia. 
c. State of California state or local government 
bonds. 
Interest on other government bonds is taxable. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Full conformity is not possible, as states are 
prohibited by the u.s. Constitut1on from taxing U.S. govern-
ment obligations. 
2. Out-of-State Benefit. With respect to state and 
local obligat1ons, the question is whether California should 
give a tax incentive for investing in bonds of other states 
other than California. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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CAPITAL GAINS 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
"Capital gains" refers to the preferential income tax 
treatment of net gains from the sale or exchange of most pro-
perty. The preferential treatment is twofold: (1) less than 
100 percent of the gain is taxable as ordinary income, if 
that asset was held one year or more, and (2} capital gains 
are taxed only when realized, not as they accrue, as is the 
case with ordinary income. 
There are numerous major differences between California 
and federal law relative to capital gains treatment, which are 
highlighted in Table 20 below: 
Provision 
(a) Categories 
of Gains 
(t) Percent of 
Gain 
Taxable 
as Income 
TABLE 20 
California Law 
Three: short-, medium-
and long-term. 
Asset held less than 
1 year: 100%. 
Asset held l-5 years: 
65%. 
Asset held over 
5 years: 50%. 
(c) Loss Takes into income 
Offset initially only the 
Procedures percentages of gain 
or loss shown in 
(b) above. 
Losses are deductible 
only to extent of aggre-
gate gains after apply-
ing above percentages 
plus up to $1,000 of 
ordinary income. Unused 
net capital losses may 
be carried forward 
indefinitely. 
Any net capital loss 
has already been re-
duced by above percent-
ages, and can be used 
to offset ordinary 
income dollar for 
dollar, up to the 
$1,000 limit. 
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Federal Law 
Two: short- and long-
term. 
Asset held less than 
l year: 100%. 
Asset held l year or 
more: 40%. 
Takes into income the full 
amount of all gains or 
losses, and then allows a 
deduction for 60% of the 
excess of net long-term 
gain over net short-term 
loss. 
All short- and long-term 
gains and losses are grouped, 
and losses are deductible 
only to extent of aggre-
gate gains pl~s up to 
$3,000 of ord~na~J income. 
Unused net capital losses 
may be carried forward 
indefinitely. 
However, only 50% of long-
term losses can be offset 
against ordinary income. 
Thus, to take advantage 
of full deduction, tax-
payer must have a long-
term loss of twice that 
amount. 
In addition, there are other differences, in greater 
or lesser degree, in the areas of (a) sale or exchange of 
patents, (b) sale of stock of foreign investment companies, 
(c) recapture excess depreciation, (d) coal and domestic 
iron ore royalties, (e) redeemable ground rents, and (f) ad-
justed basis. 
FISCAL EFFECTS OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Full conformity to the federal provisions would 
result a revenue loss of $204 million for 1981. 
For tax effect by income class and type of return, 
see Table 22 on page 69. 
FEDERAL LAW 
The Revenue Act of 1978 increased the federal capital 
gains exclusion from 50 percent to 60 percent, for long-term 
gains, which were re-defined to be assets held one year or 
more, rather than 6 months or more. (The move to a one-year 
cut-off was in conformity with California law.) A former 
"alternative capital gains tax" was repealed in the same act, 
and the loss offset limit against ordinary income was in-
creased from $1,000 to $3,000. A special study was provided 
for to determine the effectiveness of liberalizing the capital 
gains law. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
Up until 1971, California conformed to the federal 
law in effect at that time relative to holding periods and 
percent taxable as gain. In that year, California was facing 
a severe revenue shortage, and in special session the Legisla-
ture enacted Assemblyman Bill Bagley's so-called "mini-tax" 
plan, which in fact made substantial changes in the state 
tax structure. One of these was to create a medium term gain, 
thus resulting in the present three-tier structure which 
varies considerably from federal law. 
The percentage of gain taxable as ordinary income has 
varied over the years, as follows: 
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POLICY ISSUES 
that 
in 
On 
to 
3. 
favoring 
economy. 
state 
b 
c. 
.,-.,,-......-~ 
conformity 
simplified compliance 
, as the current differences 
deral law are significant. 
tax systems would be far ~ 
1 capital gains were treated 
if adminis simplicity 
concern.) 
income taxes on the 
assets, there the 
potentially increased, 
spur the California 
pre rential capital 
d on equity concerns, 
realized gain was due 
further reducing taxes, these 
are thus more fully addressed 
There is little doubt 
income will be conven-
eliminate numerous disparities 
of basis and exclusion. 
Tax Board 11 to adjust 
that any state administra-
conformity. (About 1 million 
, or 10.6 of total returns.) 
The second argument 
the California 
ted below, the incentive effect 
atment is very questionable. 
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a. Present Incentives Substantial. Total federal 
revenue effect of capital gains is estimated 
to be $22.3 billion in 1980-81, and California's 
present exclusion entails a $380 mi loss. 
Against this current magnitude of tive, 
how much additional investment would be encouraged 
by the $204 million additional state cost of 
conformity? 
b. Federal System Dominant. Since Cali a's 
tax 1s much lower than the federal tax, 
practically all business decisions which might 
be affected by capital gains treatment would 
presumably be resolved with the federal pro-
vision in mind. Any additional impact of the 
California provision, especially after inter-
action with the federal law, would only rarely 
be a deciding issue. 
c. Windfall Effect. Conformity would reduce 
California capital gains tax burdens, but it 
is questionable whether this tax reduction pro-
vides only a windfall to taxpayers for doing 
what they planned to do all along anyway, or 
whether it will be the motivating force to 
attract an investment that would not otherwise 
have been made. Would the state be "getting" 
anything for its money? 
d. Revenue Exported. Whether or not the state 
cap1tal ga1ns treatment proves to be an in-
centive, 14-70 percent of the tax savings to 
California residents are already taxed away in 
higher federal income taxes--depending on the 
taxpayer's marginal federal tax rate--due to a 
reduction in the federal itemized deduction 
for state income taxes paid. This will also 
apply with the increased tax savings under 
conformity. 
This effect appears to work counter to the 
idea of improving the California economy, for 
by this "reverse revenue sharing", California 
would be exporting dollars out of the state 
and into the federal treasury. 
e. Out-of-State Benefits. Some portion of any 
increased capital formation may accrue to 
business activity located outside California. 
Current state capital gains treatment favors 
California residents, whether or not the assets 
in which they have invested are in California. 
Reducing state taxes simply exacerbates this 
effect. 
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f. Investment Influences Vary. Capital gains treat-
ment is not the only motivating factor in a 
person's investment decisions--it is but one 
of many factors. Of far greater import in 
recent months have been interest rate levels 
and availability of financing. Countervail-
ing market forces spurred by federal monetary 
policy might completely offset the independ-
ent effect, if any, of the relatively modest 
cut in effective state tax rate brought about 
by conformity. 
Further, not all investments are in equal need 
of additional incentives. For example, invest-
ment in small, new high-technology firms is 
generally riskier than sale of single-family 
dwellings. And if the latter involves specula-
tive activity, the former may also be more 
"socially productive". 
g. Impact on Capital Mobility. One of the economic 
arguments in favor of existing capital gains 
is to encourage mobility of capital by reducing 
the tax consequences upon realization (sale of 
the asset). However, in inflationary times, 
the longer an asset is held, the higher the 
gain to the taxpayer. Thus, the incentive is 
still to hold appreciated assets, not realize 
them, even under conformity. 
4. Equity Issues. The third argument for capital 
gains--equity--applies both to current law and conformity. 
The two most frequent concerns are that a large part of the 
gain is due to inflation, and that the gain is taxed in a 
single year although it may have accrued over several years. 
a. Inflation of course effects all taxpayers; 
not just those with capital gains. In response 
to this concern, the Legislature enacted 
indexing in 1978, the first state in the 
nation to do so. Indexing is not in conformity 
with federal law. 
b. Gains taxed in a single year will be subject 
to a higher effective rate than if taxed on 
accrual (i.e., as gains are earned), but 
with or without the capital gains exclusion, 
the income averaging provisions are applicable, 
and help spread the tax effect over several 
years. 
5. Higher Income Taxpayers Benefit. Regardless of 
the potential adrninistrative,investroBnt or equity advantages 
of conformity, it is clear that capital gains conformity 
yields the largest tax benefit to higher income individuals. 
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As Table 22 shows, 75 percent of the net tax relief 
accrues to persons with an AGI of $50,000 or over; this 
group of 323,000 taxpayers will realize a net benefit of 
$152.4 million. The 90,000 taxpayers with over $100,000 AGI 
will realize an average savings of $1,000 apiece. 
6. Alternatives to Conformity. There are a number of 
possible alternatives to total federal conformity, which are 
responsive to some of the above points. 
a. Conform, but limit provisions to California 
investments only (to encourage in-State invest-
ments). 
b. Conform, but limit provisions to a specified 
list of "priority" investment activity, 
e.g., in designated "risk capital" ventures 
(to encourage "socially productive" invest-
ments). 
c. Conform to loss limitation only (to encourage 
risk-taking). 
d. Conform to loss offset procedures and limit 
only (to address most complicated differences). 
e. Full or partial conformity, with concurrent 
beefing up of preference tax on excess 
capital gains (to give increased net benefit 
to low and moderate income taxpayers, but 
minimize increased benefit to taxpayers with 
large gains, who generally are high-income 
taxpayers) . 
f. Some combination of the above. 
g. Defer any action pending results of federal 
study on the liberalized federal treatment, 
which is due in September, 1981. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
1. AB 1445 (Naylor), 1979. Proposed full conformity. 
Held in Assembly Rev & Tax. 
2. AB 2371 (Naylor), 1980. Proposed conformity to 
exclusion level only for residential real estate, new firms, 
new stock issues . Failed passage in Assembly Rev & Tax. 
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• 
AGI Class 
At But Less 
Than 
$5,000 
,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
$5,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
$5,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Totals 
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TABLE 22 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Capital Gains 
Tax Decrease Tax Increase 
No. of Amount of No. of Amount of 
Returns Change Returns Change 
946 
24,517 
62,560 
58,167 
33,503 
14,384 
23,320 
8,839 
226,235 
709 
1,362 
62,330 
101,281 
114,672 
106,343 
184,540 
75,256 
646,493 
0 
0 
7,924 
8,331 
9,187 
1,582 
4,677 
1,790 
33 '491 
1,654 
25,879 
132,814 
167,780 
157,362 
122,309 
212,537 
85,884 
906,219 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
$4,491 
492' 869 
3,236,253 
6,805,331 
6,580,795 
3,831,122 
8,836,341 
10,332,484 
$40,119,686 
634 
2, 924 
5,907 
5,785 
2,433 
1,427 
1,309 
343 
20,763 
$351,931 
21,040 
659,250 
246,204 
151,061 
355,691 
530,173 
100,547 
$2,415,898 
Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse 
$2,834 
10,967 
1,645,967 
5,297,008 
10,086,168 
15,386,560 
55,262,857 
79,866,334 
$167,558,695 
1,816 
370 
9,340 
9,918 
12,000 
10,911 
16,570 
4,227 
65,152 
$940,201 
55,941 
87,825 
1,198,428 
719,758 
490,635 
2,816,979 
2,037,268 
$8,347,033 
Unmarried Head of Household 
$0 
0 
310,222 
860,740 
2,017,714 
318,992 
1,527,781 
2,382,283 
$7,417,732 
$7,325 
503,837 
5,192,442 
12,963,079 
18,684,676 
19,536,675 
65,626,978 
92,581,101 
$215,096,114 
69 
1 
0 
534 
476 
329 
118 
1,116 
110 
2,684 
All Taxpayers 
2,451 
3,294 
15,782 
16,179 
14,761 
12,456 
18,995 
4,680 
88,599 
$10,318 
0 
1,629 
47,232 
12,707 
7,271 
263,242 
29,453 
$371,852 
$1,302,449 
76,981 
748,703 
1,491,865 
883,526 
853,597 
3,610,394 
2,167,269 
$11,134,784 
Net Amount 
7,440 
-4 71,829 
-2,577 '003 
-6,559,127 
-6,429,733 
-3,475,432 
-8,306,168 
$937,366 
44,97 
-1,558,143 
-4,098,580 
-9,366,410 
-14,895, 
-52,445,87 
-77 066 
$1,295,124 
-426,856 
-4,443,740 
-11' 4 71 '214 
-17,801,150 
-18,683,078 
-62,016,584 
-90,413,832 
-$203,961,330 
SALE OF A RESIDENCE 
CAPITAL GAINS 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Both state and federal law provide a once-in-a-lifetime 
exclusion of capital gains on the sale of a principal resi-
dence. 
The only difference is that federal law applies only to 
taxpayers 55 years of age or older, while the California 
exclusion has no age limitation. 
FISCAL EFFECTS OF FULL CONFORMITY 
The Franchise Tax Board estimates an unknown but 
minor revenue gain under full conformity. 
FEDERAL LAvl 
In 1978, Congress enacted a one-in-a-lifetime elective 
exclusion of $100,000 for taxpayers 55 years of age or older; 
home must have been principal residence for 3 of past 5 years. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
The only difference here is the age limitation. Cali-
fornia first enacted a $100,000 exclusion in 1978 (AB 3802, 
Kapiloff) with no age limit, while the feds followed suit 
later in the year with the same level exclusion, but with a 
55 year or older limitation and different eligibility criteria. 
In 1979, California revised its exclusion to conform to the 
federal eligibility criteria, but chose to keep its no-age 
limit. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Imposition of Age Limit. Conformity will mean 
loss of this benefit to taxpayers under age 55 who may wish 
to avail themselves of it. The state would save a minor 
amount of revenue, which was the principal reason for the 
feds adopting their 55 age limit in the first place. 
If the use of this exclusion is one time only, 
is it appropriate to impose an age limitation? Why age 55? 
Most existing California senior relief programs start at age 
62 or 65, in any event. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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TAXATION OF MUTUAL FUND DIVIDENDS 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 
The typical "regulated investment company" is the 
mutual fund that makes diversified investments for its share-
holders. 
Federal law allows certain mutual fund dividends to be 
treated as capital gains, while California does not offer such 
treatment. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
The Franchise Tax Board estimates a revenue loss 
of $20 million under full conformity. 
FEDERAL LAW 
If a regulated investment company distributes currently 
at least 90% of its dividend and interest income (exclusive 
of capital gain dividend distributions) and meets certain 
other conditions {e.g. company must invest at least 50% of 
its assets in cash and cash items and in issuers in which 
it holds not more than 10% of the voting securities), it is 
not taxed on amounts distributed to shareholders. 
The company must notify its shareholders as to what 
portion of the distributions made represents capital gain 
dividends, what portion represents ordinary income dividends, 
and what portion represents other income. The shareholder is 
then taxable on the distribut1ons. Thus, the shareholder may 
avail himself of (1) the long-term capital gain rate on his 
portion of the distributions representing capital gains and 
(2) the dividend exclusion. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
State law recognizes all such mutual fund dividends 
as ordinary income. 
California has not conformed in the past both because 
of revenue concerns and because in substance these proceeds 
are dividends, and dividends are treated as ordinary income. 
State law attributes the capital gains to the company, not 
the individual. 
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for Federal Law: The rationale for 
federal law was basically promotion of the mutual fund in-
dustry. Federal law treats the capital gains as being those 
of the individual, rather than of the regulated investment 
company. This pass-through treatment is the same as Sub-
chapterS (to which California also does not conform). 
2. Benefits Trade-off. Conformity would, on the 
one hand, ease taxpayer compliance and provide tax savings. 
On the other hand, it would appear that the bulk 
of mutual fund investments are outside California. To what 
purpose is a state subsidy to California residents who 
invest out-of-state? Also, assuming levels of benefit 
comparable to that of capital gains generally, the bulk 
of relief would be granted to higher-income individuals. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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TAXATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Under federal law a portion of unemployment compensation 
received is includible in gross income. California has no such 
provision. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
The revenue gain associated with full conformity would 
be in the range of $5 million. 
FEDERAL LAW 
In 1978 federal law was amended to provide for the in-
clusion in gross income of a certain portion of the unemploy-
ment compensation received by a taxpayer pursuant to federal 
or state law. 
Under this provision if the sum of the adjusted gross 
income of the taxpayer and the unemployment compensation re-
ceived exceeds the base amount (defined) , then gross income 
for the taxable year includes the lesser of one-half of the 
amount of the excess of such sum over the base amount, or the 
amount of the unemployment compensation. 
The "base amount" is defined as (1) $25,000 in the case 
of a joint return, (2) zero in the case of a married taxpayer 
who does not file a joint return for the year, and (3) $20,000 
in all other cases. 
Prior to 1978 unemployment compensation was considered 
exempt from tax under a series of IRS rulings. The IRS took 
the position that funds expended in the public welfare should 
not be taxed. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
There is no equivalent California law. 
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for Federal Law. Congress took the position 
that unemployment compensation represents substitute wages and 
would be taxable if earned. Theoretically, all income should 
be taxed, to treat persons with equal resources, but from differ-
ent sources, equally. Further, such compensation from private 
plans is taxable. Congress apparently reasoned that total 
exclusion also operated as a work disincentive. 
2. Inaccurate Rationale? At a time of high inflation 
and unemployment, there appears to be little validity to a 
theory that full exemption of unemployment compensation serve 
as a "work disincentive". 
3. Equity. For some, unemployment compensation is 
not analogous to wages. For them it is more like public 
assistance. 
4. Administration. The federal law involves a compli-
cated computation. Conformity would tend to result in addi-
tional administrative burdens and costs and complicate return 
preparation for taxpayers. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
AB 93 (W. Brown), 1979. Orginally provided for the 
inclusion of certaln unemployment compensation in gross income 
as follows: 
1. One-half of the amount of the excess of the sum of 
the recipient's unemployment benefit payments and adjusted 
gross income above $25,000 joint or $20,000 for all others, 
or 
2. The amount of the unemployment benefits received. 
However, this provision was amended out of the bill 
before enactment. 
AB 671 (Fazio), 1977. Included UI and Social Security 
benefits in income for computing gross income for persons with 
$30,000 AGI or more. Interim study • 
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CARRYOVER/CARRYBACK OF NET OPERATING LOSSES 
DI BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
law lows taxpayers a deduction for 
net incurred in the conduct of a business 
deduction exceeds the taxpayer's tax 
ility for the year in which the loss was incurred, it 
may be carried back to the three preceeding tax years and 
carried forward to the succeeding seven tax years in order 
to offset taxable income. 
C 1 does not allow net operating loss 
carrybacks or carryovers under either the Personal Income 
Tax law or Bank and Corporation Tax law. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
If only individuals (proprietorships and partner-
ships) were allowed to carry back and/or carry forward busi-
ness net operating losses for state income tax deduction 
purposes, it is estimated the "accrued" revenue loss would 
be approximately $50 million annually. Because it is 
assumed that taxpayers would not be allowed to carry forward 
any losses incurred prior to the effective date of the 
change (i.e., conformity would be prospective only), the 
full "cash" impact of conforming to federal net operating 
loss provisions would not occur for several years. 
For annual tax effect on individuals by income class, 
see table on page 79. 
FEDERAL LAW 
Under current federal law, net operating losses may 
be carried back three years and carried forward seven years 
from the year in which the loss occurred. In effect, this 
provides an eleven year income averaging period (3 prior 
years + loss year + 7 succeeding years) for purposes of com-
puting federal income taxes. A net operating loss 
is the excess of allowable deductions over gross income, 
with certain adjustments. These adjustments limit some of 
the types of deductions that may be included in determining 
the net loss and require special treatment of capital gains 
and losses. 
A taxpayer's net operating loss deduction must first 
be carried back to the third tax year preceeding the year in 
which the loss was sustained. Any amount of the loss not 
used to offset taxable income for the third preceeding year 
is carried to the second preceeding year. Any amount of the 
loss that still remains unused is then applied to the first 
preceedi year. If the loss is not entirely used to offset 
7S 
taxable income 
may be carried 
order of their 
that federal 
carryback 
taxes 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
in the three preceeding years, the balance 
forward to the seven succeeding tax years in 
occurrence. It should be noted, however, 
lows a taxpayer to elect to forego any 
to carry the entire loss forward to offset 
s 
Losses incurred in the operation of a trade or busi-
ness are deductible under California law only in the year in 
which the losses are incurred. There are no provisions 
allowing taxpayers to carryback or carryforward such losses 
to other tax years. 
POLICY ISSUES OF FULL CONFORMITY 
1. Background. The federal operating loss carryback 
and carryforward provisions, which were first enacted in 
1918, initially permitted net business losses sustained in 
one year to be claimed as a deduction against income of the 
prior taxable year and then against the income of the suc-
ceeding year. A 1918 report of the u.s. Senate Finance 
Committee indicated that a system of taxation based upon the 
annual accounting concept had as its chief merit simplicity 
of administration, but " ••• it does not adequately recognize 
the exigencies of business, and under our present high rates 
of taxation, may often result in grave injustice." Since 
that first effort at dealing with the question of the 
appropriate way to handle operating losses, the Internal 
Revenue Code sections relating to this subject have been 
amended no less than 17 times. 
2. Rationale. One observer of this area of tax law 
has listed four main Congressional objectives in enacting 
loss carryback and carryover provisions: 
a) To preclude the imposition of what is tan-
tamount to an income tax on capital rather than 
income. (By taxing only in profitable years and 
denying carryovers and carrybacks, the average effec-
tive rate of tax on the income of capital over a 
large number years would clearly exceed the nominal 
rate and would reduce the rate of return on capital 
below what might be considered the fair market rate 
of return. ) 
b) To reinforce tax neutrality by permitting 
businesses with wide cyclical swings to level their 
incomes, thereby facilitating competititon for 
investment capital with others whose earning levels 
are more stable. 
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3. Advanta~e~ and Disadvantages. The loss carryback 
and carryover prov1s1ons have certain distinct advantages: 
a results in an immediate infu-
to a iness with losses which 
firm. From a macro-
e , it also a valuable 
way to counter economic aid to 
indus In times recession, when business 
losses are high, the refunds made possible by the 
carryback provide useful economic stimulus to busi-
ness. 
b) From point view of business, the 
carryback the ue of providing certain relief, 
while the carryover speculative to the extent its 
value profit projections. Past 
tax payments are certain and the value of refunds can 
be calcu d t by the taxpayer. 
c) The carryover of particular value to new 
businesses that have large start up losses, little or 
no prev tax liability, the potential for 
large future profits. 
d) Another advantage of the carryover prov1s1ons 
is that they provide an incentive for businesses to 
operate in an efficient manner so as to generate 
future profits and tax liabilities which may be 
reduced by the loss carryover. 
There are also significant disadvantages to the use 
of carryback and carryover provisions: 
a) The carryback can lead to very cumbersome 
administrative problems, particular as the length 
of the carryback period increased. The record-
keeping requirements and need to be constantly 
recalculating prior-year tax returns can lead to 
administrative nightmares for both the taxpayer and 
the administering agency. 
b) A chief disadvantage of the carryover is the 
potential that exists for a market which trades in 
"tax loss" corporat to develop. Corporations 
with tantial carryovers can be attractive 
acquisit itable corporations because of 
7 
the 
that 
tions 
for lowering the taxes of the firm 
tax loss. Federal law and IRS regula-
attempt to limit this trafficking in tax loss 
but effort in this area can be 
t Firms that otherwise might go out 
inefficiency or changing 
market conditions are acquired solely as a means to 
reduce taxes of a profitable business. 
c) Fi ly, a serious problem with both carry-
backs and carryovers is the uncertainty that such 
prov add to the operation of fiscal policy by 
the federal government. Particularly as the period 
over wh losses may be averaged is increased, the 
ability to accurately predict tax revenues is greatly 
reduced. 
4. Lower State Tax Rates. Given the lower 
California marginal income tax rates, is there as great a 
need for the "income averaging" aspect of carryback/ 
carryover provisions as there is in federal law? 
5. Revenue Estimating Problems. Given the degree of 
unpredictability that carryback/carryover provisions add to 
the already uncertain world of revenue estimating, does the 
state place itself in greater danger of violating the 
constitutional requirement for a balanced budget as a result 
of enacting such provisions? 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
1. AB 2012 (Naylor), 1980. Allowed net operating 
losses to be carried forward (but not back) and deducted up 
to specified dollar limits. Effective only if specified 
levels of Bank and Corporation tax revenues realized. 
Vetoed by Governor. 
2. AB 2500 (Cline), 1980. Conformed to federal 
carryforward provisions only. Held in Assembly Revenue and 
Taxation Committee. 
3. AB 3066 (Lehman), 1980. Same as AB 2500. Held 
in Assembly Revenue and Taxat1on Committee. 
4. AB 1479 (Naylor), 1979. Conformed to federal 
carry forward and carry back provisions. Died in committee. 
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TABLE 23 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Allow Net Operating Loss Carryover 
Adjusted Gross Income Class 
Under $10,000 
$10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Total 
Tax Decrease 
(000,000) 
$4.5 
3.5 
4.0 
8.5 
13.5 
16.0 
$50.0 
This table was derived from data published in the U.S. 
Statistics of Income - Individual Income Tax Returns. 
The tax decrease shown is on an "accrual" concept. It 
would take several years for the tax decrease shown to 
be effective on a cash basis. This lag occurs because 
conformity would be prospective as it is assumed that 
losses in years prior to enactment of a conformity 
provision would not be allowed carryover status. 
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INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
ides a tax credit equal to 10 per-
cent of the cost of new equipment used for business purposes. 
This credit is designed to stimulate business investment in 
capital equipment by lowering the effective after-tax cost of 
business equipment. 
State law does not provide for any such credit. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Conformity to the federal investment tax credit provi-
sions could reduce annual state revenues by as much as $1.5 
billion. 
FEDERAL LAW 
A credit against the federal income tax is allowed for 
10 percent of the cost of qualified investments acquired and 
placed in service or constructed during the tax year. 
Qualified Investments. A qualified investment is 
generally an expenditure for new machinery ~r equipment used 
in a business enterprise. In most cases, land, buildings, and 
components of buildings are not eligible for the credit. 
Investment goods produced in-a-foreign country and up to 
$100,000 per year of used equipment expenditures also are 
generally eligible for the investment tax credit. 
Useful Life. In order to qualify for the full 10 per-
cent investment tax credit, the investment goods must have a 
useful life of seven years or more. For equipment with a use-
ful life of between five and seven years, a taxpayer may claim 
only 2/3 of the full 10 percent credit. For equipment with a 
useful life of between three and five years, the taxpayer may 
claim only 1/3 of the full 10 percent credit. Equipment with 
a useful life of less than three years is not eligible for the 
investment tax credit. ---
Limitations. The amount of the investment tax credit 
may not exceed the lesser of (1) the taxpayer's tax liability 
or (2) $25,000 plus a specified percentage of the tax liabil-
ity above $25,000. This percentage is 70 percent in 1980 and 
is scheduled to increase to 80 percent in 1981 and 90 percent 
in 1982 and subsequent years. Any part of the investment cre-
dit which is not used may be carried back three years and 
carried forward seven years. 
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CALIFORNIA LAW 
Californ 
credit. 
law does not provide for an investment tax 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
l. Objective of federal credit. The apparent objec-
tive of the federal investment tax credit is to increase busi-
ness investment in capital equipment toward the end of 
improving the overall productivity and international com-
petit position of the u.s. economy. Since its inception, 
however, there has been continuous debate as to the effec-
tiveness of the credit in accomplishing this goal. Proponents 
argue that the credit has been responsible for increasing 
investment in production equipment and facilities. Critics 
argue that the credit may not be cost-effective when revenue 
loss due to the credit is compared with the amount of extra 
investment stimulated by the credit. It is also argued that 
the credit distorts the market mechanism and that policymakers 
should refrain from specific interventions (i.e., altering the 
price of capital equipment relative to all other prices), and 
should rely on the general stimulus provided by cuts in indi-
vidual and corporate income tax rates. Proponents counter 
this argument by pointing out that inflation may be partly due 
to inadequate supply of goods and services in the economy and 
that a tax cut focused on investment spending may do more to 
increase industrial capacity and supply than would more 
general forms of tax relief for business. 
A 1978 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
concluded that the federal investment tax credit has succeeded 
in shifting investment toward plant and equipment, but has not 
increased the overall level of investment. 
2. Appropriateness of State Credit. Is it appropriate 
for the state to engage in macro-economic policymaking (i.e., 
stimulating growth and investment), an area traditionally left 
to federal control? 
3. Limited Effectiveness. Given the current fiscal 
constraints on the state, would any feasible amount of state 
investment tax incentives provide a significant economic sti-
mulus for the California economy? 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
AB 1555 (Filante), 1979. Provided a five percent state 
investment tax credit for both individual and corporate tax-
payers. Died in Committee. 
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tic corporation organi 
states. 
under the laws 
member of an affiliated group of 
3. Have on one class of stock. 
4. Have 5 or fewer shareholders, who must be either 
or e tates cannot include a nonresident alien. 
income and net operating losses of a qualified 
S ion are passed on to the shareholders, 
not the income is actually distributed. A net cor-
ing loss is treated by the shareholders in the 
arne manner as a loss from a trade or business under the 
federal individual income tax law. A shareholder may deduct 
his or her pro rata share of the loss, but the amount deducted 
shareholder's adjusted basis in the cor-
Excess net operating losses may not be carried over 
to other tax 
Income from long-term capital gains of a tax option 
tion retains its capital gains character when passed 
onto the shareholder. Generally, more favorable capital gains 
rates are allowed under the individual income tax law than 
corporation tax law. 
To prevent use of Subchapter S provisions as a 
means of avoiding the higher corporate tax on capital gains, 
long term corporate gains are subject to a special tax at the 
c level if the gain: 1) exceeds any short-term capi-
tal losses by more than $25,000; 2) exceeds 50 percent of the 
total corporate taxable income; and 3) corporate income 
exceeds $25,000. Net capital gains passed through to 
individual taxpayers are reduced by the amount of any special 
taxes paid at the corporate level. 
The excess of capital losses over capital gains is not 
sed on to the shareholders, but may be carried over to 
future years by the corporation. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
California law contains no prov1s1ons similar to the 
federal provisions relating to Subchapter S corporations in 
either the Personal Income Tax law or in the Bank and 
Co ion Tax law. Corporations electing federal 
Subchapter s status are subject to the state Bank and 
Co ion Tax on net corporate income at the standard 9.6 
percent rate of tax for corporations and the higher rate for 
banks financ 1 ions. 
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POLICY ISSUES OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Subchapter S provisions were first 
Technical Amendments Act of 1958. 
ional staff analyses prepared at the 
sed s ion to: 
Perm businesses to select the form of organization 
they desired, without taking into account major dif-
ferences in tax consequence; 
Aid small business by allowing shareholders to 
report their proportionate share of corporate 
income, lieu of a corporate tax; and 
Benefit small corporations by allowing them to 
apportion any net losses to shareholders. 
The chief advantage of the corporate form of doing 
business is the limited liability of the managers and share-
holders of the business. Limited liability encourages risk-
taking in economic ventures and makes it easier for small 
businesses to attract investment dollars from potential 
investors. 
2. National Subchapter S Activity. The following 
statistics drawn from publications of the Internal Revenue 
Service provide a profile of the nature and extent of 
Subchapter S activity in the u.s. in 1974, the last year for 
which such data are available. 
Economic Activity of Subchapter S Corporations 
Number of Subchapter S Returns 
Number of Shareholders 
Business Receipts 
Net Income {Less Losses) 
Net Worth 
Income Distributed to Shareholders 
Firms With: 
1 Shareholder 
2 Shareholders 
3 Shareholders 
4 Shareholders 
5 or More Shareholders 
Total 
84 
333,099 
832,493 
$120,960,889,000 
$ 3,549,831,000 
$ 14,986,003,000 
$ 2,108,297,000 
Percent of Total 
31.2% 
33.6 
15.2 
9.7 
10. 
100.0% 
Forestry, Fishing 
tur 
Transportation and Public Utility 
and Retail Trade 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Services 
TO 
Percent of Total 
5.1% 
.7 
11.3 
10.3 
4.4 
35.5 
11.5 
21.2 
100.0% 
way of comparison, there were 10,881,969 sole 
torships and 1,073,147 partnerships involving 4,950,576 
in the entire u.s. in 1975. As can readily be seen, 
Subchapter S corporations are only a minor part of the small 
business community in the United States. 
3. Participation in California. California taxpayers 
have not particiated in the use of the Subchapter S option in 
p ion to their share of the total population of the u.s. 
In the 1976 tax year, 642,980 individual tax returns in the 
entire u.s. reported net income or a loss from a small busi-
ness corporation electing Subchapter S treatment. Only 4.1 
percent of these individual returns were from California tax-
payers, a total of 26,226. In comparison, a year earlier in 
1975, there were 1,105,976 sole proprietorships and 156,817 
partnerships involving 794,171 partners in California. 
Whether the limited use of the tax options corporation by 
California businesses was due to the lack of corresponding 
provisions in state law is hard to determine without an in-
depth examination of the circumstances in individual cases. 
Clearly, however, the rather substantial state corporation tax 
rate (9.6 percent), has some deterrent effect upon California 
businesses' choice of a legal form of doing business. 
4. Exemption from minimum tax. If the state should 
decide to enact provisions simliar to the Subchapter S provi-
sions in federal law, is it appropriate to exempt Subchapter S 
corporations from the minimum tax ($200) features of the 
California Bank and Corporation Tax Law? 
5. Appropriate Objective? Should it be state policy 
to encourage the types of businesses that are most likely to 
make use of Subchapter S (retailing, finance insurance, real 
estate and services)? 
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RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
1. AB 874 (McVittie), 1979. Conformed both Personal 
Income Tax Law and Bank and Corporation Tax Law to federal 
Subchapter S provisions (amended out of final version). Died 
in committee. 
2. AB 1470 (Kelley), 1979. Same general provisions as 
AB 874. Died in committee . 
TABLE 24 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Allow Sub-Chapter "S" Corporation Losses on 
Individual Returns 
Adjusted Gross Income Class Tax Decrease 
Under $10,000 
$10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Total 
(000,000) 
$.3 
1.1 
2.0 
3.3 
5.4 
7.9 
$20.0 
This table was derived from data published in the U.S. 
Statistics of Income - Individual Income Tax Returns. 
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for Federal Law - Over the years, deprecia-
generated many d1sputes and litigation. The ADR pro-
sions are the latest in a series of steps which have been taken 
to alleviate the contention which has surrounded this deduction. 
ADR essentially represents an agreement that if its provisions 
are elected, the depreciation claimed need not be justified by 
the taxpayer and cannot be changed by either the taxpayer or the 
government. 
2. Rationale for California Law - At the time of the 
federal adopt1on of the ADR rules, 1t was felt that the cash 
flow problems the provisions would cause would be unacceptable 
for the state. Later, after the federal law had been in place 
for several years, it was determined that the ADR mid-range 
depreciation would not cause any major disruption and would 
conform to the method used by most taxpayers for federal purposes. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
NONE. 
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net e full conformity will be a gain in revenue, 
amount cannot be predicted since it depends upon utilization 
of the deposits. 
The 
of 
gas percentage depletion allowance has been a 
ss concern for many years. From 1926 until 
allowable percentage depletion was 27 1/2 percent of 
s income property. Beginning after October 9, 1969, 
allowab percentage was reduced to 22 percent. In all cases 
the depletion could not exceed 50 percent of taxable income com-
without to depletion. In 1975 several changes were 
A 22 le rate is allowed for regulated 
natural gas and natural gas sold under contract, subject to 
the 50 percent limitation noted above. Independent oil and gas 
producers and royalty owners are also entitled to the 22 percent 
rate for the period 1975 - 1980. The rate drops for these 
producers each year until it reaches 15 percent by 1984 and 
thereafter. The rate for geothermal wells varies in a similar 
fashion to 15 percent in 1984. These rates apply to an average 
daily production in 1979 of up to 1,200 barrels of oil per day 
or 7.2 million cubic feet of gas per day. These daily maximums 
drop to 1000 barrels and 6 llion cubic feet after 1979. For 
se producers is to 65 percent of taxable 
income computed without regard to the depletion allowance,or 50 
of property before the depletion 
ce. For purposes of the 65 percent limit, taxable income 
is reduced by zero bracket amount the case of an individual 
is computed without regard to any net operating loss carry-
portion of the al 
be carried over. 
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, conformed to federal law. 
gas depletion allowance from 27 1/2 
rate applies to oil, gas and 
law was extensively amended to end 
for smaller producers, California 
, but not in a similar fashion. Percentage 
fully allowed as to amounts up to $1.5 
$1. million the deduction is reduced by 125 
excess depletion over $1.5 million. By this 
deduction can be claimed if it exceeds $7.5 
Rationale of Federal Law- The exploitation and avail-
gas and oil have always been important in Congressional 
The strategic and public welfare implications of 
r with the more recent desire for American 
in them has led Congress to provide many 
encourage further exploration and development 
geo rmal sources, consis.tent with a desire that 
s not le to routinely evade paying a "reasonable" 
Under sent law this incentive is directed more to small 
rs, apparently on the theory that small producers are more 
in exploration within the United States. 
2. Rationale for California Law - The California rationale 
is much the same as the federal. The 1975 California amendments 
ch were analogous to the federal changes in that year also bene-
smal producers rather than larger ones. 
Relation to Actual Costs - The statutory percentage 
allowances bear little or no relationship to the amount 
of resources lost or to the taxpayer's original investment. The 
current law as to large producers reflects the concern that percentage 
eas r 
can permit tax free recovery of several times the tax-
actual stment. 
4. Full conformity would make administration 
in increased revenues. 
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THAN 
FEDERAL LAW 
law minerals,other than oil, gas and geothermal 
ject to percentage depletion according to 
by statute. Generally, California follows the 
federal law includes more minerals and 
instances. 
EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
1 
FEDERAL LAW 
Under 
result in some revenue gain, but the 
since the degree of utilization cannot 
a taxpayer earning income from depletable 
a percentage depletion allowance for 
at a percentage rate specified by statute for 
mineral. The amount of deduction is limited 
computed without regard to the 
Cali generally follows federal law. The California 
not provide for percentage depletion for as many minerals as 
s the federal , and the percentages differ in many instances. 
The depletion for sulfur is treated like that for 
1, gas and geothermal deposits. The percentage rate is 22 percent 
and the amount deductible is decreased by 125 percent of all 
allowance excess of $1.5 million. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
- Congress has, for many 
concern for the development and exploitation 
The strategic and economlc importance of 
Congress to extend a number of incentives 
exploitation of mineral reserves. The 
allowance is one such tax benefit. 
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2. Rationale for California Law - The California rationale 
for this deduction is much the same as that for the federal law -
to encourage production of valuable minerals for industrial use. 
The California approach has been slightly different from the 
with California generally allowing lower depletion 
percentages where state and federal differ. 
3. Efficacy of Rationale - Percentage depletion bears no 
relation to actual costs or capital investment, but is rather an 
arbitrary amount which may be taken year after year even though 
the taxpayer's original costs have long before been recovered. 
This approach more closely resembles a subsidy than a recovery of 
capital investment. 
4. Administration - Although the federal approach is no 
simpler than that of Cal~fornia, full conformity would simplify 
administration somewhat. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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• 
add 
no 
ISSUES 
1. Rationale for Fede 
in the Revenue Act of 
December 31, 1962. The 
incentive to land 
business 
expenses 
farming purposes or may charge 
There is no comparable Calif-
a cash f rather 
a taxpayer engaged in the 
expense and deduct, within certain 
during the taxable year for 
making it s table for farming. 
ted to lesser of $5,000 or 
farming. The allow-
the land, or amounts which 
fue Internal Revenue Code. 
ions. 
Law - This measure was first 
1962 for taxable years beginning 
purpose of this election was to 
to productive farm use. 
of the relatively low 
rare afford a substantial 
to those who would under-
would appear that the high 
California farmland would 
stances re s tax 
would be where marginal 
land and marginal farming operations are involved. This 
raises the question, however, of whether in such cases 
the deduction may operate as a subsidy to inefficient 
operations. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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AMORTIZATION OF FOREST LAND IMPROVEMENT 
RAL LAW 
California law permits taxpayers to elect to amortize 
over 60 months or to depreciate, according to schedule, the cost 
any forest land improvement. There is no comparable federal law. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
1 con ty (repeal) would not affect revenues 
substantially but would result in some minor cash flow savings. 
FEDERAL LAW 
None. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
Under California law taxpayers may elect to amortize 
over 60 months the costs of forest land improvements or to 
charge such costs to capital account and depreciate over a 
regular depreciation schedule. 
Forest land improvements are defined as all or a portion 
of the costs of labor, materials and use of equipment required to 
(1) re-establish commercial tree species pursuant to the require-
ments of Section 4561 of the Public Resources Code and/or (2) 
accomplish forest resource improvement work as defined by sub-
division (j) of Section 4793 of the Public Resources Code. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for California Law - This law was enacted 
in 1978 with the intent of increas1ng forest renewal and pro-
ductivity. 
2. Incentive Value - The incentive value of this law is 
questionable. Rapid amortization is valuable only if there is 
income. Income does not arise until the trees mature and are 
cut. Further, the relatively low California tax rate is usually 
not an important consideration to taxpayers making the decision 
to undertake such improvements, compared to availability of 
financing and forest management objectives, for example. 
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2. Propriety of Incentive - Reforestation is itself 
a benefit to the taxpayer whose business is sale of timber. 
Should the tax law be used to encourage undertakings which 
themselves are direct benefits to the taxpayer? This is some-
what like offering a tax incentive to a grocer to continue 
to stock his shelves. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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months 
a taxpayer to elect to amortize 
pollution control facilities over a short 
charge such cost to capital account and 
schedule. 
similar to federal law except that 
rapid amortization over 60 months 
zation over ther 12 months or 60 
The fiscal effect of full conformity would be 
to change cash flow between years. 
LAW 
law taxpayers may elect to amortize the 
the installation of certified pollution 
over 60 months or to charge such costs to 
account depreciate in the usual manner. The rapid 
amortization election is made the months after the facili-
been led and may be revoked at any time before 
is a provision for facilities having a life 
greater than 15 years. In such instances the taxpayer may 
claim rapid amortization for only that portion of the cost 
which represents the first 15 years' depreciation of the life 
of facility. The remainder of the cost must be depreciated 
in the regular manner. 
In order to qualify for the election the equipment must 
be certified by the appropriate state and federal authorities. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
The very similar to the federal law. 
California had a somewhat more liberal pollution control 
facilities amortization law between 1955 and 1971. After the 
federal law was 69, California conformed its law 
more close to the federal provision. 
The only substantial differences from federal law is that 
California al a 12-month rapid amortization as well as 
60-month and state election to amortize in 12 months is 
97 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale forFederal Law - The temporary repeal of the 
investment tax cred~t by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 removed some 
incentive to install pollution control equipment. This law was 
aimed at restoring the incentive for equipment which would help 
alleviate the growing pollution problem. The 15-year limita-
tion was directed at encouraging use of shorter life equipment 
rather than longer -- presumably to encourage taxpayers to 
constantly adopt newer technology. 
2. Rationale for California Law - California has en-
couraged pollut~on control fac~l~t~es by rapid amortization 
of costs since 1955. Conforming to the federal law reduced 
administrative problems and potential taxpayer confusion. 
3. Windfall - There is already much legislation mandat-
ing pollution control. To the extent the equipment must be 
installed anyway, the tax break is a windfall and has no incen-
tive value. 
4. Revenue Effect - Even without the rapid amortization 
feature, there would be little direct tax impact upon 
taxpayers. The regular depreciation rules would still apply 
so that costs would be fully recovered in any event. In 
general, only cash flow would be affected. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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RAPID DEPRECIATION/AMORTIZATION OF ENERGY-SAVING EQUIPMENT 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Recent changes in California law provide fast writeoff 
options for four kinds of equipment: 
• Co-generation equipment - rapid amortization over 
12 or 60 months. 
• Alternative energy equipment - rapid amortization 
over 12 or 60 months . 
• Solar energy systems - depreciation over 36 months. 
• Energy conservation devices - depreciation over 
36 months. 
All these fast writeoff options are in lieu of any 
credit incentive for which they may qualify. 
Federal law does not offer rapid depreciation or amor-
tization for these items. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Repeal of California's fast writeoff provisions would 
result in cash flow gain for the state. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
These four provisions were enacted by 1980 legislation, 
as listed below. The co-generation and alternative energy 
provisions were patterned after the existing pollution control 
writeoff provision. The solar and energy conservation provi-
sions were part of the respective bills establishing tax 
credits in those two areas. 
Co-generation - AB 1404 (Hayes), Chapter 1328 
Alternative Energy - AB 2893 (Cline and Hayes), 
Chapter 1327. 
Solar Energy Systems - AB 2036 (Hart), Chapter 903. 
Energy Conservation Devices - AB 2030 (Levine) , 
Chapter 90 4. 
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FEDERAL LAW 
No similar provisions. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Incentive. The California fast writeoff options 
are intended to ease the initial cash-flow burdens of install-
ing these energy-saving types of equipment. In the case of 
items which qualify for the state solar or energy conservation 
tax credits, fast writeoff was offered as alternatives to those 
tax incentives. 
2. Other Benefits. Even without rapid depreciation 
options, normal depreciation is still available to installers 
of this kind of equipment, so that costs can be fully recovered 
over the life of the equipment. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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PERSONAL, DEPENDENT, AGE AND BLIND EXEMPTIONS 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AJ.~D FEDERAL LAW 
Under federal law taxpayers are allowed to deduct specified 
amounts for exemptions from adjusted gross income to arrive at 
taxable income. California law allows credits against the tax 
for these exemptions and does not have a credit corresponding to 
the federal exemption deduction for the aged. The state credits 
are indexed. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Conformity to federal law would result in a loss of revenue 
of $429 million in 1981. To conform to the added age<exemption 
would add S2JJffiillion to this loss in 1981. 
For tax effect by income class and type of return see 
Table 25A on page 104and Table 25B on page 105. 
FEDERAL LAW 
Current federal law allows the following deductions for 
exemptions in computing taxable income: 
Single person 
Married persons filing jointly 
Dependent 
65 years of age or older-additional 
Blind - additional 
$1,000 
2,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
Under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code taxpayers were 
allowed a $600 exemption for themselves, their spouses and their 
dependents. The amount of the deduction was gradually increased 
over the years to its present level. The Revenue Act of 1943 
added an additional $600 for blind persons in recognition of 
the fact that such persons often incur extra expense which are 
not incurred by sighted persons. In 1948 the law was amended 
to allow an additional $600 exemption for persons 65 years of 
age or older. These additional exemptions have been increased 
at the same times and in the same amounts as the personal exemptions. 
CALIFOR...'IIJIA LAW 
Prior to 1967, deductions were allowed for personal ex-
emptions as follows: 
Single person 
Head of household 
Married couple 
Blind Person - additional 
Dependent 
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$1,500 
3,000 
3,000 
600 
600 
In 1967 the California law was amended to 
credits for exemptions. The tax is now conputed 
reduction by exemptions and the credits are then 
substitute tax 
on income without 
deducted from the 
tax. The 67 were: 
Single person 
Married couple 
Head of household 
Dependent 
Blind person - additional 
$25 
50 
50 
8 
8 
The amount of the credits have varied over the years, 
generally depending on the amount of the General Fund surplus. 
~or example, due to a one-time major tax cut (AB 3802, Kapiloff, 
1n 1978), and the advent of indexing, for the past three years 
the credits have been: 
1977 1978 1979 
Single person $25 $100 $27 
Married person filing 
separate return 25 100 27 
Married couple filing 
joint return 50 200 54 
Head of household 50 200 54 
Surviving spouse 50 200 54 
Dependent 8 8 9 
Blind person - additional 8 8 9 
For years after 1978 the exemption credits are indexed 
to reflect changes in the California Consumer Price Index, 
from June of 1978 to June of the current year, rounded off to 
the nearest $1. (The reason for freezing the exemption credits 
to a base year is so that this very low dependent exemption 
credit, $8, eventually may be adjusted. Without such a pro-
vision, the Legislature feared that the credits would forever 
keep rounding back to $8.) Federal exemptions are not indexed. 
The California rules with respect to the determination of 
whether an individual is married, surviving spouse, head of 
household, a dependent, or blind are generally the same as under 
federal law. One significant difference between state and federal 
law is that, for California purposes, no dependent credit is allowed 
for the first dependent who qualifies the taxpayer as "head of 
household." There is no comparable loss of a dependency deduction 
under federal law. California does not allow an additional credit 
to taxpayers 65 years of age or older. 
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POLICY ISSUES CONFORMITY 
The allowance for personal 
economic and political 
1 should be exempted from 
is of a more generic concept that income 
taxation should based upon the ability to pay. It was also 
felt a married couple is entitled to an exemption recognizing there 
are two persons involved rather than one taxable entity; likewise, 
exemption from tax should be weighed in proportion to the number 
children or r dependents of the taxpayer. It was also de-
that consideration should be given to persons 
over 65 years and to the blind. 
2. California Law - The considerations set 
forth above to federal law generally apply for 
California s. The switch from deductions to credits, 
however, represents one additional consideration. A credit 
confers the same benefit to all taxpayers, regardless of income. 
A deduction, on the other hand, becomes progressively more 
valuable as one's income increases. It was felt that no public 
policy was rewarding the well-to-do by an item which 
essentially was a tion of a taxpayer's personal status. 
As to the "aged" , California has various programs 
which are targeted to "needy" senior citizens instead of to 
senior citizens ly. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
1. AB 234 (McCarthy), 1979 - Increases the personal ex-
emption credit from $25 to $135 and from $50 to $270 for taxable 
year 1979. Died in Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee. 
2. SB 20 (Smith}, 1979 -Would continue the increased 
personal exemption credits of $100 and $200 for taxable year 1979 
and succeeding taxable years. Died in Senate Revenue and Taxation 
Committee. 
3. SB 679 (Carpenter), 1979 - Provides for a nonrefundable 
personal exemption credit of $8 for a taxpayer who is permanently 
physically handicapped at the close of the taxable year. Died 
in Senate Finance Committee. 
4. AB 2478 (Brown), 1978 - Increases the dependent credit 
from $8 to $25. Died in Assembly Ways and Means Committee. 
5. AB 2895 (Mori), 1978 - Provides for an additional $8 
tax credit for a taxpayer or taxpayer's spouse who is severely 
impaired. Died in Assembly Ways and Means Committee. 
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Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
- 100,000 
And Over 
$5,000 
,000 - 10,000 
,000 - 20,000 
000 - 30,000 
,000 - 40,000 
40 50,000 
,000 - 100,000 
000 And Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
000 - 10,000 
,000 - 20,000 
,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
,000 - 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
000 - 10,000 
,000 - 20,000 
,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
50,000- 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Totals 
'!'ABLE 25A 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Personal and Dependent Exemptions 
Tax Decrease Tax Increase 
No. of Amount of No. of Amount 
Returns Change Returns Change 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
0 
82,112 
1,231,707 
482,884 
122,690 
38,331 
42,617 
12,033 
2,012,374 
236 
118 
284,696 
1,171,525 
954,932 
503,333 
469,167 
109,926 
3,493,934 
0 
0 
115,159 
120,189 
35,868 
9,373 
8,821 
2,651 
292,060 
236 
82,230 
1,631,562 
1,774,598 
1,113,490 
551,037 
520,605 
124,610 
5,798,368 
$0 
649,512 
24,657,589 
29,412,729 
10,650,675 
3,746,684 
4,054,527 
1,171,133 
$74,342,849 
58,062 
1,086,253 
67,300 
5,202 
206 
29 
65 
12 
1,217,130 
$498,993 
12,887,651 
654,357 
61,364 
1,943 
206 
591 
284 
$14,105,389 
Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse 
$236 
591 
5,798,987 
57,921,039 
96,444,481 
78,011,420 
106,424,423 
30,450,649 
$375,051,825 
23,384 
33,409 
824,554 
123,661 
18,144 
3,905 
2,192 
13 
1,029,262 
$199,709 
659,260 
19,053,768 
1,974,496 
349,537 
68,683 
53,240 
442 
$22,359,136 
Unmarried Head of Household 
$0 
0 
3,197,033 
9,878,441 
5,680,917 
1,862,229 
1,743,870 
608,526 
$22,971,015 
$236 
650,102 
33,653,609 
97,212,209 
112,776,073 
83,620,333 
112,222,819 
32,230,308 
$472,365,690 
104 
3,189 
3,071 
257,928 
7,049 
88 
299 
299 
0 
271,923 
All Taxpayers 
84,635 
1,122,732 
1,149,782 
135,912 
18,438 
4,234 
2,556 
25 
2,518,314 
$25,746 
80,072 
6,289,519 
145,896 
1,030 
897 
10,172 
0 
$6,553,333 
$724,447 
13,626,983 
25,997,645 
2,181,755 
352,511 
69,787 
64,003 
726 
$43,017,858 
Net Amount 
of Change 
$498,993 
12,238,139 
-24,003,232 
-29,351,365 
-10,648,732 
-3,746,478 
-4,053,935 
-1,170,849 
-$60,237,460 
$199,473 
658,670 
13,254,782 
-55,946,544 
-96,094,944 
-77,942,737 
-106,371,183 
-30,450,207 
-$352,692,690 
$25,746 
80,072 
3,092,486 
-9,732,545 
-5,679,886 
-1,861,332 
-1,733,698 
-608,526 
-$16,417,682 
$724,211 
12,976,881 
-7,655,964 
-95,030,454 
-112,423,562 
-83,550,547 
-112,158,816 
-32 '229 '582 
-$429,347,832 
TABLE 25B 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
AGE EXEMPTIONS ($1,000 per exemption) 
AGI Class 
At But Less 
Least Than 
$5,000 
$5,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 and Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
$5,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 and Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
$5,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 50,000 
50,000 - 100,000 
100,000 and Over 
Totals 
*Less than 500. 
Number 
of 
Exemptions 
( t h 0 u 
Value 
of 
Exemptions 
s a n d s ) 
Single Taxpayers 
148 $0 
136 5,440 
80 5,600 
1 152 
* 
51 
* 
23 
* 7 366 $11,273 
Joint Taxpayers 
168 
295 
259 
7 
3 
1 
1 
734 
All Taxpayers 
316 
431 
339 
8 
3 
1 
1 
1,099 
$0 
0 
10,352 
430 
278 
140 
55 
$11,255 
$0 
5,440 
15,952 
582 
329 
163 
62 
$22,528 
This table was derived from data published in the U.S. Statistics 
of Income - Individual Income Tax Returns. 
FTB/R&S 10/3/80 
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STANDARD DEDUCTION 
Both laws provide a standard deduction from adjusted gross 
those taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions. 
amounts allowed by each law differ however, and federal law 
after 1976 contains a new concept for the standard deduction called 
"zero bracket amount." The state indexes its standard 
deduction. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Full conformity to federal law would cause a revenue loss of 
110 million for 1981. 
For tax effect by income class and type of return, see table 
on page 109. 
FEDERAL LAW 
The standard deduction was added to the law by the Individual 
Income Tax Act of 1944. The stated purpose was to simplify both the 
tax return and the computation of tax liability. The existence of a 
standard amount, allowable to all taxpayers, makes possible the con-
struction and use of tax tables. The initial tax table allowed a 
deduction of 10 percent of adjusted gross income up to $5,000, for a 
maximum deduction of $500. This deduction was in lieu of any 
itemized deductions, such as contributions, interest and taxes, to 
which the taxpayer may have been entitled. 
In the case of married persons filing a joint return, there 
is only one adjusted gross income and consequently, only one standard 
deduction. The standard deduction was not allowed to either spouse 
if the income of one spouse is determined without regard to the 
standard deduction. This rule is necessary to prevent one spouse 
from claiming all the itemized deductions while the other spouse 
claimed the standard deduction. 
The Revenue Act of 1964 changed the name of the standard 
deduction to the "10% standard deduction" and raised the adjusted 
gross income base to $10,000. 
As the income level of the country rose over the years, and 
as more persons purchased homes, it became increasingly advantageous 
to itemize deductions. Therefore, the standard deduction was again 
revised by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Under that Act, the standard 
deduction is the larger of the "percentage standard deduction" or 
the "low income allowance." The percentage standard deduction 
increased the allowable amounts as follows: 
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Taxable Years 
Beginning In 
70 
1971 
1972 
1973 and thereafter 
Applicable 
Percentage 
10 
13 
14 
15 
The low income allowance is set forth below: 
Year Amount 
1971 $1,050 
1972 1,300 
1973 1,300 
1974 1,300 
1975 1,900 
Maximum 
Amount 
$1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
2,000 
The Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 repealed 
all provisions regarding the standard deduction and substituted the 
"zero bracket amount" for taxable years beginning after 1976. 
For individual taxpayers, the 1977 act redefined taxable 
income in terms of the zero bracket amount. The zero bracket amount 
is that part of a taxpayer's income which is not subject to tax. 
However, in order to "simplify" the tax computation, the amount of 
the zero bracket amount is built into the tax tables and tax rate 
schedules. The net result of all this is that taxable income is 
now defined as adjusted gross income--(1) either minus any excess 
itemized deductions or plus any unused zero bracket amount, and (2) 
minus exemptions. 
The zero bracket amounts currently are: 
Married persons filing jointly 
Single persons and head of household 
Married persons filing separately 
$3,400 
2,300 
1,700 
As earlier noted, these amounts are built into the tax 
tables and tax rate schedules. Taxpayers, therefore, who itemize 
their deductions can only deduct the excess of those deductions over 
the zero bracket amount. Those persons required by law to itemize 
deductions (e.g., unmarried person filing a separate return whose 
spouse itemized) are required to increase income by the amount, if 
any, by which their zero bracket amount exceeds their allowable 
itemized deductions. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
California law and federal law (prior to the federal adoption 
of the zero bracket amount approach, which California has not adopted) 
were essentially the same. 
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the standard deduction was $500 
person fi a separate return 
filing jointly, house-
amounts were increased to 
, for the 1968-1978. Tax-
40,000 taxable income (or amounts as 
prescribed by the Franchise Tax Board) are required to use a 
tax table to determine their state income tax, and the FTB is 
tted to redesign the form so that the standard deduction 
no longer be into the tax table; taxpayers would 
claim deduction or itemize and then go to 
to their tax liability. 
For 
to reflect the 
the prior 
reason 1979 
ever is cab 
1978, the standard deduction is indexed 
the Consumer Price Index from June 
, rounded off to the nearest $10. For this 
standard deduction is $1,100 or $2,200, which-
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for Federal Law. The standard deduction is 
recognition that all taxpayers incur some deductible 
during the ar and that some allowance should be made 
zero t amount approach was intended to 
the preparation of the return. 
2. Rationale for California Law. The same considerations 
produced the standard deduction for federal purposes were 
the formulation of the California law. The different 
amounts lowed generally reflect different fiscal situations in 
state and California has not conformed to 
the federal zero bracket amount approach because it appeared to 
add complexity to the law rather than simplification and, there-
fore, it was thought wise to wait and later review the federal 
experience. 
3. Equity v. Simplification. The entire concept of 
deductions from income is a question which over the years has 
received much consideration. There is no question but that 
deductions complicate the law and contain a definite element of 
the arbitrary. For example, a donation to a recognized charitable 
organization is allowed as a deduction. The same donation to a 
starving child the street is not. The reason for this 
difference in treatment, while perhaps not noble, is understand-
able; namely verification. If there were no curbs and standards, 
the tax system would likely collapse. A standard deduction 
eliminates the need for verification, and as lt lS increased, it 
displaces persons currently itemize. A more radical departure 
would be to eliminate all deductions and soften the tax burden 
by adjusting the tax rates. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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TABLE 26 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Standard Deductions 
AGI Returns With Tax Decrease Returns With Tax Increase 
But Less Amount of Amount of 
Least Than No. of Returns Tax Decrease No. of Returns Tax Increase 
Single Taxrayers & Married Filing Serarate 
$5,000 37,830 $139,670 0 $0 
,000 10,000 1' 111' 112 22,866,855 0 0 
,000 20,000 1,065,716 45,954,291 0 0 
20,000 30,000 248,606 17,608,663 0 0 
30 000 40,000 40,792 3,080,904 0 0 
,000 50,000 11,526 828,277 0 0 
50,000 100,000 9,111 678,480 0 0 
,000 And Over 1,476 110,312 0 0 
Totals 2,526,167 $91,267,452 0 
Joint Taxrayers & Surviving srouse 
$5,000 9,330 $10,629 0 $0 
5,000 10,000 18,487 54,988 0 0 
,000 20,000 765,899 9,122,674 0 0 
20,000 30,000 474,354 9,526,672 0 0 
30,000 40,000 182,666 5,036,818 0 0 
,000 50,000 63,757 2,173,036 0 0 
50,000 100,000 47,675 1,926,320 0 0 
100,000 And Over 7,557 314,283 0 0 
Totals 1,569,725 $28,165,419 0 
Unmarried Head of Household 
$5,000 0 $0 1,063 $1,181 
$5,000 10,000 0 0 1,063 8,621 
10,000 20,000 0 0 267,266 5,915,265 
20,000 30,000 0 0 50,898 2,409,499 
30,000 40,000 0 0 7,520 430,753 
40,000 50,000 0 0 1,099 74,478 
50,000 100,000 0 0 954 63,048 
100,000 And Over 0 0 248 17,007 
Totals 0 $0 330 '110 $8,919,852 
All Taxpayers 
$5,000 47,160 $150,299 1,063 $1,181 
$5,000 10,000 1,129,598 22,921,843 1,063 8,621 
10,000 20,000 1,831,615 55,076,965 267,266 5,915,265 
20,000 30,000 722,960 27,135,334 50,898 2,409,499 
30,000 40,000 223,458 8,117,722 7,520 430,753 
40,000 50,000 75,283 3,001,313 1,099 74,478 
50,000 100,000 56,786 2,604,800 954 63,048 
100,000 And Over 9,033 424,595 248 17,007 
Totals 4,095,892 $119,432,872 330,ll0 $8,919,852 
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CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Both California and federal law allow an itemized deduction 
for charitable contributions. The differences between the two 
laws are: 
1. California limits the charitable contribution deduction 
to 20% of AGI. Under federal law, the limit for most contributions 
is 50% of AGI (although contributions to some types of organizations 
are limited to 20%). There's also a difference in the calculation 
of AGI to which the limit applies, due to other provisions of law. 
2. Federal law provides for a charitable contribution for 
amounts spent to support non-dependent students (max: $50 a month). 
California does not permit this deduction butallows a separate 
"dependent tax credit" which is indexed by CPI ($9 in 1979). 
3. California permits a charitable deduction as well as 
a business expense deduction (a double deduction) for the cost 
of agricultural products donated to a non-profit charitable 
organization. Federal law does not allow such treatment. 
4. California law contains a special provision for artists, 
not found in federal law. The federal law allows a full deduction 
for the value of art works created by the owner which have appre-
ciated in value, if the value of the work is established by 
independent appraisal and if 20% or more of the AGI of the tax-
payer is derived from the sale of artistic property created by 
such taxpayer. 
ISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF FULL CONFORMITY 
1. Conform to federal 50% limit--State general fund 
revenue loss of $25 million for 1981. 
2. Conform on other items--Unknown revenue impli-
cations, probably minor. 
For tax effect by income class, see Table 27 on page 114. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
The fair market value of property or money donated to 
qualified charitable organizations may be deducted from AGI to a 
maximum of 20% of AGI. Any excess may be carried forward up to 
five years. There are special rules for property which has 
appreciated in value. 
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If an individual (other than an artist) contributes 
ated property, the allowable deduction is limited to the 
's basis if the property, if sold would have resulted in 
income or a from the sale a capital asset held 
less than one year. 
Current law also requires that the deduction of up to the 
full fair market value of assets held more than one year must be 
reduced by the amount of the reportable gain, if the property is 
tangible personal property and the property will be used by the 
donee organization in a manner unrelated to the exempt organiza-
tion's purpose or function. Also, if the tangible personal property 
held more than one year is given to a private foundation, the 
lowable deduction must be reduced by the reportable gain. 
Charitable contributions of artistic property created by 
the personal efforts of the income taxpayer (artist) are not 
reduced because of the appreciated value of such artistic 
property if: 
(1) 20% or more the the taxpayer's adjusted gross 
income is derived from the sale of artistic 
property created by such taxpayer, and 
(2) the fair market value of the artistic property 
is established by independent appraisal. 
The value of a service donated to a charitable organization 
is not deductible, but expenses incurred in connection with the 
donation of the service are deductable. 
FEDERAL LAW 
Under federal law, contributions of money or property to 
qualified charitable organizations may be deducted up to 50% of 
the taxpayer's AGI (20% for certain organizations not regarded 
as public charities such as war veterans' and fraternal organi-
zations). 
Amounts contributed in excess of the limit may be carried 
over up to five years. 
The value of a service donated to a charitable organization 
is not deductible, but expenses incurred in connection with the 
donation of the service are deductable. 
There are special rules for properties which have 
appreciated in value. These are similar to California law, 
except for the special provisions for artists. 
111 
• 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Deductions for philanthropy are 
justified as a way o centralizing decision-
making in wel and cultural matters and to some extent as a 
way of providing tax incentives for the private subsidization of 
activities which might otherwise have to be carried out at public 
expense. 
Will an increase the amount of allowable deductions 
from state income tax, above 20% of AGI, increase the amount of 
charitable giving? The major tax incentives will come from the 
deductions allowed against federal law. There is no clear evidence 
to help evaluate the impact of a state tax change on charitable 
giving. 
According to the U.S. Treasury Department, there are 
many non-economic incentives for giving. These include: 
" •.. responses to social awareness, generosity, social 
pressure, pity, and habit. To the extent that the 
noneconomic factors influence charitable giving 
patterns, changes in the tax treatment of charitable 
donations have little repercussion on the level of 
contributions. 
"Since these noneconomic motivations are largely 
nonquantifiable, the importance of the economic 
incentive is difficult to distinguish from that of 
the noneconomic incentive. There is reason to 
believe, however, that noneconomic motivations have 
considerable influence on the level of giving. This 
is substantiated by the fact that studies relating 
variations in charitable contributions to changes 
in both the tax treatment and the incomes of contrib-
utors have been successful in explaining scarcely 
half of the observed variation in contributions." 
2. Rationale for Federal Law. The present 50% federal limit 
was enacted as part of the Federal Tax Reform Act of 1969. In 
that measure, the then-30% cap was raisedto 50%, but the unlimited 
deduction available to some taxpayers was also eliminated. Data 
published in connection with the bill show an increase in federal 
revenue from the interaction of the two provislon~. 
According to the Senate Finance Committee: 
"In order to strengthen the incentive effect of the 
charitable contributions deduction for taxpayers, 
the committee's bill generally increases the present 
30-percent limitation to 50 percent. The committee 
believes this change is particularly desirable in 
view of the repeal of the unlimited charitable 
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contributions deduction. It is believed that the 
increase in the limitation will benefit tax-
payers who donate substantial portions of their 
income to charity and for whom the incentive effect 
of the deduction is strong--primarily taxpayers in 
the middle and upper income ranges. In addition, 
the combination of the increase in the limitation 
to 50 percent with the repeal of the unlimited 
charitable deduction means, in effect, that charity 
can remain an equal partner with respect to an 
individual's income; however, charitable contribu-
tions no longer will be allowed to reduce an indi-
vidual's tax base by more than one-half." 
3. Simplification Argument. Conformity would help simplify 
tax computations for those taxpayers who contribute more than 20% 
of their income to charity. However, due to differences in 
calculation of AGI, part of which may be due to u.s. Constitu-
tional restriction, even if the state conforms to the federal 
limit, the dollar amount which could be deducted may still be 
different. 
4. Beneficiaries. As noted in the U.S. Senate Finance 
Committee report, conformity will generally benefit upper-middle 
and upper income taxpayers who can afford to give away more than 
20% of their income in a given year. 
5. Revenue Exporting. The Franchise Tax Board estimates 
40% to 50% of the benefits of conformity on this issue will be 
lost to the federal government in higher federal taxes (due to 
the reduction of California income tax deduction) . 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
SB 94 (McBride) was introduced in 1961 to conform to 
what was then the federal law in charitable contributions. The 
bill was sent to interim. Since that time federal law has changed 
substantially. 
AB 606 (Sieroty) was introduced in 1972 to conform to 
federal law. The measure died in Senate Finance. 
AB 905 (Sieroty) was introduced in 1973 to increase the 
20% limit to 30%. Thls provision was deleted in the Senate prior 
to passage. 
SB 1373 (Maddy) was introduced in 1980 to allow charitable 
contributions to be aeducted from gross income, rather than from 
adjusted gross income, provided such contributions did not exceed 
20% of AGI computed without regard to AGI. (This meant a tax-
payer could take the standard deduction and still deduct charitable 
contributions.) 
This bill would have moved state law further out of 
conformity with federal law. It was vetoed by the Governor. 
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AGI Class 
At 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
But Less 
Than 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Totals 
100,000 
And Over 
$5,000 
$5,000 10,000 
10,000 20,000 
20,000 30,000 
30,000 40,000 
40,000 50,000 
50,000 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
$5,000 10,000 
10,000 20,000 
20,000 30,000 
30,000 40,000 
40,000 50,000 
50,000 100,000 
100,000 And Over 
Totals 
FTB/R&S 7/18/80 
TABLE 27 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Contribution Limit Increase 
No. of Returns 
Tax Decrease 
Amount of Tax Decrease 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
118 $1,653 
956 9,427 
4,734 283,455 
1,570 197,798 
623 334,781 
505 271,834 
1,008 1,124,087 
606 3,931~948 
10,120 $6,154,983 
Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse 
118 
118 
3,135 
5,519 
1,697 
1,292 
1,866 
2,246 
15,991 
$827 
2,126 
74,104 
334,565 
114,599 
443,204 
1,197,716 
16,669,604 
$18,836,745 
Unmarried Head of Household 
0 
0 
148 
0 
0 
59 
77 
16 
299 
236 
1,074 
8,016 
7,089 
2,320 
1,856 
2,950 
2,869 
26,410 
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All Taxpayers 
$0 
0 
2,831 
0 
0 
34,649 
30,439 
206,365 
$274,284 
$2,480 
11,553 
360,389 
532,364 
449,380 
749,687 
2,352,243 
20,807,917 
$25,266,013 
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TAX DEDUCTION 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
California allows a deduction from adjusted gross income, 
not to exceed $100 annually ($200 joint return) • 
Federal law uses the method of a tax credit against taxes 
due, not to exceed $50 for an individual ($100 joint return). 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
It is estimated that adopting the federal method and limits 
would reduce state revenues by approximately $12 million annually. 
For taxpayer impact by income class, see Table 28 on p.ll6. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONF0R}1ITY 
l. Need. The purpose of both federal and state provisions 
is to encourage financial participation in political affairs by 
citizens of moderate means. Given the limits on the deduction (or 
credit), the provisions have little financial impact on the wealthy. 
2. Incentive Value. The credit method is substantially 
more enticing to taxpayers in lower marginal tax brackets, or to 
taxpayers who do not itemize deductions. However, it is question-
able whether a change from deduction to credit would actually in-
duce substantially more taxpayers to participate, or simply give 
current participants another tax break. 
3. Federal Interaction. The Franchise Tax Board staff 
estimates that the typ1cal participant is in an average marginal 
federal tax bracket of 25%. Given a $12 million state revenue 
loss, the federal gain under conformity would be approximately 
$3 million annually from the increase in federal taxes of Calif-
ornia itemizers. 
HECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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AGI 
Least 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40 000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
But Less 
Than 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Totals 
100,000 
And Over 
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TABLE 28 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Political Contributions 
No. of Returns 
Tax Decrease 
Amount of Tax Decrease 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
118 
369,939 
794,370 
176,067 
23,276 
6,376 
7,259 
2,662 
1,380,067 
$118 
417,200 
1,031,590 
470,950 
204,297 
83,544 
135,669 
80,383 
$2,423,751 
Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse 
118 
0 
385,994 
379,111 
177,380 
80,509 
83,748 
34,569 
1,141,429 
$118 
0 
731,507 
1,321,637 
1,823,718 
1,559,057 
2,227,993 
1,518,329 
$9,182,358 
Unmarried Head of Household 
0 
0 
87,730 
40,301 
5,788 
1,516 
1,144 
686 
137,164 
236 
369,939 
1,268,094 
595,479 
206,443 
88,401 
92,151 
37,917 
2,658,660 
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All Taxpayers 
$0 
0 
225,939 
124,850 
52,783 
28 ,424 
19,459 
18,851 
$470,307 
$236 
417,200 
1,989,037 
1,917,437 
2,080,798 
1,671,025 
2,383,120 
1,617,562 
$12,076,416 
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GAS TAX DEDUCTION 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
California law allows for an itemized deduction for 
the amount of state gasoline tax paid (7¢ times the number 
of gallons purchased) . 
Federal law does not provide for a gasoline tax deduc-
tion . 
FISCAL EFFECTS OF FULL CONFORMITY 
State General Fund revenue increase of $30 million for 
1981. 
For tax effect by income class and filing status, 
see Table 29 on page 119 . 
FEDERAL LAW 
The former federal gas tax deduction was repealed as 
part of the Federal Revenue Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-600). 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
See above. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Arguments in favor of conformity, and which were 
used to justify the federal action of repealing the gas tax 
deduction are as follows: 
a. The deduction of the gasoline tax has no more 
justification than a deduction for bridge 
tolls (which are not deductible). This tax 
is, by constitutional mandate, a user charge 
designed to pay for the cost of a service. 
b. In a time when energy conservation is impor-
tant, it is questionable tax policy to reward 
large users of gasoline energy with larger 
income tax write-offs. 
c. Since this is an item common to nearly all tax-
payers who itemize, conformity will simplify 
tax reporting. 
117 
d. The gas tax deduction is unenforceable 
within rather broad limit$, as most tax-
payers have no records to support the 
number of miles driven in any given year. 
2. Arguments which can be made in opposition to 
conformity include: 
a. Many consider deductibility of excise and 
other taxes from the income tax essential 
to avoid "double taxation". These people 
consider elimination of the gas tax deduc-
tion to be a step toward double taxation 
of gasoline. 
b. Deductibility of sales tax, including 
sales tax on gasoline, makes it difficult 
to justify removing deductibility of the 
gas tax. 
c. Conformity would cause a tax increase of 
approximately $8 for each of 3 million 
itemizing taxpayers. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
1. AB 93 (W. Brown), 1978-Comprehensive Committee 
bill on conformity with the Federal Revenue Act of 1978. 
The provision repealing the gasoline tax deduction was 
deleted by Senate Revenue and Taxation Committee. 
2. AB 2030 (Levine), 1979.Energy Conservation Credit. 
This bill was amended by Assembly Rev & Tax to repeal the 
gasoline tax as a cost offset to new credits in the bill. 
The provision repealing the gasoline tax deduction was 
deleted by Assembly Ways and Means. 
3. SB 1911 (Petris), 1979. Credit for transit passes 
and vanpools. Proposed to repeal the gasoline tas deduction 
to offset cost of proposed new tax credits. Failed passage 
on Assembly floor. 
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AGI Class 
But Less 
At Least Than 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Totals 
100,000 
And Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
FTB/R&S 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
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TABLE 29 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Gas Tax Deduction Elimination 
Tax Increase 
No. of Returns Amount of Tax Increase 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
354 
37' 722 
256,063 
258,244 
87,119 
28,067 
31,054 
8,600 
707,223 
$354 
76,128 
1,152,561 
1,982,829 
844,054 
225,353 
246,355 
68,373 
$4,596,007 
Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse 
0 
2,126 
244,265 
834,070 
803,982 
445,312 
416,805 
96,289 
2,842,848 
$0 
2,244 
732,342 
4,571,543 
6,568,880 
4,860,803 
5,227,431 
1,115,593 
$23,078,836 
Unmarried Head of Household 
0 
0 
78,868 
73,564 
27,425 
7,916 
7,247 
2,135 
197,155 
354 
39,848 
579,195 
1,165,878 
918,526 
481,296 
455,106 
107,024 
3,747,226 
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All Taxpayers 
$0 
0 
287,405 
566,524 
296,389 
91,558 
62,064 
20,111 
$1,324,052 
$354 
78,372 
2,172,308 
7,120,897 
7,709,323 
5,177' 714 
5,535,850 
1,204,076 
$28,998,895 
FEDERAL LAW 
are 
The contribution 
of $750 (even 
tion) or 100% of 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
most 
no 
POLICY ISSUES 
was 
corporate 
plans in 
has 
PLANS 
individuals are permitted 
retirement account which 
ect to tax when 
very similar with the 
amounts permitted to 
under the sponsorship 
92) taxable years 
this provision a self-
fied pension plan, 
This contribution 
• There are 
taxes and penalties for early 
and other distributions 
d ibution. 
of contribution to such plans. 
must be at least the lesser 
of earned income limita-
parallels the federal in 
of deductibility, how-
There are 
federal enactment 
individuals who 
provisions available to 
and the inclusion of such 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
this area. 
2. Rationale for California Law - California has followed 
law very closely, inclUdinq the ERISA provisions, on 
• may be argued that the lower contribution 
fornia's lower tax rates. 
3. Budget Impact - In a period of projected budget 
deficits conformity would result in substantial revenue losses. 
4. Administration - Since California is in substantial 
conformity with most of the technical and procedural features of 
federal pension and stock option provisions there is no particular 
administrative benefit to be gained by conformity with the federal 
contribution limits. 
5. Taxtayer Com~liance - Conformity to federal limits 
would avoid con usion an uncertainty among participating tax-
payers, e.g., some taxpayers still claim the federal deduction for 
California purposes1 this can be burdensome because there are 
penalties for excess contributions. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
1. SB 822 (Nielson), 1980. Conforms state law to federal 
law with regard to maximum contribution limits for self-employed 
pension plans. Vetoed. 
2. AB 766 (Filante), 1979. Amends state law to conform 
to various changes in federal law relating to retirement plans. 
Died in Assembly Revenue & Taxation Committee. 
3. AB 1131 (Nestande), 1977. Increases the amount of 
deductible contribution by a self-employed individual to a qualified 
pension plan to conform to the current federal limitations. Died 
in Assembly Revenue & Taxation Committee. 
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ADOPTION 
, 0 
LAW 
costs 
tax purposes. 
to 
1 ncome tax law contains no comparable provi-
s 
EFFECT FULL CONFORMITY 
state revenues 
FEDERAL LAW 
law 
expenses, but s 
adopted chi to 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
nse 
imately 
increase 
no income tax deduction for adoption 
certain medical expenses of an 
by the adopti parents. 
ion nses deductible under 
state ated medical expenses of the 
r plus welfare agency, legal and 
other costs relating adoption. Generally, only those 
qualified adoption expenses which exceed three percent of the 
taxpayer's adjusted gross income may be deducted for state 
income tax purposes. The maximum deduction allowed is $1,000. 
Hard-to-Place Children. Otherwise qualified taxpayers 
who adopt "hard-to-place" chlldren may deduct the maximum 
$1,000 of adoption expenses regardless of the level of their 
income. That is, they are not subject to the three percent 
AGI test. A "hard- " child is defined as "a child who 
is disadvantaged because of adverse parental background, or a 
handicapped chi , or a ild of three years or more." 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Tax Policy or Social Program? From a tax policy 
standpoint, allowing an income tax deduction for major medical 
expenses is most often justified on the grounds that extra-
ordinary, nonelective expenses can severely restrict a 
taxpayer's "ability to pay" his or her income tax liability. 
2 
Adoption expenses do not clearly fall within this category to 
the extent they are incurred largely at the option of the 
taxpayer. Deductions such as those for medical expenses and 
casualty losses also have been justified as a form of 
"coinsurance" through which the state shares in the taxpayer's 
risk of incurring large, unanticipated costs. Again, because 
they are discretionary, there is no comparable rationale for 
the deduction of adoption expenses. 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis. To the extent California's 
adoption expense deduction is intended to encourage and/or 
subsidize adoption, rather than to further tax equity goals, 
the key conformity issues would seem to be: 
a) Is an income tax deduction the most effective 
and efficient mechanism for accomplishing this goal? 
(One of the more serious limitations of using an income 
tax deduction as a social policy tool is that it pro-
vides no benefits to taxpayers claiming the standard 
deduction or to individuals with a zero tax liability.) 
b) To what extent does the use of a "tax expendi-
ture," rather than a direct Budget Act appropriation, 
limit the Legislature's opportunities to review and 
evaluate the costs and benefits of the adoption expense 
deduction? 
c) Can the costs of nonconformity (in terms of 
foregone revenues and increased tax return complexity) 
be justified by the measurable benefits of the 
deduction? 
RECENT LEGISLATION 
None. 
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DEDUCTION FOR REPAIR/REMODELLING OF BUILDINGS 
OR TRANSPORTATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED OR ELDERLY 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
State law provides a deduction (alternatively 
lization and depreciation) for both business-
related and sonal expenditures. This includes 
personal res s and transportation. 
law is limited to business-related ex-
penditures, the benefit of which is for the general 
handicapped (or elderly) public. 
State law sunsets as of 1985; federal law is 
repealed as of 1983. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Full conformity would produce minor savings for 
the state. (The Franchise Tax Board est1mates that the 
more inclusive sions of Section 17238 (R&TC) currently 
reduce state revenues by approximately $250,000 annually.) 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
Section 17238 (under a different number) was added 
to the R&T Code in 1977. This followed enactment of 
federal law in 1976. The state law is particularly 
beneficial to individually handicapped (or elderly) 
people who have funds to remodel or alter their personal 
residential or transportation property for their personal 
benefit. The maximum allowable deduction in one year 
is $25,000. 
FEDERAL LAW 
The 1976 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code 
provided for the equivalent $25,000 deduction, but is 
limited to trades or businesses which deal with the 
handicapped/elderly public. The federal law is scheduled 
to expire (after further amendments) in 1983. 
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Need. The need for the differential between 
the personal aspects of state law, and the more limited 
aspects of federal law would appear to depend on indivi-
dual legislative philosophy. The amount of money is not 
great. 
2. Incentive Value. Since the benefit of the 
California differentlal lS strictly personal, the public 
interest of the state provisions may rest in concepts 
such as: 
a. The ability of a handicapped person to equip 
a vehicle to provide himself with a practical 
means of gainful employment. 
b. The potential that elderly people may avoid 
accidents which might lead to higher public 
health costs. 
In view of the maximum 11% marginal state tax rate 
for individual returns, the incentive for non-personal 
use of the combined federal/state provision would appear 
small. The FTB estimates that users of the state provision 
(from a personal standpoint) are probably at about the 
35% marginal rate onfue federal tax. The net incentive 
value is therefore about 8% of whatever personal ex-
penditure is made in a year. 
3. Time Limits. The available time limit for both 
state and federal law have been extended since their 
original adoptions. As an alternative to conforming the 
1985 state expiration date to the 1983 federal date, the 
committee may wish to eliminate any state date after 
1985, and let the state law ride on whatever extensions 
are granted federally. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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STATE INCOME TAX DEDUCTIBILITY 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Cali 
income taxe 
its state income taxes to be deducted 
tax , but does not allow a deduc-
income tax. In other words, the federal 
against itself. 
tax law allows neither state nor federal 
ucted for state income tax purposes. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF 
state income tax as a deduction against 
adopting federal taxable income as the 
reduce state revenues by approximately 
ax year. 
For tax ef by income class and type of return, see 
table on 9. 
FEDERAL LAW 
law lows state income taxes to be deducted for 
f income tax Administratively, the federal 
1 s 
(as 
state income taxes is computed in two steps. 
withholding tax payments made in the current 
's item 
year state income 
to taxable income 
form W-2) are included in the 
uctions. Second, any refund of prior-
taxes received in the current year is added 
e combined effect of these two computa-
1 taxable income by the net amount of 
payments actually paid during the tax 
tions is to uce 
cash state income tax 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
to be 
not permit the state income tax itself 
for sta ncome tax purposes. Most other 
taxes (e.g., sales, property and gasoline 
uctible and a credit is available for income 
states. Based on a strict comparison of 
, federal and California tax laws are not 
t to the deductibility of the state 
, California does clearly conform to 
the sense that neither the state nor the 
its its respective income tax to be 
itself. 
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
Reduction in Progressivity. Apart from the 
1 revenue loss, the most significant effect of state 
uctibility a uct in the "progres-
of the state income tax. Due to a steeply graduated 
tax rate s ule, taxpayers at higher levels of income 
current a much greater proportionate share of their 
income in state income taxes than do lower income taxpayers. 
Because f this because many low-income taxpayers do not 
deductions, allowing the state income tax to be 
from itself would result in much greater dollar and 
uctions in state income taxes for higher income 
for those at lower income levels. As a result, 
some reduction in the progressivity of the 
ncome tax, i.e., the rate at which the tax, as a percent of 
income, rises with income. 
The following table illustrates the average impact of 
state income tax deductibility on married taxpayers at dif-
t income levels. As shown in this table, both the dollar 
tax decrease due to state income tax deduc-
ili rise rapidly with income. For example, taxpayers 
with $20,000 to $30,000 of income would realize an average 
nnual tax uction of about $15, or 2.7 percent of current 
tax. For taxpayers with incomes above $100,000, the dollar 
uct average $1,773, representing nearly 11 percent 
of current tax. 
Impact on Married Taxpayers of 
State Income Tax Deductibility 
1981 Income Year 
Average Tax Decrease 
AGI Class 
$10,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 30,000 
30,000 - 40,000 
40,000 - 50,000 
50,000 -100,000 
00,000 and over 
Amount Percent of Current Tax 
$ 3 
15 
44 
103 
305 
1,773 
0.7% 
2.7 
5.1 
7.4 
9.9 
10.8 
It s important to note that this reduced progressivity 
along wi the revenue losses associated with state income 
tax deductibility) could be minimized with offsetting tax rate 
c s. 
2. Rationale for federal deduction. The arguments 
most f tly offered for the deduction of state income 
taxes federal tax purposes are that the deduction: 
a) Encourages state use of the income tax; 
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I 
b) Narrows interstate net tax differences and, 
, ts impact of state tax policy on 
population shifts; and 
c) Prevents excess ve, or even confiscatory, tax 
ich othe result from the combined 
of the state and income taxes. 
On more 
state or local tax 
tion or s, but 
is an ate deduct 
grounds, it is also argued that any 
income available for consump-
direct benefits to the taxpayer, 
the federal income tax base. 
3. Federal Rationale Not Applicable to State. The 
arguments listed above for allowing a state income tax deduc-
tion against income taxes generally cannot be applied 
at the state level. Much of the rationale for the federal 
deductibility of state income taxes relates to interstate 
fiscal coordination, an area in which the state has no 
substant 1 responsibility. Although there may be some sup-
port the deduct ility of state income taxes on purely 
theoreti grounds (ref ting the fact that such taxes 
reduce income avai for consumption or savings), it is 
equally logical to assume that the existing state income tax 
rate schedule was designed based on the assumption that the 
income tax itself would not be deductible. 
4. Tax Return Preparation Considerations. If the 
state were to conform completely and automatically to federal 
law (e.g., by adopting a percentage of the federal income tax 
or the t e income base), one benefit to taxpayers 
of allowing state income tax deductibility would be to 
eliminate relatively complex adjustments needed to net out 
the effect of the federal deduction currently allowed for 
state income taxes. 
5. Administrative Versus Policy Conformity. The 
deductibility of the state income tax may not even be a signi-
ficant conformity issue, to the extent the Legislature's pri-
mary concern is with federal/state tax policy differences, 
rather than with strict administrative conformity of the tax 
bases. As indicated above, the state already conforms to the 
federal policy of not allowing the income tax to be deducted 
against itself. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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AGI Class 
TABLE 30 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Deductibility of State Income Tax 
Tax Decrease 
Least But Less Than No. of Returns Amount of Tax Decrease 
000 
10,000 
20 000 
000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
,000 
000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
And Over 
$5,000 
,000 10,000 
,000 20,000 
,000 30,000 
,000 .40,000 
,000 50,000 
000 100,000 
,000 And Over 
Totals 
$5,000 
000 10,000 
000 20,000 
,000 30,000 
,000 40,000 
000 50,000 
50 000 100,000 
000 And Over 
Totals 
7/18/80 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
118 
36,946 
418,626 
486,621 
122' 778 
38,360 
42,641 
12,033 
1,158,124 
$118 
78,334 
5,848,141 
30,857,087 
21,988,095 
11,019,917 
22,993,614 
26,674,086 
$119,459,392 
Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse 
118 
1,181 
232,601 
870,836 
900,425 
505,477 
470,889 
109,939 
3,091,466 
$118 
1,299 
806,462 
13,489,246 
39,614,716 
52,076,548 
143,412,088 
194,927,027 
$444,327,504 
Unmarried Head of Household 
0 
118 
77' 691 
79,563 
35,539 
9,373 
9,132 
2,651 
214,067 
236 
38,245 
728' 918 
1,437,020 
1,058,742 
553,211 
522,662 
124,623 
4,463,657 
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All Taxpayers 
$0 
118 
378,565 
2,557,308 
3,560,296 
1,833,449 
3,791,054 
5,601,140 
$17,721,931 
$236 
79,751 
7,033,169 
46,903,641 
65,163,107 
64,929,914 
170,196,756 
227,202,253 
$581,508,827 
I 
EARNED INCOME CREDIT 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Under this federal provision a refundable tax credit is 
allowed on the "earned income" of lower income individuals. 
California has no similar law. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Full conformity would result in tax refunds of about 
$180 million for the 1981 taxable year. 
FEDERAL LAW 
The federal law allows a refundable tax credit of 10% 
of earned income for the taxable year applied to earned income 
not exceeding $5,000. The amount of the credit may not exceed 
the excess of $500 over 12.5% of so much of the taxpayer's 
adjusted gross income (or, if greater, earned income) which 
exceeds $6,000. 
Earned income is defined as wages, salaries, tips and 
other employee compensation, plus net earnings from self-
employment for the taxable year. Eligible individuals are 
married persons entitled to a dependency exemption for a 
child, a surviving spouse, or a person who qualifies as a head 
of household. Persons entitled to a foreign source income 
exclusion are not eligible for this credit. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
California has no similar provision but does have a 
special nonrefundable low income tax credit which relieves 
low income persons of state tax liability. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for Federal Law - This credit first appeared 
in the Revenue Act of 1924. In certain periods it was repealed 
only to reappear in subsequent legislation. The purpose of this 
provision is to provide cash assistance to low-income workers. 
2. Rationale for California Law - The federal provision 
is a form of negat1ve 1ncome tax. Cal1fornia has met the problem 
of assistance to low-income persons both with direct assistance 
programs and with its low income credit (see pagesl32-134). 
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l Administration - The federal law requires that 
claimants of the cred1t provide certificates of eligibility 
and must show that they have not made similar claims through 
other employers. This could add considerably to administrative 
burdens depending on how much of the federal system is adopted 
by California. The federal law also contains provisions to 
permit an eligible employee to claim a portion of the credit 
during each pay period which places added burdens upon the 
employer. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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LOW INCOME CREDIT 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Federal law does not contain provisions for the allowance 
of a low income credit as does California law. The credit is 
also indexed. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
The state revenue gain from full federal conformity (re-
peal of the low income credit) would be $500,000 for 1981. 
For tax effect by income class and type of return, see 
table on page 134 . 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
Since 1973 California law has provided a credit for persons 
receiving less than a specified amount of income. 
In the case of a single person or a married person filing 
a separate return, the credit is $40 if the adjusted gross income 
(plus any Keogh or IRA deductions made) of the taxpayer is 
$5,000 or less and the total income is $10,000 or less. The 
credit is reduced by fifty cents for each one dollar of adjusted 
gross income in excess of $5,000. 
In the case of a head of household, a surviving spouse, or 
a married couple filing a joint return, the credit is $80 if the 
adjusted gross income is $10,000 or less and the total income is 
$20,000 or less. Again, the credit is reduced by fifty cents for 
each one dollar such adjusted gross income is in excess of $10,000. 
The credit is not allowed to any taxpayer required to pay 
a preference tax. 
For taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1979, 
the credit is indexed to reflect the changes in the Consumer 
Price Index from June of the prior year, rounded off to the 
nearest $1. For this reason, for 1979 the credit is a maximum 
of $44 for single taxpayers and married taxpayers filing 
separately and $88 for all other taxpayers. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for California Law - The rationale for the 
low income cred1t evolved out of a bas1c policy decision that 
low income persons should not have to bear a part of the income 
tax burden because they do not have the "ability to pay." 
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2. Equity Considerations - The foundation of a pro-
gressive income tax system is that each should pay according 
to his ability. Is it, therefore, equitable to excuse anyone 
from making at least some contribution toward the support and 
maintenance of the society in which he lives? While this pro-
gram is modes, its beneficiaries nonetheless enjoy the advantages 
of numerous public services. Is it fair that they should con-
tribute nothing and thereby raise the contribution of others? 
3. Disappearing Credit. Although the credit was 
indexed, the $5,000/$10,000 ceiling was not adjusted. There-
fore, for certain taxpayers, there is a disappearing credit 
because of the interaction with indexed brackets, the standard 
deduction, personal credits, and the rate of the phase-out for 
income over the ceiling. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
AB 234 (McCarthy), 1979. Raises the adjusted gross 
income (AGI) limits for the special low-income credit from 
$5,000 to $7,000 and from $10,000 to $14,000 for the 1979 
and 1980 taxable years. The AGI limits for 1981 and subse-
quent years would be these limits indexed for inflation. 
The amount of the low-income credit would be the amount of 
the tax liability for a taxpayer with AGI equal to or less 
than the limit. This amount would be reduced by 50 cents 
for each one dollar of AGI in excess of the AGI limits. 
Taxpayers require to pay tax on preference income would not 
be eligible to claim the special low-income tax credit. 
Died in the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee. 
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TABLE 31 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Special Low Income Credit Eliminated 
AGI Class Tax Increase 
But Less 
At Than No. of Returns Amount of Tax Increase 
Single TaxEa~ers & Married Filing SeEarate 
$5,000 34,800 $69,903 
,000 10,000 30,050 171,976 
10,000 20,000 118 4, 724 
20,000 30,000 0 0 
30,000 40,000 0 0 
40,000 50,000 0 0 
50,000 100,000 0 0 
100,000 And Over 0 0 
Totals 64,968 $246,604 
Joint TaxEayers & Surviving SEouse 
$5,000 118 $118 
$5,000 10,000 8,308 $26,824 
10,000 20,000 10,039 148,819 
20,000 30,000 118 9,448 
30,000 40,000 0 0 
40,000 50,000 0 0 
50,000 100,000 0 0 
100,000 And Over 0 0 
Totals 18,583 $185,209 
Unmarried Head of Household 
$5,000 0 $0 
$5,000 10,000 5,414 $17,381 
10,000 20,000 5,074 53,985 
20,000 30,000 0 0 
30,000 40,000 0 0 
• 40,000 50,000 0 0 50,000 100,000 0 0 
100,000 And Over 0 0 
Totals 10,488 $71,366 
All TaxEa~ers 
$5,000 34,918 $70,022 
$5,000 10,000 43,772 216,181 
10,000 20,000 15,231 207,528 
20,000 30,000 118 9,448 
30,000 40,000 0 0 
40,000 50,000 0 0 
50,000 100,000 0 0 
100,000 And Over 0 0 
Totals 94,040 $503,179 
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EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CHILD-CARE EXPENSES 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Both federal and state law permit a tax credit for 
certain "employment-related" expenses of caring for children 
and other dependents. 
The major differences are: 
1. Size of credit: Federal law allows a credit of 
20% of qual1fy1ng expenses, while state law allows a credit 
of 3% of qualifying expenses. 
2. Phase-out of credit: Federal law does not phase 
out the credit as income rises. The California credit is 
reduced by 2% of the amount of the credit for each $100 of 
AGI over $15,000. Thus, no credit is allowed if AGI is 
$20,000 or more. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Full conformity to the federal provisions would result 
in a revenue loss of $75 million in 1981. This is compared 
to the $2 mill1on revenue loss of California's current child-
care credit. 
FEDERAL LAW 
The Federal Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed the federal 
treatment of child-care costs from a deduction to the current 
credit. The basic provisions of federal law are as follows: 
Size of credit: 20% of qualifying expenses. 
Expenses not to exceed: $2,000 for one dependent, 
$4,000 for two or more dependents. 
Qualifying expenses: Employment-related household 
services and direct care. 
Eligibility of dependents: Child under age 15 or 
dependent or spouse of taxpayer who is physically 
or mentally incapable of caring for himself. 
Limits on income: Earned income only, not to exceed 
income of spouse with lesser earnings. Generally, 
if one spouse is not working, no credit is allowed. 
No upper limit on eligibility based on income. 
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CALIFORNIA LAW 
In 1977, California law was changed to conform in all 
respects to the new federal child-care credit, except the 
two areas of divergence listed above. Prior to 1977, 
California also allowed a deduction for certain child care 
expenses. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for Federal Law. The reason for setting 
the size of the federal cred1t at 20% is not known. The pur-
pose of imposing no income ceiling on eligibility--a departure 
from the prior federal law--was to allow more families to use 
the provision. Further, a fundamental of tax theory is that 
all expenses of earning income should be deducted, regardless 
of cost. 
2. Rationale for State Departures from Federal Law. 
The apparent purposes for California's deliberate divergence 
from federal law in 1977 were: 
a. Tax Relief. Tax relief of another 20% of 
child care costs on top of federal credit 
not justified or needed; additional tax relief 
of 3% was considered sufficient, as the state 
tax burden is proportionately smaller than 
the federal. 
b. Concentration of Benefits. The phase-out 
feature concentrates benefits among lower-
income taxpayers, who presumably are less 
able to afford child-care costs than higher-
income taxpayers. 
c. Revenue Effect. These two features limit the 
amount of state revenue loss. 
3. Cumulative Tax Relief. If California were to 
conform fully to federal law, the effective total credit 
enjoyed by taxpayers would be 40% of qualifying expenses. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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RENTERS CREDIT 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
California law allows a refundable income tax credit 
for qualified renters. There is no comparable federal 
provision. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
State General Fund savings of $420 million for 1981. 
For tax effect by income class and filing status, 
see Table 32 on page 139 . 
FEDERAL LAW 
Federal law does not provide for a renters credit. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
California law allows a refundable income tax credit 
for qualified renters. Married renters, heads of households 
surviving spouses are entitled to a $137 credit and single 
renters are entitled to a $60 credit. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. History of the Renters credit. The renters credit 
California originally was enacted to offset the impact of 
a sales tax increase which funded tax relief for homeowners 
(SB 90 of 1972). 
Subsequently, the State Constitution was amended to 
require renters relief comparable to homeowner relief (but 
not vice versa). 
In 1976, the original variable credit of $25-$45 
(based on income) was changed to a flat $37 credit. 
In 1979, the Legislature increased the amount of the 
renters tax credit to present levels. The rationale for 
the higher level for married renters is that in many cases 
single renters share domiciles. 
The comparable tax benefits received by homeowners from 
the homeowners' exemption is approximately $84. 
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2. Viewed as a State Issue. The federal government 
provides for no renters tax cred~t, since the federal govern-
ment has not attempted to fund a separate homeowners' relief 
program, preferring to leave such matters to the individual 
states. 
3. Constitutional Constraint. Full conformity with 
federal law--that is, repealing the renters tax credit--would 
probably require a change in the California Constitution, 
even though the credit was originally enacted statutorily 
(see Comment #1) . 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
SB 1604 (Wilson), 1980. Proposed giving the $137 renters' 
credit to surviving spouses permanently (until remarriage), rather 
than the current 2 year period. Died in Ways and Means. 
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TABLE 32 
Elimination of the Renters' credit 
* Existing Levels of Benefit {1977 tax year) 
I 
I REKTER'S CREDIT 
ADJUSTED GROSS 
INCOME CLASS HUMBER AMOUKT 
NOKTJI.XJ\BLE RETURNS 
NO ADJ. GROSS INCOME 153. 116 $5,272.001 $1 UNDER $1,000 103.404 3,750,080 
1' 0 0 0 UNDER 2. 0 0 0 145,273 5,265,066 
2 '0 0 0 UNDER 3.000 18 6. 18 0 6,811,626 
3' 0 0 0 UNDER 4.000 218,746 8,013,795 
4,000 UNDER 5,000 206.098 7,563,434 
5,000 UNDER 6.000 96,367 3,552,406 
6,000 UKDER 7,000 98. 16 5 3.617,889 
7. 0 0 0 UNDER 8,000 97,940 3.599,134 
8,000 UNDER 9,000 91,474 3,376,788 
9,000 UNDER 10,000 89.224 3,291.135 
1 0 '0 0 0 J\ND OVER 6' 6 18 243,116 
~OTAL NONTAXABLE RETURNS 1. 492.605 $54,356,470 
. TAXABLE RETURNS 
I 
I 
I 
' i 
' 
LESS THfdi ,000 2,765 $63,907 
3' 0 0 0 UNvEF. ,000 2' 553 6 4' 86 1 
4,000 UNDER ,000 2,800 78' 300 
5,000 UNDER 6,000 133,603 4,902,432 
6' 0 0 0 UNDER 7,000 118' 39 1 4,320,664 
7' 0 0 0 UNDER 8,000 128,867 4,726,823 
8.000 UNDER 9,000 120,468 4,412.796 
9' 0 0 0 UNDER 10' 000 112.809 4,140,669 
10' 000 UNDER 11.000 168' 0 18 6,184,428 
11,000 UHDER 1 2. 0 0 ~I 169,375 6,252.219 1 z' 0 0 0 UNDER 1 3' 0 0 0 157,1l75 5,821,175 
1 3' 0 0 0 UNDER 1 4' 0 0 0 133.036 4,908,086 
14.000 UNDER 1 5' 0 0 0 11 3. 4 8 1 4,185,545 
15' 0 0 0 UHDER 16, 0 00 I 103.402 3,811.897 
1 6. 0 0 0 UHD R 17. 00 0 90,673 3,347,625 
17' 0 0 0 UND R 18' 0 0 0 82. 136 3,033.364 
18' 0 0 0 R 19,000 72.784 2,676,883 
1 9' 0 0 0 UHDER 20,000 58' 147 2.146,419 
20,000 UNDER 21.000 51.750 1. 908.990 
21.000 UNDER 22,000 45,320 1,675,990 
22' 000 UNDER 23,000 40' 390 1, 489' 576 
23,000 UHDER 24,000 31.260 1.153,750 
24,000 UNDER 25.000 28,708 1,059,586 
25,000 ll 2G,OOO 18' 47 3 683,401 
26.000 u R n. occ 17' 56 0 648,550 
27' 000 UH'J !< ZB, OOU 17,788 657.706 ! ~; (j 0 0 Ln{ n 29,000 13,318 481,225 
L ':J, 0 0 0 VHD!:R 30~tJOO 9,560 353,520 
30,000 UHDER 35,000 I 34,873 1.283,543 35' 000 UHDER ,, 0. 00 0 16.368 604,818 40' 000 UNDER 50,000 1 3' 18 1 487,047 
50' 000 UNDER 60,000 4,750 I 174,570 60' 000 UHDER 70,01]0 2,850 104,780 
I 70,000 UHDER 80.000 1 '48 0 I 54. 180 80.000 UHDER 90,000 I 810 29,750 90,000 UllDER 100,000 480 17,480 100,000 UllDER 200,000 1,740 6 4' 150 
200' 000 U~{DER 500,000 310 11. 36 1 
500,000 UHDER 1,000,000 47 1 '721 1. 000' 000 AND OVER 14 518 I 
TOTAL TAXABLE RETURNS 2,122.263 $78,024,305 I 
GRAND TOTAL 3.614,868 $132,380,775 
*From Franchise Tax Board's 1978 
Annual Report -- reflects $37 
credit for all renters. 
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TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT & WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM CREDIT 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Both federal and state law allow employers to claim 
a credit against tax owed equal to a portion of wages paid 
to employees from targeted hard-core unemployed groups. 
There are two nearly identical federal laws--a Targeted Jobs 
Tax Credit (TJTC) for several categories of disadvantaged 
unemployed, and a WIN (Work Incentive) credit for WIN program 
recipients. These two federal credits are discussed below 
as one provision. 
The differences between state and federal law are as 
follows: 
1. Size of Credit: Federal law limits the credit per 
employee to 50% of wages paid in the first year and 25% of 
wages paid in the second year. The credit applies to wages 
up to $6,000 per year. California law allows credit of 10% 
per year of wages paid for each of the first two years of 
employment, and applies to $3,000 per year in wages. 
2. Qualified Employees: Federal law covers a variety 
of targeted groups, including economically disadvantaged 
youth, veterans, and ex-convictsi certain handicapped persons; 
and certain public assistance recipients. The state credit 
is available to a sub-set of this federally-eligible group, 
comprising persons who receive state or local public assist-
ance or are WIN registrants. 
3. Cap on Amount of Credit: Federal law requires 
that an employer's credit for first-year wages may not exceed 
30% of the aggregate unemployment insurance wages paid that 
year*. California law has no such cap on the total amount 
of wages for which the jobs tax credit may be claimed. 
4. Double Benefit Prohibition: Federal law requires 
that the amount of the credit be subtracted from the amount 
of wages the employer deducts for business expenses. Calif-
ornia law contains no such provision. 
5. Sunset date. The Federal Credit (TJTC only) is 
authorized through December 31, 1981. The state credit has 
a sunset date of December 31, 1984. 
* Thls llmlt applicable to the TJTC only. No such cap for 
the federal WIN credit. 
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FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Full conformity to the federal provisions would result 
in an estimated revenue loss in the tens of millions . 
This would be in addition to the $10 million to $15 million 
annual cost of the current state jobs tax credit. 
FEDERAL LAW 
Prior to 1979, federal law provided for an untargeted 
"new jobs tax credit". The program was altered by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1978 to its present form as a Targeted Jobs 
Tax Credit, which will be effect through the 1981 year. 
The credit is "targeted" in order to encourage jobs 
for "hard-core unemployed" in the following groups: 
• Handicapped vocational rehabilitation referrals 
• "Economically disadvanted" youth, 18-24 years old 
• SSI recipients 
• General assistance recipients 
• Youth participating in cooperative education 
programs 
• "Economically disadvantaged" ex-convicts 
• "Economically disadvantaged" Vietnam-era veterans 
In addition, there is a separate federal credit for 
employing AFDC recipients who are registered in the WIN 
program, which is nearly identical in most respects to the 
TJTC. The size of the credit and restrictions on its use 
are as described above in "Differences". 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
California's jobs tax credit was enacted in 1979 after 
the federal TJTC and WIN credits were put into place. Pre-
sumably, each of California's departures from the federal 
framework were deliberate. 
The state credit allows employers a credit for employing 
persons in the following groups: 
• WIN program registrants 
• AFDC recipients not in WIN 
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• 
• SSI recipients 
Size of the credit and restrictions on its use are as 
in "Differences". 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Size of Credit. The federal credit amounts pre-
were 1ntended to provide an economic incentive suffi-
to encourage employers to create new jobs and fill them 
th un- or under-employed persons. The smaller size of the 
fornia credit apparently was chosen on the belief that 
behavior is more greatly influenced by tax incentives 
the federal tax than by the lower state tax, and that a 
state credit added to the federal one may have diminish-
ing returns terms of jobs created. Revenue loss considera-
may also have entered into the choice of the lower state 
credit. 
Conformity to the federal credit size would give 
loyers a total credit of 100% of wages of up to $12,000 per 
loyee for the first year and a 50% credit the second year. 
Is an incentive of this magnitude needed? Would any additional 
j be created over those created with the existing credit 
s , or would this be merely a tax windfall? 
2. Cap on Amount of Credit. The federal requirement 
ting the credit to 30% of all wages paid by the employer 
is intended to prevent wholesale substitution of existing 
for subsidized workers. The reason for California's 
from this provision is not known. 
The effectiveness of the federal cap in preventing 
lacement is questionable, however. From a recent mail 
survey of 1,000 firms, the General Accounting Office con-
cluded that only 13%-25% of jobs taken by subsidized workers 
were new jobs created by the federal credit. What this per-
centage would be without the cap is not known. 
3. Qualifying Employees. The purpose of targeting the 
deral jobs credit at the specific groups listed above was to 
encourage creation of jobs for the hard-core unemployed. 
California's apparent purpose in limiting the state credit to 
a subset of these was to provide further encouragement to 
employers to hire persons on state and local public assistance. 
The rationale was that the state cost of the credit would be 
at least partially offset by reduced state aid payments to 
who became employed. 
State conformity to the broader federal list of 
lifying employees would increase the state cost of the 
rogram without increasing the potential for off-setting 
assistance reductions. 
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are not 
ly between for 
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for Federal Law - The basic idea of the 
income credit/credit for the elderly is to place 
receiving retirement income on the same basis as persons 
s security payments, payments under the Railroad 
Act or other tax-free retirement income. It was felt 
pre-1954 system discrminated against persons receiving 
under other publicly administered programs, such as 
servants, as well as persons receiving industrial pensions 
The 
s lify 
liberalized 
system over 
independently for their old age. 
amendments made by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were to 
computations and to recognize the increased and 
benefits which had occurred within the social security 
the years. 
2. Rationale for California Law - The California law 
was straight conformity legislation, prompted by the same con-
siderations which influenced the Congress. The nonrefundable 
credit is 15% of retirement income with theoretical maximum of 
$375 (single), $562.50 (married-joint returns), and $281.25 
(married-separate returns). The community property provisions 
were retained the California provisions because of the statets 
storic commitment to the concept of community property. The 
ssion of an earned income definition was an oversight which 
can be remedied by legislation. 
LEGISLATION 
None. 
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SOLAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY TAX INCENTIVES 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LAW 
ral law provides tax incentives for installation 
of solar and other alternative energy source devices under 
both the Residential Energy Conservation Credit and the 
Bus s Energy Investment Credit. California's Solar Tax 
Credit was recently extended to be effective through 1983. 
A comparison of the two laws is made in Table 33 . 
The major differences are: 
1. Size of the Credit. For residences, the federal 
credit is 40%, not to exceed $4,000, while the state credit 
is 55%, not to exceed $3,000. In the non-residential sector, 
the federal credit is 10% to 15% (depending on the device), 
while the state credit is a flat 25%. 
2. Qualifying Expenditures--Residential. Both federal 
and state law cover solar, wind and geothermal. In addition, 
the state covers photovoltaic, and may be claimed for swimming 
pool improvements (federal law does not cover pools). 
3. Qualifying Expenditures--Business. Federal coverage 
is broader than the state. In addition to solar, geothermal 
and wind (covered under both laws), federal credits are 
available for ocean thermal, hydroelectric, intercity bus, and 
biomass investments. 
4. Excess Credits. Federal law allows carryover of 
credits in excess of tax liability and carryback for businesses). 
California law allows carryover, and in addition, for indivi-
dual taxpayers within certain income limits, permits refunds 
for credit amounts in excess of tax liability. 
5. Limitations. The federal credit is generally more 
restrictive regarding who may claim and how much may be 
claimed, particularly for residential property. See Table 33 . 
6. Sunset Dates. The federal credit is effective 
through 1985, while the state credit sunsets at the end of 
1983. 
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FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
would result a 1981 revenue loss 
of impact results as follows: 
Revenue gain from repealing 
s credit 
Revenue loss from federal 
conformity* 
• Residential Solar 
• Business Energy In-
vestment Credit 
NET EFFECT 
1981 Income Year 
(in millions) 
+ $ 15 
5 
20 
- $ 10 
*Based on 5% of federal revenue loss. 
FEDERAL LAW 
federal benefits were recently raised to their 
current 1 as part of the Windfall Oil Profits Tax bill. 
See Table 33 summary of provisions. 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
California has had a solar tax credit since 1976. 
It's 1980 sunset date was extended to 1983 by AB 2036 (Hart), 
Chapter 903 of 1980. Refer to Table 33 for provisions. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Simplicity. Full conformity would reduce 
complexi and confusion for taxpayers, since the present 
laws are quite different in terms of eligible expenditures, 
limitations, and other provisions. 
2. Changed Benefit Levels. Total taxpayer benefits 
under conformity compared to benefits under current state 
and federal credits could both be claimed (i.e., are additive), 
or whether the federal credit must be subtracted from the 
state ere t, similar to current law. This is shown below: 
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If State & Federal 
)" 
Additive 
Res1dent1al Business 
Mutually Exclusive 
Residential Business 
varies. Generally Less. 
Generally less,except 
greater, where costs 
except exceed $7, 500 
where costs 
exceed 
$200,000. 
3. Incentive. The optimum size of a credit to encourage 
additional installation of solar devices is unknown. With 
prices of conventional energy sources continually increasing, 
and with stence of the federal credit for solar devices, 
it questionable how much additional investment is encouraged 
by a state ere t. 
4. Benefits for Businesses. Conformity with federal 
law would reduce the dollar amount of credit available to 
businesses, since California law currently provides a flat 
25% ere t with no upper limit and allows state and federal 
credits to be additive. It should be noted that both state 
and federal law already offer other tax benefits in addition 
to the solar credits. Businesses may take deductions either for 
depre of such property or for a business expense for 
items not depreciated on top of the credits. However, con-
formity would broaden the list of eligible expenditures for 
the business solar credit. 
5. Benefits for Low Income Taxpayers. One of the 
objections to tax credits in the past has been that they pro-
vide scant incentive to low income people with little or no 
tax liability. Even with provisions for carryover of unused 
credits, the benefit is so delayed (and perhaps diminished 
by inflation) that it is an ineffective incentive and makes 
the credit discriminating. California's credit attempts to 
respond to this concern by providing that any portion of the 
credit which exceeds current-year tax liability may be 
refunded to individual taxpayers with incomes under a specified 
level. Conformity to federal law would remove this refund-
ability ion. 
6. Swi~ning Pools. One of the major criticisms of 
ifornia's credit recently has been that over two-thirds 
credits were claimed for swimming pool systems. 
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In response, recent legislative changes phases the pool credit 
down to 25% by 1983. Federal conformity would eliminate 
pool solar equipment from eligibility entirely. 
Size of Credit 
Not to Exceed 
Qualifying 
expenditures 
Excess Credit 
Limitations 
Sunset 
TABLE 33 
COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 
SOLAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY TAX INCENTIVES 
Federal 
Residential Non-residantial 
State 
Residentia-l----Non-residential 
40% 
$4,000 
Solar, Geo-
thermal or 
Wind. Swimming 
pools excluded. 
Carryover 
eDwelling unit 
must be taxpay-
er's principal 
residence, com-
pleted before 
4/22/77. 
eCredit must 
be reduced by 
prior year's 
claim. 
Dec. 31, 1985 
10%-15%,depend-
ing on category 
below. 
55%** 25% 
$25,000 plus % of $3,000 
tax liability above 
$25,000. 
No upper limit 
(l)Solar, Geother-
mal or Wind (2) 
Ocean thermal 
(3)Hydroelectric 
generators (4) 
Intercity busses 
(5) Biomass 
Carryover, 
carryback. 
eProperty must be 
depreciable and 
have a useful 
life of 3 or 
more years. 
Dec. 31, 1985 
Passive, semi-passive and active 
solar, photovoltaic and wind-
driven systems. Swimming pools 
included. Energy conservation 
measures applied in conjunction 
with solar energy system. 
Carryover. For individual tax-
payers under certain income limits, 
may be refunded. 
•Applies to any eState credit may 
dwelling owned be claimed in addi-
(not necess- tion to any federal 
arily occupied) credit. 
by taxpayer 
eState plus 
federal credit 
may not exceed 
55%. 
eMay be claimed 
in future 
years for 
other systems. 
Dec. 31, 1983 Dec. 31, 1983 
* Appl1es 1n cases where costs exceed $2,000. Where 
costs are less than $12,000, non-residential buildings 
treated as residential. 
** For swimming pools, credit phased down 10% per year 1981 
through 1983. 
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• 
ENERGY CONSERVATION TAX INCENTIVES 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE & FEDERAL LAW 
Federal law contains a recently-expanded Residential 
Energy Conservation Credit. Legislation enacted in California 
in 1980 establishes a state Energy Conservation Tax Credit, 
effective beginning the 1981 tax year. 
The differences are illustrated on Table 34 . The 
major departures are as follows: 
1. Sectors Covered. The federal credit applies to 
owner-occupied residences only. The state credit applies 
to the residential sector (including non-owner-occupied) 
and the non-residential sector. 
2. Size of the Credit. The federal residential credit 
is 15%, not to exceed $300. The California credit is 40%, 
not to exceed $1,500. 
3. Excess Credits. Federal law allows carryover of 
credits in excess of tax liability. California law also 
allows carryover, and in addition, for individual taxpayers 
under certain income limits, permits refunds for credit 
amounts in excess of tax liability. 
4. Qualifying Expenditures. Federal law covers in-
sulation and a variety of other components, such as storm 
windows, weatherstripping, set-back thermostats, energy use 
meters and others. The state credit covers all items on the 
federal list, plus numerous others. Some of the additional 
state items are water-conservation devices, load management 
devices, heat pumps, window coverings, swimming pool and hot 
tub covers, and others. 
5. Limitations. The federal credit is generally 
more restrictive regarding who may claim and now much may 
be claimed. See Table 34 . 
6. Sunset Dates. The federal credit is effective 
through 1985 wh11e the state credit sunsets at the end of 
1986. 
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Size of Credit 
Not to Exceed 
Excess Credit 
Qualifying 
Expenditures 
Limitations 
Sunset 
TABLE 34 
COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 
ENERGY CONSERVATION TAX INCENTIVES 
State 
Residential Non-residential Residential --Non"""res1dential ** 
15% 
$300 
Carryover 
Energy conserva-
tion expendi-
tures, as defined 
eDwelling unit 
must be tax-
payer's princi-
ple residence, 
completed before 
4/22/77. 
eCredit must be 
reduced by prior 
year's claim. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
December 31, 1985 * 
40% 25% 
$1,500 No upper limit 
Carryover. For individual tax-
payers under certain income limits 
may be refunded. 
Energy-conservation expenditures, 
as defined. More inclusive than 
federal law. 
•Applies to 
any dwelling 
owned (not 
necessarily 
occupied) by 
taxpayer. 
eState plus 
federal credit 
may not exceed 
40%. 
eApplies to any pre-
mises owned by tax-
payer. 
eState credit must 
be subtracted from 
federal credit (if 
enacted) . 
eMay be claimed 
in future 
years for 
other measures. 
December 31,1986 December 31, 1986 
* No federal credit for energy conservation expenditures. 
**Applies in cases where costs exceed $6,000. Where costs 
are less than $6,000, non-residential buildings treated 
as residential 
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FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Full conformity would result in a 1981 revenue gain 
of $20-25 million. This impact results as follows: 
Revenue gain from repeal 
of state credit: 
Revenue loss from federal 
conform1ty: 
NET EFFECT 
FEDERAL LAW 
See Table 34 . 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
1981 income year 
(in millions) 
+ $ 50 
25-30 
+ $ 20-25 
California's Energy Conservation Tax Credit was newly 
added by AB 2030 (Levine), Chapter 904 of 1980. It is con-
siderably broader than the federal credit. Refer to Table 34. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Simplici!Z. Full conformity would reduce complexity 
and confusion for taxpayers, since the present laws are quite 
different in terms of eligible expenditures, sectors covered, 
and other provisions. 
2. Incentive. Full conformity would reduce the size 
of the tax incentive substantially. If addit1ve, total 
benefit from both credits would be 30%, not to exceed $600. 
If mutually exclusive--as under current law--benefits would 
be half that. This would reverse the action taken by the 
California Legislature this past August to enact a -40%, 
$1500 maximum credit. 
The need for and effectiveness of a credit of 40% can 
be questioned, however: In light of large price increases 
expected for conventional energy sources, how much impact 
will an additional incentive for conservation (in the form of 
a state tax credit) will have on consumers' decisions? The 
state tax credit may primarily be a windfall for those who 
would have made such expenditures anyway. 
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3. Benefits for Low Income Taxpayers. One of the 
objections to tax credits 1n the past has been that they pro-ide 
de scant incentive to low-income people with little or no 
tax li lity. Even with provisions for carryover of unused 
credits, the benefit is so delayed (and perhaps diminished 
inflation) that it is an ineffective incentive and makes 
the credit discriminating. California's credit attempts to 
respond to this concern by providing that any portion of the 
credit which exceeds current-year tax liability may be 
refunded to individual taxpayers with incomes under a specified 
level. Conformity to federal law would remove this refund-
lity provision. 
4. Benefits for Businesses. Conformity with federal 
law would eliminate the credit available to businesses for 
energy conservat1on expenditures. It should be noted that 
both state and federal law already offer other tax benefits 
to businesses. Businesses may take deductions either for 
depreciation of such property or for a business expense for 
items not depreciated. Under the newly-enacted California 
law, these deductions are available in addition to the tax 
credit 
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AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION TAX CREDIT 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
California allows a credit to certain farmers for 10% 
of the cost of installing water-conserving irrigation equip-
ment, not to exceed $500. 
Federal law provides no such special credit, although 
general-purpose 10% investment tax credit does cover agri-
irrigation equipment. All equipment, regardless of 
water conservation potential, is eligible for the investment 
tax credit. (Refer to Investment Tax Credit section of 
this briefing book.) 
Federal law contains no specific credit for water-
conserving equipment similar to California's credit, so full 
conformity would mean repealing the existing state credit. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Repealing California's special 10% state tax credit 
for water-conserving irrigation equipment would produce an 
annual revenue gain in the $100,000 range. 
(Re r to the Investment Tax Credit section of this 
book for fiscal effect of conforming to that federal 
provision for all equipment, pages 80-81.) 
FEDERAL LAW 
Federal law has no special tax incentive for installing 
water-conserving irrigation equipment. The federal 10% in-
vestment tax credit may be claimed for irrigation equipment, 
regardless of water-conserving potential, along with a variety 
of other types of machines, equipment and property. 
Congressman Norm Shumway (Stockton) introduced 
H.R. 5965 last year, which would have established a new 
federal 10% credit for equipment which conserves irrigation 
water, claimable on top of the current 10% investment tax 
credit. The bill also would have allowed rapid 3-year depre-
ation of such equipment. The bill is being held in the 
House Ways and Means Committee and, according to the author, 
will not move further this year. 
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CALIFORNIA LAW 
Current state law allows a credit against net taxes of 
(not to exceed $500) of acquisition and installation costs 
(excluding interest charges) for irrigation systems used on 
cultivated agricultural land which result in reduced water 
usage. 
The credit is limited to taxpayers who receive at least 
75% of their income from farming and whose adjusted gross 
come does not exceed $500,000. The credit is allowed in 
addition to any other deduction which the taxpayer is entitled 
to claim. The credit is in effect for the tax years 1977 
through 1980. 
SB 1367 (Vuich), Chapter 900 of 1980 extends the 
sunset date for this credit until December 31, 1985. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Need. The original state credit was enacted in 
1977 during the California drought. The Legislature, in 
recently extending the credit through 1985, apparently con-
cluded that a tax incentive is still needed to encourage 
farmers to purchase water-conserving equipment. 
2. Incentive Value. With the cost of drip irrigation 
systems at approximately $1,000 per acre, is a credit of 10% 
not to exceed $500 per year a sufficient incentive to change 
behavior? 
3. Declining Use of Credit. Claims for this credit 
in 1978 were only half what they were in 1977, suggesting 
declining interest in the program. In 1978 (the latest year 
for which figures are available), there were 339 claims. 
4. Other Tax Benefits. Conformity to federal law--
that is, by repeal of this credit--would still allow farmers 
annual deductions for depreciation of such equipment. 
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INCOME AVERAGING 
DIFFERErJCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
Both laws provide for income averaging. There are 
differences in the amounts used to compute the averaged income. 
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY 
Full federal conformity would result in a revenue ~ 
of approximately $26 million in 1981 . 
For tax effect by income class and type of return, see 
table on page 159. 
FEDERAL LAW 
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1964, federal law provided 
a special computation to soften the impact of income earned over 
a period of years but which was received in one year. These 
provisions were repealed by the 1964 Act and were replaced by 
a new general method of averaging income. These new provisions 
are based upon a comparison of income received in a taxable year 
with the taxpayer's income during the prior four-year base period. 
The 1964 provisions were liberalized by the Tax Reform Act of 
1969. The current provisions may be outlined as follows: 
1. The 1'averageable income 1' is determined. This is the 
excess of the current (or computation) year's taxable income 
over a base amount. The base is 120% of the average taxable 
income for the preceding four years (the base period years) . 
In order to qualify for income averaging, averageable income 
must exceed $3,000. 
2. A tax is computed upon the base amount. 
3. A tax is computed on the sum of the base amount and 
one-fifth of the averageable income. 
4. The difference between the taxes computed under 2. and 3., 
above, are multiplied by 5 to get the tax on the averageable income. 
5. The total tax is the sum of the tax on the base amount 2. 
and the tax in 4. on the averageable income. 
157 
CALIFO&"\JIA LAW 
a law is much like the federal law as 
Reform Act of 1969. The existing differ-
two laws are: 
l. Under California law, tax relief is based on the 
excess of the current year's income over 133 l/3 percent of 
period income. The federal percentage is 120 percent. 
2. In computing average income for the base period, 
income which was excluded because it was from sources 
United States must be added back. There is no 
fornia adjustment because such excluded income 
have been received by a nonresident who is not 
for income averaging in the first place. 
3. The federal computation requires that each pre-1977 
base period year be increased by the zero bracket amount in order 
to make the pre-1977 taxable incomes comparable to post-1976 
taxable incomes which are determined with the zero bracket 
amounts taken into account. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY 
1. Rationale for Federal Law - Since 1939 the federal 
law has conta~ned prov~sions to spread back to prior years 
types of income which were received in a taxable year 
but were attributable to services rendered over a period of 
ars. The intent of these rules was to mitigate the effect of 
the progressive tax rates on the "bunched" income. 
The prior provisions were considered to be too narrow and 
the computation too complicated and, therefore, were replaced 
the income averaging concept in 1964. As earlier indicated, 
the 1964 provisions were liberalized and expanded in 1969. The 
intent of all this legislation, however, remains the same - to 
alleviate the impact of the progressive tax rate structure. 
2. Rationale for California Law- California's reason 
the adoption of income averaging was based upon the same 
considerations underlying the federal law. With the much lower 
state rates, need is perhaps not so imperative. The state 
has not conformed to the 1969 federal amendments because of the 
revenue loss involved. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
None. 
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AGI Class 
Least 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Totals 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
And 
100,000 And 
Totals 
But Less 
Than 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
Over 
Over 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
7/16/80 
TABLE 35 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
Income Averaging - Federal Basis 
Tax Decrease 
No. of Returns Amount of Tax Decrease 
Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate 
0 
299 
13,670 
31,506 
10,591 
4,337 
4,689 
1,073 
66,164 
$0 
2,094 
273,798 
1,205,330 
722,136 
435,387 
761,202 
240,107 
$3,640,056 
Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse 
0 
0 
2,629 
34,045 
60,672 
63,246 
84,172 
12,297 
257,061 
$0 
0 
71,679 
992,155 
2,097,375 
3,373,283 
10,118,151 
4,253,907 
$20,906,550 
Unmarried Head of Household 
0 
0 
2,751 
5,552 
4,567 
893 
1,987 
380 
16,131 
0 
299 
19,050 
71,104 
75,830 
68,476 
90,848 
13,749 
339,356 
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All Taxpayers 
$0 
0 
52,462 
197,234 
298,750 
80,319 
360,595 
113,152 
$1,102,511 
$0 
2,094 
397,939 
2,394,720 
3,118,261 
3,888,989 
11,239,948 
4,607,166 
$25,649,117 
AND FEDERAL 
income" 
, off-
assume not only a change in state 
but also changes the 
would also assume changes in 
capital gains, percentage depletion 
The fiscal effect of such full 
this time,but the impact of the off-
a revenue loss in 1981 of 20 million. 
federal law provides for an "add-on minimum tax" 
and an "alternative minimum tax." 
The "add-on" is computed separately from and is in addi-
" " The items of tax preference include: 
on real property personal 
(2) excess amortization certified 
railroad s (3) excess 
institutions, (4) excess 
, (5) excess amortization of on-the-job training and child-
care facilities, (6) the "bargain element"in qualified stock options 
and (7) excess drilling costs. The sum of tax 
preference items in of $10,000 is subject to a 15 percent 
rate. there are net operating losses, 
married persons returns, estates and , etc. 
The "alternative minimum tax" applies to individuals, 
estates and trusts. The tax is imposed only to the extent it 
exceeds the " tax" plus the "add on" minimum tax. Generally, 
the tax base allowable deductions tlls 
adjusted deductions and the deduction for capi a gains. 
The rates are: 10 minimum taxable income over $20,000 
and less than $60 minimum taxable income over 
$60,000 to such income over $100,000. 
law somewhat parallels the "add-on m1n1mum 
an "aluernative minimum tax." The 
include excess amortization items but 
capital gains and excess farm 
o tax to sum 
0 
return) 
aws 
federal ~add-on" 
response to the complaint 
or no income 
to items of income. 
was provided in 1978 to insure that 
itemized deductions or capital gains 
2. Rationale for California Law - The rationale for 
fornia law regaraing tax preference items is the same as 
the differences in the tax 
items of preference 
of certified pollution control 
ference" items, (2) the belief that 
a "tax " which constitutes 
(3) the belief that the rates should be 
proportional (flat), and (4) the belief 
taxes" is unnecessarily complicated and 
fication - The tax preference 
~~~~~~~e~~e~n~e~-o~n~e~quity grounds (everyone 
") even though they tend to greatly 
In effect, the provisions "penalize" 
"preferences" which are expressly authorized 
4. Partial Conformity - Changing state law to the 
law as to the items of tax preference would not result 
unless additional state provisions are also 
, the amount of capital gains which would be 
be fferent because of the basic 
in how capital gains are computed. 
of 15 percent would also not represent 
state "normal" tax rate is 11 
70 percent. 
change the method which 
le drill-
wells by 
Assembly 
AGI 
I 
000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
50,000 
,000 And 
Totals 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
,000 
10,000 
000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 And 
Totals 
Less 
Than 
,000 
10,000 
,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
$5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
100,000 
Over 
~ .. ~~~ 
TABLE 36 
FEDERAL CONFORMITY 
1981 INCOME YEAR 
No 
1, 
923 
7,641 
12,928 
11,887 
7,928 
15,114 
6,889 
64,363 
Joint 
1,187 
71 
1,962 
7,002 
15,186 
21,375 
65,550 
48 
1 
0 
897 
716 
1,757 
476 
3,129 
1,398 
8,374 
2,241 
994 
10,500 
20,646 
28,830 
29,779 
83,792 
56,817 
233,600 
162 
of Tax Decrease 
,289 
17.013 
,196 
1,223,942 
1,557,397 
1,535,399 
3,577,234 
,082 
4 894 
41 925 
165 04 
438 456 
681,922 
488 
486 
Head of Household 
0 
7,180 
8,065 
,776 
,138 
961 
All Taxpayers 
,499 
21, 
327,301 
1,397,053 
TAX RATE STRUCTURE 
Both s rate schedule. Federal 
Special schedules are provided in 
households. Federal law provides a special 
singles. State provides for automatic indexing of 
brackets, which federal law does not. 
EFFECT OF 
State adoption of federal rate schedule (14 percent to 
not realistic. Partial conformity to grant equiva 
f to singles, head of households or to make the state 
tax steeply progressive, will have varying revenue impacts 
depending on the draft language and interaction implications. 
However, if the state were to drop 
to federal practice, the state would save 
in 1981-82. 
FEDERAL LAW 
indexing to conform 
a staggering $2.9 billiT 
Provides separate progressive tax rate schedules which 
on fi status [single, unmarried head of household, 
married ling separate and married ling jointly]. The rates 
for singles ranging from 14 percent for income over $2,300 to 70 
percent for income over $108,300; for head of households the rates 
range from 14 percent for income over $2,300 to 70 percent for 
income over $161,300; for marrieds filing separately the rates 
range from 14 percent for income over $1,700 to 70 percent for 
income over $107,700; and for marrieds filing jointly the rates 
range from 14 percent for income over $3,400 to 70 percent for 
income over $215,400. 
Generally the federal tax law treats a married couple as 
one tax unit and filing separate returns generally leads to a 
tax compared to filing a joint return. 
The federal head of household schedule imposes a tax which 
is about halfway between the tax for a single return and a joint 
return on the same amount of income. The federal single schedule 
gives about half the benefit of "income splitting." Thus, for 
come levels between $10,000 and $100,000, the single schedule 
provides a tax which is 10 to 20 percent more than the tax 
imposed on married persons filing a joint return with the same 
amount of aggregate income. This means that if two wage earners 
marry and one earns 20% or more of their total income, they 
will more tax. This the so-called !'marriage tax" or 
"diverse bonus". 
163 
1 law also provides for a tax rate limit of 50 percent 
FORNIA LAW 
income (earned income and pension or annuity 
employer-employee relationship or from tax 
to a retirement plan) . 
California law provides for two tax rate schedules. The rate 
for all taxpayers except head of households ranges from one 
for income of less than $2,000 to 11 percent for income over 
500. For head of households the schedule ranges from one percent 
less than $4,000 to 11 percent for income over $18,000. 
persons fil jointly are allowed to "income split" so that 
rate schedules reflects a tax ranging from one percent 
less than $4,000 to 11 percent for income over $31,000. 
The preceding figures do not take into account the impact of 
the brackets which began in 1978. The current rates are 
unchanged, but the income tax brackets have been changed:S:l<fnificantly. 
See discussion about indexing.) 
The schedule for heads of household gives modified income 
, but unlike the federal schedule it is designed to give 
relief to lower income persons. California does not have 
schedules for singles so the so-called "marriage tax" 
(However, the"marriage tax" could apply in some cases 
heads of households with equivalent incomes marry 
Beginning in 1978, the California income tax brackets have 
usted to reflect an inflation factor. For 1978 and 1979 
factor was the Consumer Price Index percentage change from 
June to June to the extent it exceeded three percent. For 1978, this 
was 5.222 percent. For 1979 the factor was 6.8822. For 1980 
1981 t~e factor is the full Consumer Price Index percentage 
For 1980 the Consumer Price Index change will be 17.3346%. 
For 1982 and thereafter, the three percent threshold will again be 
us to determine the factor. 
California does not have a counterpart to the federal maximum 
rate of 50 percent for personal service income. 
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORJHTY 
1. Rationale for federal law - The federal provision allowing 
income splitting" by married persons was enacted in response to a 
court decision that persons living in community property states could 
ly divide income and thus reduce their taxes in a progressive 
Those persons living in noncommunity property states could 
164 
The 
taxes 
and 
As a re , many 
to s this 
1948 enacted 
the treatment heads was 
single persons with dependents in their 
living expenses and thus are entitled to some 
greater expenses. The head of household 
present s 1951. 
for s les was enacted in 1969. 
le some difference was justified as to 
single persons or marrieds, because of 
, amount of "extra" taxes paid by singles 
Accordingly, Congress provided a new schedule for 
percent above the 
however, resulted 
imposed a tax which was no more than 20 
tax for married couples. This new schedule, 
in the "marriage tax" discussed above. One 
"marriage tax" is that a married couple's 
" 
s are to be less than those of two single 
tax should be higher. This "marriage is 
subject to criticsm, and Congress is 
ways alleviating it. An artie out-
lows--see page .l6 7. 
all income. 
schedule for heads of households generally 
for federal special schedule, that 
directed that the schedule be designed to confer 
to lower income taxpayers. 
Californ has not followed the federal approach 
of revenue loss cons 
tax" and the argument 
s 
tend to income splitting 
schedules 
a community 
3. 
neutra 
state. 
Some 
which 
zed that lation does 
taxes as taxpayers 
le the 
"buying power" they are subject to 
rates. A more detailed analysis of indexing 
--see pages 168-175 
should be the same as two single persons with the same amount 
of income. Others argue that married persons are an economic 
unit with pooled income so that equity requires that married 
couples taxes not depend on how thier combined income is dis-
d between them. Still others contend that the tax system 
should be progressive. These three propositions are logically 
inconsistent--you can't have all three at the same time. The 
present federal system (and the state's to some extent) relies 
on equal taxation of couples and progressivity and ignores 
marriage neutrality. 
4. Simplicity. Joint returns are defended because they 
are simpler than separate returns. Also, if separate returns 
were encouraged, there could be manipulation of unearned 
come deductions to reduce taxes. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
1. AB 2669 (Deddeh) 1980. Would have conferred tax 
relief to heads of households who maintain a home for a depend-
ent child under a joint custody decree for less than a full 
taxable year. Died in Senate. 
2. AB 2001 (Bergeson) 1980. Would have removed the 
three percent threshold for indexing tax brackets for 1982 
and thereafter. Vetoed. 
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INCOME TAX INDEXING 
the cost of 1 adjust-
progressive individual income 
automatic tax increase that ~TOuld 
inflation. The procedure is to 
rsonal exemptions, deductions, 
general price level. The 
income tax brackets is 
page. 
Trend? 
s no reali 
can be advanced for and against indexation. 
the merits of the arguments, or lack thereof, 
indexing is gaining increasing popularity 
Perhaps the time for indexing 
s have concluded that there 
For reason, 
of reducing inflation significantly. 
, to a verv limited extent, shifts 
ary pressure off individuals and sibly 
caused by continuing inflationary 
some of the 
ates the 
pressures, at 
have 
zona, Cali 
on Income Taxes 
for 
, Iowa, 
tax, California's income tax is progressive; 
that is, tax rates increase as income goes up. 
flationary s, an un-indexed tax system cannot 
between nominal increases -- i.e. 
below or above 
-- that is, 
ion which actually 
tax 
of whether 
68 
,000 
,000 
,000 
38,000 
37 000 
36,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
32,000 
31,000 
30,000 
29,000 
28,000 
2 '000 
26,000 
25,000 
24,000 
2 '000 
,000 
1,000 
0,000 
19,000 
18,000 
17,000 
16,000 
15,000 
14,000 
3,000 
12,000 
ll' 000 
10,000 
9,000 
8,000 
7,000 
6,000 
5,000 
4,000 
3,000 
2,000 
TAX RATES BY TAXABLE INCOME CLASS 
EFFECT OF INDEXING FOR TAXPAYERS FILING JOINT RETURNS 
1977 
Before Index. 
1% 
1978 
CPI:+8.22 % 
Index:+5.22 % 
1% 
1979 
CPI ::t9.""8 8 % 
Index:+6.88 % 
1% 
1980 
. CPI!+Ii. 33% 
Index:+l7. 33% 
11% 
* Taxable income is all household income minus exempt 
l~come (i.~., social security), minus adJUstments 
(l.e., bus2ness expenses, alimony), minus standard 
deduction or itemized deductions. -----
1t;C) 
TABLE A 
EXAMPLES 
l. A family on a fixed income (for 
example, a taxable lncome of 
just over $13,000) loses buying 
power over the years as lntla-
tion occurs. Reading across the 
chart shows that indexing lowers 
the family's tax liability-rn---
recognition of the loss in buy-
ing power, from the 5% tax 
bracket in 1977 to the 3% tax 
bracket in 1980. 
2. A family with a $16,000 taxable 
income in 1977, whose income 
goes up at the exact rate of 
inflation, would have a 
$22,300 income in 1980. Look-
ing at the 1977 column shows 
that, without indexing, that 
family would have been pushed 
from the 6% to the 8% tax 
bracket, with no increase 
in buying powe~ Reading 
across the chart shows that 
indexing keeps that family 
in the 6% tax bracket. 
lation continues to push taxpayers into 
brackets, there would come a time when most 
the 11 percent bracket. This would 
sivity of the tax and a loss of 
revenues relative to growth in the 
In short, inflation causes individual income tax burdens 
automatically, without public debate or legislated tax 
Present State Law 
Indexing was first introduced in thel978 tax year by 
AB 3802 (Kapiloff), Chapter 569, Statutes of 1978. 
Elements of the tax system that are subject to indexing 
are (a) the tax brackets, (b) credits for personal, 
dependent, and blind exemptions, (c) the special low-income 
tax credit, and (d) the standard deduction. Each item is 
indexed somewhat differently, as indicated in the following 
discussion (and summarized in Table B below) . It is impor-
tant to note, however, that this basic system of indexing 
enacted in 1978 is permanent, and does not sunset in any 
future year. 
a. The income tax brackets are indexed by the annual 
change in Cal1forn1a Consumer Price Index (CCPI) from June 
prior year less 3 percent. For example, if the CCPI 
is 11 percenr;-the inflation adjustment factor applied 
brackets would be 8 percent. The brackets are rounded 
to the nearest $10. 
However, legislation in 1979, AB 276 (Bergesen), 
Chapter 1198, eliminates this 3 percent threshhold for the 
1980 and 1981 years only; thus in these two years, the 
InCOme tax will be fully indexed to the rate of inflation. 
The indexing above the 3 percent threshhold is scheduled to 
resume in 1982 and thereafter. 
The rationale for the 3 percent threshhold is that (1) 
this amount is thought to be "structural" inflation represent-
ing productivity, rather than inflation, and (2) the thresh-
hold mi s state revenue losses until experience 
indicates whether or not the state can afford full indexing. 
Legislation in 1980, AB 2001 (Bergesen), proposed to 
extend full indexing of the brackets beyond 1981 indefinitely. 
That bill was vetoed by the Governor on the grounds of 
future fiscal uncertainty and the substantial income tax 
relief already provided by indexing and other measures enacted 
since 1978. An attempt to override that veto failed. 
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rst 
The personal exemption and dependent credits are 
the CCPI change from June of 1978 to June of the 
to be indexed was 1979. 
f to the nearest $1. 
z the exemption credits to a base 
that this very low dependent exemption 
ly may be adjusted upward. Without such 
, the Legislature feared that the credits would 
back to $8. 
tax credit for low-income 
in subsequent years by 
June of the prior year rounded 
The credit cancels all tax liability 
adjusted gross incomes of $5,000 
for couples filing joint returns with 
gross income of $10,000 or less. 
d $1,000/$2,000 standard deduction will be indexed 
79 and for the following years by the change in the 
from June of the or year, rounded off to the nearest 
TABLE B 
TAX INDEXING COMPARISON CHART 
Credits 
1978 1979 
Standard 
Deduction 
1979 
Low Income 
Credit 
1979 
Base Year 1977 1977 1978 1978 
Year upon 
va based Prior Year 1978 Prior Year Prior Year 
Index Factor* ** CCPI minus 3% CCPI CCPI CCPI 
off to the 
nearest $10 $1 $10 $1 
* CCPI = California Consumer Price Index, "All Urban 
Consumers" s. 
** In the 1980 and 1981 years the 3% threshhold 
for is removed. In 1982 and thereafter, the 
3% threshhold for indexing is again applied. 
LOW-
excess of 
credit is reduced by 50% for each dollar of income in 
$5,000/$10,000. The credit is indexed, but these 
l therefore,for some taxpayers there is a dis-
ause of the intera indexed brackets, 
l t, and the rate of the phase-out 
1 1 
rsonal Income 
Tax Receipts 
TABLE C 
REVENUE EFFECT OF INDEXING OVER TIME 
( billions) 12.0 
$12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-----
1.8 
current Law, 
WITH Indexing 
WITHOUT Indexing 
--
1973-74 74-75 75-76 76-77 77-78 
Annual Revenue Reduction Due To 
Indexing (in billions) 
cumulative Revenue Reduction 
(in billions) 
10.3 "' / 
,; 
/ 
8. 7 ,/ 
/ 
7. 2 ;/ 
, 
r 
.,. 
/; ___ _ 
; 
5.1 / ; 6. 5 6.7 
/ 
.,...¥ 
78-79 79-80 80-81 
$0.3 $0.7 $2.0 
$0.3 $1.0 $3.0 
81-82 
$2.9 
$5.9 
/ 
,# 
"' / 
82-83 
$3.6 
$9.5 
NOTE: Effect of indexing shown above reflects 3% threshold for 1978 
and 1979 tax years, full indexing for 1980 and 1981, and a 
return to the 3% threshold in 1982 and thereafter. 
Source of data: Department of Finance 
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results in a substantial state 
compounds over time -- tax savings for 
lation rises. 
shows that the estimated cumulative effect of index-
the 1978-79 through 1982-83 fiscal years will be 
tax reduction of $9.5 billion below income tax 
which would have been realized without 
The Franchise Tax Board estimates that, in 
each one percent increase in the CCPI, after 
the 3 percent threshhold, results in a 
tax reduction, which is currently in 
million range. 
Since the CCPI increase is not estimated and 
in the withholding tables, overwithholding 
occurs. California has not yet dealt with withholding 
ons. It is anticipated that this problem can be 
omewhat alleviated by indexing, in advance, the withholding 
tab s and rates on some conservative basis. AB 2539 
( ) proposed using 50 percent of the prior year's CCPI 
current year withholding. That measure was 
, however, due to a substantial cash flow loss that 
is necessarily involved. 
. * Benef1t 
shows the tax benefit of indexing for a married 
th two children and a constant income of $25,000 
from 1977 through 1980. 
TABLE D Tax 
Personal Savings 
Income Standard Tax Before & Dep. From 
Year Income Deduction Credit Credits Net Tax Index. 
1977 $25,000 $2,000 $930 $66 $864 
978 25,000 2,000 884 216~ 668~ $46 
1979 25,000 2,200 820b 72 748b 116 
8 25,000 2,580 686- 84 602- 262 
% Reduc. 
From 
1977 
5.3~ 
13.4 
30.3 
a One year $150 increase in personal credit. If $150 excluded, 
then net tax would have been $818. Percent change based on $818. 
b s amount reflects the full value of the 3 percent wider tax 
rate brackets. If the 3 percent had not been taken into effect, 
these amounts would have been $17 more, $703 and $619, 
1y. 
Data and text of 
Law", 
Sta 
s section from ''Indexing Under the Persona 1 
Allan N. Desin, Director, Franchise Tax Board 
s Bureau (September 26, 1980) 
1 7 ') 
• 
Year ncome 
$1 
1 0 
100,000 
0 000 
40 
19 8 and the 
2,000 
,000 
2,200 
580 
tax 
1978 
1980, 
nearly 20 percent 
CCPI change made 
about 3 percent 
indexing the 
for high 
indexing 
a constant income 
TABLE E 
Tax 
Personal Savings 
Tax & From 
Credit Credits Net Tax Index. 
$9,030 $66 $8,964 
8,939 216 8,723 $91 
8,790 72 8,718 246 
8 407 84 8,323 641 
cates that 
bene 
than the higher income tax-
taxpayer's tax was reduced by 
to 1979 the 
1 S tax was reduced by 20 percent, 
was indexed by 17 percent for both 
is 
The 
the 
4 
no tax liabi ty 
the annual 
brackets 
Taxat Code. 
se effect in 1977, 
is to these brackets that 
tments been made. 
% Reduc 
From 
1977 
1.0 
2.7 
7.2 
Under $5,000 
Under 10,000 
Under 20,000 
Under 30,000 
Under 40,000 
Under 50,000 
Under 100,000 
And Over 
Under $5,000 
Under 10,000 
Under 20,000 
Under 30,000 
Under 40,000 
Under 50,000 
,000 Under 100,000 
,000 And Over 
Totals 
Returns 
Under $5,000 
,000 Under 10,000 
,000 Under 20,000 
,000 Under 30,000 
,000 Under 40,000 
40 000 Under 50,000 
,000 Under 100,000 
000 And Over 
Totals 
than .05% 
9 
TABLE F 
State of California 
Cumulative Tax Benefit From Indexing 
1980 Income Year 
(Data in Millions) 
1977 Law Tax 
% Of 
Tax Total 
$2 .1 
147 7.7 
650 34.0 
516 27.0 
196 10.3 
83 4.4 
163 8.5 
153 8.0 
$1,910 100.0 
$1 * 2 
* 267 4.7 
863 15.2 
1,120 19.7 
826 14.5 
1,380 24.3 
1!224 21.5 
$5,683 100.0 
$3 * 149 1.9 
1,014 12.8 
1,480 18.7 
1,356 17.1 
924 11.7 
1,573 19.9 
1,410 17.8 
$7,910 100.0 
Benefit Of 
Indexing 
Tax % Of 
Reduc. Total 
$1 .2 
60 14.2 
194 45.9 
117 27.7 
28 6.6 
9 2.1 
11 2.6 
3 .7 
$423 100.0 
* $1 .1 
113 9.6 
265 22.6 
311 26.5 
208 17.7 
224 19.1 
52 4.4 
$1,174 100.0 
$1 .1 
61 3.6 
354 20.9 
417 24.6 
349 20.6 
219 12.9 
238 14.0 
56 3.3 
$1,695 100.0 
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1980 Indexed Tax 
% Of 
Tax Total 
$1 .1 
87 5.9 
456 30.7 
399 26.8 
168 11.3 
74 5.0 
152 10.2 
150 10.1 
$1,487 100.0 
$1 
* 1 
* 154 3.4 
598 13.3 
809 17.9 
618 13.7 
1,156 25.6 
1,172 26.0 
$4,509 100.0 
$2 
* 88 1.4 
660 10.6 
1,063 17.1 
1,007 16.2 
705 11.3 
1,335 21.5 
1,354 21.8 
$6,215 100.0 
APPENDIX c 
State of California 
Personal Income Tax Statistics 
Summary of Data 
1978 Income Year 
Returns Amounts on 
Nontaxable Taxable All 
Nontaxable Taxable All Returns Returns Returns 
( t h 0 u s a n d s 
Total Returns 4,098,438 5,350,272 9,448, 710 
Adjusted Gross Income $23,287,166 $125,816,480 $149,103,646 
Total Deductions 8,753,751 21,833,113 30,586,864 
Taxable Income 15,617,590 104,041,143 119,658,733 
Tax Assessed 4,174,011 4,174,011 
Salaries and Wages 3,351,608 4,877,175 8,228,783 19,718,139 101,836,261 121,554,400 
Dividends 322,059 1,121,965 1,444,024 347,584 3,167,818 3,515,403 
Interest 1,427,596 3,449,496 4,877,092 1,656,656 5,810,340 7,466,997 
• 
Annuities and Pensions 331,372 407,026 738,398 1,409,603 2,683,661 4,093,264 
Alimony 26,760 21,753 48,513 76,930 119,167 196,097 
Business and Professional 
Gains 263,040 441,557 704,597 1,344,714 7,217,465 8,562,179 
Losses 125,378 202,371 .327,749 567,403 743,565 1,310,968 
Farms 
Gains 10,083 31,834 41,917 28,138 422,215 450,353 
Losses 19,171 49,236 68,407 205,544 327,951 533,495 
Partnerships 
Gains 44,107 206,195 250,302 194,031 3,180,790 3,374,821 
45,953 161,301 207,254 332,923 1,066,988 1,399,911 
and Trusts 
23,373 69,712 93,085 69,086 693,439 765,525 
1,422 5,581 7,003 6,259 21,787 28,047 
123,378 :n2,0l9 4 35.397 224,334 1,523,378 1,767,712 
117,199 408,251 525,450 480,876 1,411,839 1,892, 
76,053 236,042 312.095 132,543 575,667 708,210 
6, 799 16,185 22,984 28,276 46,480 74,757 
Assets 
Short-Term Gains 23,542 126,445 149,987 $67,282 $467,517 $534,798 
Short-Term Losses 20,611 116,489 137,100 100,569 424,912 525,481 
r·!edium-Term Gains 50,125 298,863 348,988 247,810 2,920,459 3,168,270 
Medium-Term Losses 17,297 68,901 86,198 42,997 193,897 236,894 
Long-Term Gains 91,287 347,000 438,287 358,068 4,756,966 5,115,034 
Long-Term Losses 18,769 '. 85,830 104,599 60,710 254,563 315,273 
Loss Carryover* 28,611 121,433 150,044 295,678 1,165,250 1,460,928 
Sales 
139,130 568,648 707' 778 361,078 4,338,057 4,699,136 
61,391 .246,645 308,036 46,204 185,698 231,902 
Other Than Capital Assets 
15,987 49,536 65,523 32,994 191,678 224,672 
Losses 12,837 18,608 31,445 84,812 88,268 173,080 
Sick Pay 25,949 7,451 33,400 103,446 12,652 116,098 
Ex:>ense 32,890 83,840 116,730 52,020 157,363 209,383 
Employee Business Expense 149,093 640,939 790,032 291,643 1,151,094 1,442,738 
Military Exclusion 64,480 43,125 107,605 61,917 39,045 100,962 
f-Emp1oyed Pension Plan 9,125 80,009 89,134 8,484 149,621 158,105 
25,030 210,635 235,665 23,993 261,361 285,354 
Defined Benefit Plan 584 1,228 1,812 692 1,752 2,443 
ted Interest 22,237 55,099 77,336 7,625 15,335 22,960 
Alimony 9,528 63,483 73,011 26,578 262,822 289,400 
*Reportable on future returns. 
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Sununary of Data Continued 
1978 Income Year 
Returns Amounts on 
Nontaxable Taxable All 
Nontaxable Taxable All Returns Returns Returns 
( t h 0 u s a n d s ) 
Itemized Deductions 
Medical 547,650 2,140,047 2,687,697 $695,177 $1,260,058 $1,955,235 
Child Adoption 815 3,384 4,199 449 1,424 1,874 
Taxes 
Real Estate 589,477 2,770,803 3,360,280 398,497 2,158,821 2,557,318 
Gas 618,433 2,986,525 3,604,958 63,606 370,008 433,614 
Sales 655,809 3,065,348 3, 721,157 224,562 1,561,897 1,786,459 
In Lieu License 553,029 2,786,919 3,339,948 43,557 261,273 304,830 
Other 47,872 256,242 304,ll4 13,437 56,067 69,504 
Contributions 
Cash 587,935 2,871,369 3,459,304 229,891 1,350,124 1,580,015 
Other 200,984 1,192,878 1,393,862 37,569 448,938 486,507 
Excess* 24,603 18,637 43,240 42,689 414.395 457,084 
Political 26,260 219,876 246,136 1,61:<. 18,141 19,754 
Interest 
Home Mortgage 507,353 2,410,649 2,918,002 1,278,654 6,091,148 7,369,803 
Other 538,351 2,655,846 3,194,197 556,611 3,053,330 3,609,942 
Casualty Loss 74,479 339,252 413,731 153,076 285,928 439,004 
Miscellaneous 541,241 2,730,981 3,272,222 228,762 1,590,885 1,819,647 
Standard Deductions 3,420,968 2,251,306 5,672,274 4,813,369 3,048,462 7,861,831 
Personal 4,098,438 5,350,272 9,448, 710 602,265 857,919 1,460,184 
Dependent 2,563,918 4,680,205 7,244,123 20,103 ·n. 085 57,188 
Blind 2,255 5, 724 7,979 18 45,992 64,232 
Other States 2,195 17,236 19,431 $394 $ 9,630 $ $10,024 
Child Care 12,772 62,183 74,955 322 1,292 1,614 
Low Income 
Agricultural Water 309 309 98 98 
Income Averaging 13,734 346;537 360,271 1,398 68,203 69,601 
Solar Energy 5,670 16,409 22,079 2,209 7,140 9, 349 
Retirement 20,798 15,009 35,807 2,400 3,107 5,507 
Refundable Credits 
Renters 1,839,869 1,939,649 3,779,518 67,194 71,255 138,449 
SDI 40,048 335,300 375,348 1,164 15,222 16,386 
Withholding 2,900,705 4,760,966 7,661,671 310,596 3,824,614 4,135,210 
Declaration 90,523 677,870 768,393 24,432 1,086,032 1,110,464 
Balance Due with Return 1,073,887 1,073,887 559,860 559,860 
IRA Premature Distribution 1,894 1,894 147 147 
Preference Tax 105,753 105,753 72,138 72,138 
Throwback Tax 80 80 254 254 
Oveqlayrnents 
Refundable 3,528,565 4,087,964 7,616,529 396,730 1,281,873 1,678,603 
Credite'J 31,765 236,047 267,812 7,295 101,290 108,585 
177 
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Other Distributtons 
Single Returns 
Joint Returns 
Separate Returns 
Head of Household Returns 
Surviving Spouse Returns 
Renters' Returns 
Nonresident Returns 
Fiduciary Returns 
Administrative Information 
Tax Forms Next Year 
Yes 
No 
Type of Return 
Single Page 
Multi page 
Tax Return Prepared by 
Taxpayer 
Practitioner - :-iot Computer 
Practitioner - Computer 
VTAP 
Solar Credit 
Single Family Dwelling 
Other Premises 
Personal Residence Exclusion Returns 
FTB/R&S 3/10/80 
State of California 
Personal TncomP Tax Statistics 
Summary of .Data 
1978 Income Year 
Returns 
Nontaxable Taxable All 
1,993,544 1,975,555 3,969,099 
1,458, 728 3,065,239 4,523,967 
62,642 60,576 123,218 
572,516 244,662 817,178 
ll,008 4, 240 15,248 
1,839,869 1,939,649 3,779,518 
201,385 136,492 337,877 
160,606 44,033 204,639 
3, 754,858 4,655,413 8,410,271 
343,580 694,859 1,038,439 
2,010,811 1,074,695 3,085,506 
2,087,627 4,275,577 6,363,204 
2,038,949 2' 135.064 4,174,013 
1,473, 796 1,735,276 3,209,072 
555,332 1,472,388 2,027,720 
30,361 7,544 37,90'1 
6,491 16,}')9 22,850 
264 96 :160 
6,033 6,10 l 12,1 l6 
178 
Nontaxable 
Returns 
( t h 0 
Net 
Amounts on 
Taxable 
Returns 
u s a n 
Tax Liabilit:t 
(thousands) 
$975,672 
3,033,826 
31,399 
128,875 
4,238 
875,281 
52,331 
33,519 
d 
Page 3 
Continued 
All 
Returns 
s ) 
APPENDIX D 
CALIFORNIA'S 
IDENTIFIABLE TAX EXPENDITURES 
11110-11 
(In biUions) 
Personal income taxes ......................... ,............................ $3.8 
Retail sales and use taxes . . .. .. .. . . . .. .. ..... .. ..... .. .. .. . .. .. . .. ... .. . . 2.1 
Inheritance Tax.................................................................. 0.6 
Bank and corporation tax ................................................ 0.2 
Motor vehicle fuel taxes.................................................... 0.1 
Insurance tax...................................................................... a 
Horse 111Cinc ......................•......•.........•.............................. a 
Total State tax expenditUI'ell ........................................ $6.8 
• Less than SSO million. 
Personal Income Tax 
(In millions) 
Interest expense ..................................................................... . 
Personal and dependent credit ........................................... . 
Property, sales, and vehicle taxes ....................................... . 
Capital ga!ns exclusion ......................................................... . 
Charitable contributions ....................................................... . 
Trade & business expense, union dues and miscellaneous 
Employer contributions to pension plans ........................... . 
Medical expenses ................................................................... . 
Head of household status ..................................................... . 
Employer contributions to health plans ............................. . 
Employee business expense ................................................. . 
Standard deduction ............................................................... . 
Income averaging ................................................................. . 
Social Security Income ......................................................... . 
Capital gains on death ......................................................... . 
Interest on government bonds ............................................. . 
&"IJC'''""lS of certain agricultural costs ............................. . 
Comrlen:satlon for injuries or sickness ............................... . 
Low credit ............................................................... . 
Exclusion of $100,000 of gain from sale of home ........... . 
Individual retirement accounts & self employed retirement 
accounts ......................................................................... . 
Casualty losses ..................................................................... . 
Accelerated depreciation ..................................................... . 
Taxes paid to another state ................................................. . 
Solar energy device/credits ................................................. . 
Professional corporations ...•.................................................. 
Meals & lodging furnished by employer ........................... . 
Moving expense ..................................................................... . 
Scholarships & fellowships ................................................. . 
Exploration & development costs ....................................... . 
Pe1centage depletion ............................................................. . 
Timber valuation for capital gains ..................................... . 
Military pay exclusion ......................................................... . 
$880 
520 
250 
380 
230 
210 
140 
140 
120 
125 
100 
100 
85 
60 
ss 
so 
40 
32 
32 
27 
30 
20 
17 
IS 
20 
13 
lO 
9 
s 
4• 
3 
3 
3 
Bank and Corporation Tax 
(In millions) 
Exploration and development expenses ................................... . 
Accelerated depreciation ........................................................... . 
Research and experimental expenses ....................................... . 
Exempt corporations (from minimum tax only) ................... . 
Charitable contributions ........................................................... . 
Solar energy devices ................................................................. . 
Depreciation of low-income rental housing ........................... . 
Exemption from preference tax ............................................... . 
Percentage depletion ................................................................. . 
Bad debt reserves ....................................................................... . 
Certain agriculture costs ........................................................... . 
Pollution equipment ................................................................. . 
Horst:racing tax 
Other Taxes 
(In millions) 
Preferential rates ................................................................. . 
Preferential breakage treatment ......................................... . 
lnhetit.ence Tax 
Pret:!rential rates: Class A and B beneficiaries ............... . 
Speci!ic exemptions ............................................................. . 
Chari:cable contributions ..................................................... . 
Life insu1ance exclusion ..................................................... . 
Insurance tax 
Non;Jrofit hospital service plans ....................................... . 
Pensions and profit-sharing ............................................... . 
Fratt:rn~l benefit societies ................................................... . 
Motor V einide fuel taxes 
Aircraft nses, primarily commercial ................................. . 
Sales w military ................................................................... . 
Sales end Un Tax 
(In millions) 
Sales tax expenditures: 
To be consumed at home ............................. . 
Candy ............................................................. . 
Vending machines-33% provision ............. . 
Gas, electricity, and water .............................. .. 
Vessels and aircraft ........................................... . 
Cargo and returnable containers ..................... . 
Prescription medicines ....................................... . 
Newspapers and periodicals ............................. . 
Leases of motion pictures ................................. . 
Option to pay on cost rather than rental re-
ceipts···························································· 
Sales by charitable organizations ..................... . 
Master tapes ....................................................... . 
Vending machine operators ............................. . 179 
Optometrists and podiatrists ............................. . 
Hot food sold to airlines ................................... . 
$950 
50 
13 
605 
215 
115 
69 
28 
23 
15 
3 
2 
2 
2 
I 
$43 
38 
21 
14 
II 
II 
6 
6 
5 
4 
2 
I 
$3 
2 
$493 
30 
97 
8 
$29 
13 
I 
$45 
35 
• 
APPENDIX E 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
'MIDDLE CLASS' ITEMS DOMINATE TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET 
The tax expenditure figures in the President's 1981 
are dominated by items with a solidly "middle 
class" tone, such as the mortgage interest and property 
tax deduction for owner-occupied homes, which is 
estimated to cost $22.3 billion in fiscal 1981; the 
exclusion of social security from income which (together 
with other tax benefits for the elderly) is estimated to 
$12.4 billion in 1981; and the exclusion from income 
plan contributions and earnings, estimated to 
$14.7 billion. 
the 1981 tax expenditure budget does not 
r:ontain a distribution of tax expenditures by 
income class. The Administration has decided to make 
such distributions only on special request, since it 
appears inconsistent to allocate tax expenditures by 
class in the budget documents, when similar 
are not made in the case of other government 
most recent available allocations of tax 
by income class are set forth in the 
1978 publication by the Senate Budget 
entitled Tax Expenditures: Relationships to 
Programs and Background Material on 
of bef.el1ls and 
!0 Armed fO!ctS 
1!79 
1.210 
530 
15 
1.490 
1,275 
1.010 
10 
'"" 
1,400 
445 
1.160 
1.580 
1.160 
10 
Fu-
1911 
1.470 
480 
1,930 
1.815 
1.350 
10 
1979 
1.360 
115 
530 
35 
470 
820 
65 
1.470 
115 
555 
35 
610 
1.150 
75 
'"' 
1.585 
135 
600 
40 
750 
1,670 
90 
180 
Individual Provisions. That study is available as Doc 78-
7873 in the Tax Notes Microfiche Edition. 
Some Expenditures Are Aggregated 
For the first time, a few tax expenditure budget figt:~res 
have been aggregated in the budget documents. In the 
past, the Treasury officials who are responsible for 
compiling tax expenditure figures have been content to 
warn about the dangers of adding tax expenditures 
together to get a grand total, since changes in one tax 
expenditure figure are likely to cause changes in other 
figures too. 
This year. all of the previous caveats about 
aggregation have been repeated in the budget 
documents. In addition. however, a special "memo-
randum" aggregates a limited number of major tax 
expenditures, including the special treatment for capital 
gains, which is estimated to cost $22.3 billion; tax exempt 
interest. estimated at $3.9 billion; the deduction for state 
and local taxes. which is pegged at $24.8 billion; and the 
charitable contributions deduction, estimated at $8.9 
billion. The figures also indicate that 
itemized deductions, taken as a whole, will cost $44.6 
billion in fiscal 1981. 
Res.denlial energy cred1!s 
Alternalivt, coostrvat100 and """ 
technology Cled!IS 
Natural resources and envtron~ 
ment: 
lxdus100 ol mterest on slate and 
loc.al government pollutoo COO· 
lrol bonds 
U:cluSIOO of payments 1n aid of 
coostroctoo of water, sewage. 
gas and ele<:tnc utilitieS 
fiVe-year amort1Zal100 on pollutiOfl 
control fat1htlfS ... 
Tax Jncent~m for preservat100 of 
lustO!~ structures. 
Caprtal gams treatment of certam 
!Imber 1ncorne 
Capital gams treatment of ~ron 
ore .... 
ArricuHutt: 
U:pensmg of cer1am caprtal oof. 
lays 
CaPital gams treatment of cerum 
111corne 
Deductibility of 11011CiiSh patron. 
age 61v1dends and certatn 
other 1!ems of cooperatives 
hcJus10n of certam COSl·Sharmg 
payments 
220 
200 
10 
-15 
385 
10 
75 
15 
SO\ 
390 
120 
60 
10 
10 
410 
10 
75 
10 
540 
!9B! 
495 
245 
110 
15 
20 
470 
10 
80 
20 
590 
1919 
645 460 460 
1l5 140 165 
10 15 
110 120 
10 10 
445 430 
365 405 
liD -ll5 
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Commerce and hou~ne: credit: 
OJV!dend exch.JSiOO 
ExclusiOn of mterest 011 Stale and 
local tndustnal developmtnt 
bonds 
b:emot100 of cred1t umon mcome 
Excess ba<l debt reserves of It· 
nanoal mshtuhons 
Deductibility of mortgage mterest 
on owner .occupied ho<nes 
Dedutliblhty of property lax on 
owner «CillJied ho<nes 
Deducttblilty of mterest on CtJn· 
sumer credtt 
Exoensmg of construct1011 penod 
m:erest and taxes 
hcess hrst,year deprec1abon 
llepreetaiiOO on rental l!ousmg m 
stratghlli~ 
on ilwldmgs (other 
rental l!ousmg l m excess 
of stratgh! lme 
Asset depreCI>IIOO range 
CaPital gams (other tnan agrrcul· 
ture_ t1mbef. 1ron ore and 
coal) 
Deferral ol cap;tal gams on hOll\e 
sales 
CaPital g31ns at death 
Surtax exemptiOn (through 
1978) 
Reduced rates on the first 
$100.000 of Ctlfpora!e 1nrome 
Investment credlt, ather than 
[SOP's and rehabllrta!ton of 
structures 
Investment cre<hf lOf rehablhta-
1100 of structures 
Transportation: 
Deducttb<htl ot nonbusmess State 
gasolme taxes 
amortllatron on railroad 
stock 
ot Ia< 011 shiPPing CtJm· 
pames 
Commuruty and regional develop.. 
ment: 
fiVe-year amorluat1oo fOf housmg 
rehJblhtalion 
Education, training, employment, 
and social services: 
Exclus100 of scholarship and tel· 
!owslup mcome 
Parental personal exemptron lor 
students age 19 v. over 
Exciusron of employee meals and 
todgmg ( olher than mrhtary) 
Employer educat100al ass1stance 
Exclus100 of contnbut1011s. to pre-
paid serv1ces pians 
credit tor ESOP' s 
Deducliblirly ol chantable contn· 
ool!ons ( educat!Oil) 
Oeduc!rllilrty of cha11!able con!n· 
butrons. oth€r than educatron 
and health 
Max1mum !ax on personal servtce 
mrome 
Cr€-(N tor .ctH!d and dependent 
care expenses 
Cred1t tor of AfOC 
rec!Cients pubhc ass1st. 
ance rec1p!ents under work m-
crotrve programs 
Gene<al jOIJs credit 
Targeted ,oils credr! 
Health: 
f.xclu:aon of co-nlrlbu 
t1ons for msurance 
pn:!m1ums and medJCal care 
Oeducntnhty of medica! expenses 
Expensmg of removal of arch!!ec. 
tura! and transPQftatlon Dar-
ners to the handicapped 
ol chan!aO!e contn-
Income secunty: 
b:c!u~mn of sooa! secunty bene 
fits 
!919 
140 
90 
780 
525 
50 
70 
I35 
2.460 
655 
3.IIO 
3.185 
13,910 
55 
-40 
75 
650 
315 
405 
45 
1.!10 
IS 
10 
zoo 
1910 
180 
100 
855 
555 
50 
65 
135 
2.880 
715 
115 
7,555 
15,705 
I20 
-40 
70 
700 
345 
430 
45 
190 
115 
2!0 
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1911 1919 
460 
335 255 
115 
965 
10,745 
6.760 
3.085 
585 90 
50 135 
65 190 
140 I20 
3.400 I30 
810 10.190 
7.510 
l.l15 
4,440 
16.860 2.590 
140 IO 
350 
-40 
70 
10 10 
740 
3IO 
935 
315 
10 
15 
360 680 
450 5.110 
1.215 
715 
so 5 
85 685 
175 
11.080 
3.115 
220 1.020 
-1910 
490 
305 
11.505 
7.740 
3.595 
140 
135 
285 
110 
!50 
13,855 
1.010 
4.750 
2.910 
60 
IO 
375 
1.030 
350 
30 
10 
765 
5,725 
1.265 
810 
!0 
11.965 
3.585 
l.l45 
1911 
515 
360 
14.760 
8.975 
4,240 
160 
145 
190 
I25 
ISO 
14.885 
l.lll 
5.085 
3.115 
65 
15 
400 
1.045 
380 
35 
35 
885 
6,645 
!.580 
900 
IO 
40 
I5,2!5 
4,050 
1.330 
181 
Disability insurance benefit'S .. 
OASl benefits lor retired work· 
en. 
Benefits for dependents and 
SUM'IorL 
E.<ctusion of railroad retirement 
system benefits .. 
ExcluSIOO of workmen's compen· 
sationllenefits .. 
ExcluS!OO of specii! benefits for 
disabled coal miners ... 
ExcluS!OO of untaxed unempioy· 
men! msurance llenefrts . 
Exclusion of public assiStance 
benefrts 
UOUSIOO Of disability pay 
Net exclUSlOfl of pensron COfllnlltl· 
hoos and eammgs 
Employer plans 
P:ans lor self.employed and 
ot1lers 
Exclusron of other employee bene-
Iris· 
PremiUms orr grOUjl term life 
msurance < 
Premrums on IICCldent and diS· 
ab!ltty insurance 
Income of trusts to finance 
suppleme!ltary unemploy. 
ment benefits .. 
ExcluSIOO of rnterest on life rnStJr· 
ance savmgs .. 
E.lcluSion of capdal gams on 
home sales lor pe<SOI1s age 65 
and O'ler 
Exclus1011 of caprtal gams on 
hOll\e S<les for per1011s age 55 
and over 
AdditiOllal exemptron lor the blrnd 
Addrtronal exemption lor elderly 
lax credit for the elderly 
Deductrbllity of caSIJ.'llly losses 
Earned mcome credit 1 
ExcluSIOn of mterest on State and 
local l!ousmg bonds 
Veterans benefits and services: 
Exclusion of veterans disability 
compensation 
Exclusron of veterans pens10ns 
Exclusion of Gl bill benefits 
General government: 
Credfts and deduct100s for polifr. 
cal contnbulions 
General purpose fiscal assistance: 
ExcluSIOn of interest on general 
purpose state and lor.al debt 
Deductibilrty of norrbu~ness state 
and local taxes (other than 011 
owner.occupred homes and 
gaSillrne) .. 
Tax credit for Ctlfporations recerv-
ing income lrOll\ domg buS!· 
ness m United States posses. 
SIOIIS 
Interest: 
Deferral ol 1nterest on savmgs 
bonds .. 
Memoundum 
Combined effect of provisions 
diuggregated above: 
Caprtal garns 
ExcluSion ot rnterest 011 state and 
local debt 
Deduclibility of state and local 
noobusmess taxes 
Deductrbilrty of chantable cootn· 
butrons 
ltemued deductions 
Deduct.blh~l ot mortgage <nterest 
and property tax on owner ·OC. 
cuplf!d homes 
Benefits lor the elderly 
[xcluSIOII of soc<al secunty and 
railroad retltemenf plus the 
add1ftonal exemption and 
tax credrt lor the elderly 
410 
3.145 
740 
!075 
4,095 
930 
1910 
630 
3.5!5 
780 
l.l/5 
4.645 
985 
1911 
1.010 
3.900 
860 
1.310 
5,500 
1.030 
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1579 
590 
5,465 
845 
285 
980 
50 
1.885 
345 
185 
ll.l35 
1}65 
1.350 
85 
lO 
1.910 
75 
125 
35 
1.745 
I45 
530 
300 
80 
915 
45 
190 
80 
1.110 
12.595 
500 
I6.605 
1.610 
18.895 
6.810 
31.960 
I6.545 
8.405 
1910 
685 
6.880 
99() 
330 
l.l65 
50 
2.495 
395 
185 
11.925 
1.125 
!.485 
90 
!0 
3,365 
535 
40 
!.970 
135 
590 
m 
I80 
1.050 
50 
160 
100 
1.365 
I4.665 
190 
20.740 
3,090 
1l.l90 
7.635 
38.040 
19.095 
10.145 
1911 
8ZO 
8.695 
1.205 
380 
1.385 
50 
ll!O 
450 
190 
I4.140 
2.510 
I,635 
100 
3.895 
590 
40 
2.070 
135 
665 
360 
615 
!.liS 
55 
130 
80 
2.615 
17J2L 
250 
12.310 
3.865 
24.795 
8.860 
44.505 
22.340 
11.4IO 
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APPENDIX F 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
®fficc of 'lficgislatibe illmntsei 
3021 STATE CAPITOL, SACRAMENTO 14 
311 STATE BUILDING, LOS ANGELES 12 
~acrar.1ento, California 
October 19, 1Y59 
Constitutional Problema Involved in 
Conforming California's Personal 
Incor;le and Bank and Corporation 'l'ax 
La~·:s t·Jith Federal Income '.i'ax Lat1 
LAWR€.1>4Clf G. ALLYN 
Tr"""' L. OA.U"' 
&ARDARA c. CAl.AtS 
VJRCJNIA COtt&.A 
K£NT L. Ot:CHA.WtU:,\U 
qtCHAAD E. GAfllO!LLA 
J. GOUI.O 
(0~1!:1. W. llAW5 
ROBERT G Htt,SHAW 
OWII:N K KUNS 
EIIN«sT H. Ku·.zt 
ANN M. MI\C:Kll:Y 
R'I'ANM. POLST,U, 
EowAIIID K. PU.,C:£1..1 
R'v H. WHtT"""" 
The question has been as .hat constitutional 
problems, if any, would confront the Le slature in re-
ing California's ~ersonal Income Tax La~ (n. & T.C. 
c. 17001 and fcl ·1ng) and .Bank and Corporation Tax Lm1 
(F.. 1:: T .. c Sec. 23 1 and 11m: ing) to ra~(e these latts 
co with the Federal inco~e tax la~; (Internal Revenue 
Code of 1S54, Subtitle ,'\, cor.Jnencing at Sec. 1)? 
1. Delegation of Legislative Po~·~ 
A revision of the California la~s as indicated 
wou present the 9roblem of an unconstitutional del~3a­
tion of the State•s legislative power to the Congress of 
the United States should it provide for the automatic in-
clusion of pros~ective congressional legislation. 
The State Legislature is vested uith a generally 
nondelegable pm:er to r!:ake lattJS for the State of Califo~nia 
(see 11 Cal. Jur. 2d 481; and Calif. Canst.~ Art. III). 
California courts have _ooked upon this as ~rohibitinG 
the Legislature fro1:1 providing for the autowat ic incor:;>ora-
t by re terence of the future ar.oendt;:ents of the la'!.·:s of 
a other jurisdiction. As the court stated in Erock v. 
Superior Court (1937), 9 Cal. 2d 291, 297: 
" ••• It is, of course, perfectly valid to 
adopt existing statutes, rules or regulations 
of Conzress or another state, by reference; 
but the atte~,pt to rdake future regulations of 
another Jurisdiction part of t)Je state la·.! is 
generally held to be an unconstitutional dele-
t of legis lat pm·1er. 11 
1 
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To the same effect, see In re 
Cal. 326, 328; and 11 Cal. Jur. 2d-sl97 
(1923), 190 
In Fa lerrno v. Stockton Theaters, • { 1948), 
32 Cal. 2d 53:-Gur State Supre~e Court ci£ea the Brock And 
Burt~e cases to the point that uher<? a statute adopts Ey 
specJ.fic reference the lau o~ another juri t - Federal 
as uell as State - the adopted lau is incorpora in the 
.foro in uhich it exists at the tirr.e of reference and not as 
later modified. This \'las in regard to langua the Alien 
Land Lau giving aliens the right to acquire "in the 
~anner and to the extent, and for the purposes scribed by 
any treaty nou existing betueen the goverru:;e the United 
States and the nation or country of which s 1s a 
citizen or subJect'' (p. 58). The court s ) : 
" ••• there is Erave doubt whether 
Legislature could constitutionally 
to the treaty-na~ing authority of the 
States the right and po:jer thus direct 
control our local leaislation uith res 
future acta ••• " 
None of the California cases Btie 1 lved 
tax legislation. In the Brock case, houever, court 
cited in support of its sEate~ent as to the inval ity of 
incorporating the future le~islation of a jurisd tion 
by reference, the South Carolina case of Santee r1ills, et al 
v. Query (1922), 115 S.E. 202, 206. The nere-ITas---
concel'ned \'Jith the validity of a 1922 South 1 incon~e 
tax lmJ \'Jhich imposed on individuals and orga tior.:: liable 
for payL1ent of the Federal incone tax, a tax on inco:!le equal 
to 1/3 of the amount of the Federal tax. The provision~of 
the Federal income tax law relating to the assessment 
and collection of such tax, "passed and prior to the 
t ir.1e of the approval" of the state lat;, a in conflict 
uith the latter, together '.!ith the rules and regulations 
issued thereunder, t·Iere adopted and incorporated by reference 
aD if set forth in full. It naa contended that this incor-
poration had the effect of ado;>ting, or atter.:pting to adept, 
future Federal income tax la~s, ru:es and regulations, ae 
uell as those in existence on the date of the approval of 
the state lav, and thus delegated, or attempt to delegate, 
to Congress a nondelegable le~islative povJer the South 
Carolina Legislature. The court held agai is c enti~n 
on the ground that the language of the la~1 support 
it, and construed the la~ as incorporating provi-
sions of the Federal lat-I, rules and regul ef'f:e at 
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the time of the approval of the state law, stating that 
such incorporation is valid. HovH~ver, it recognized the 
existence of a prohibition against the adoption of prospec-
tive Federal legislation, and indicated that if such had 
been the nature of the state law, it would have held it 
invalid .. 
Consistent with Santee fUlls, et al v. Query 
is the Georgia case of Featherstone v. Norman-(1930),·· 
153 S.E. 58. There the court was conce~ned with a 1929 
Georgia law which imposed a tax on the net income of 
individuals and organizations equal to 1/3 of the tax 
on the same net taxable income payable by them to the 
United States under the Federal income tax law, provision 
being made for excluding from the tax base any income 
which was taxable only by the Federal Government and for 
including therein certain income which only the state 
could tax. The court held in part that the law did not 
unlawfully delegate legislative power by making future 
Federal legislation a part of the state law, since it 
merely adopted an existing Federal method for determining 
the state tax (at p. 70). 
It is stated in an annotation in 133 A.L.R. 
401, entitled 11 Adoption by or under authority of state 
statute without specific enactment or re-enactment of 
prospective Federal legislation or Federal administrative 
rules as unconstitutional delegation of legislative power": 
"Plthough there is some conflict, it is 
generally held that the adoption by or under 
authority of a state stat~te of prospective 
Federal legislation,or Federal administrative 
rules thereafter to be passed, constitutes an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power." 
Cases cited in the annotation in support ·of thie 
proposition include the Brock and Santee Mills cases (133 
A.L.R., at p. 403). . 
Also in support of the proposition are the annota-
tions in 166 A.L.R. 516, 518 (citing the Featherstone case), 
and 42 A.L.R. 2d 191, 798, entitled 11 Cons~itutionalifJ, 
c ruction,and application of provisions of state tax law 
for conformity uith federal income tax law or administrative 
and judicial interpretation." 
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In the light of the foregoing, we consider it 
extrerJely doubtful that the California c s sustain 
a revision of our Personal Income Tax and Bank and Corpora-
tion Tax Laws to make them conform to the Federal income 
tax law by the autcmatic incorporation by reference of 
future provisions of the Federal law. 
In reaching this conclusion we have considered 
also·the case of Alaskg Steamship Co. v. Mullaney (1950-
9th C.C.A.), 180 Fed. 2d 805, wfiicflSupports a contrax·y 
view. That case involved a 1949 act of the orial 
legislature of Alaska which imposed an income tax on indi-
viduals and corporations at a rate of 10% the total 
Federal income tax payable for the same t year to 
the United States pursuant to the Internal venue Code 
"as now in effect or hereafter amended" regula-
tions promulgated thereunder. The court stat that the 
incorporation by reference of the provisions of 
Federal law "now in effect" could not be que 1 , citing 
the Santee Mills, Featherstone end Burke cases p 815). 
Hm·1ever, even though there Has no issue "before on the 
matter since the Federal law had not been arne , the 
court added that there was no unlawful de legis-
lative power by the incorporation by reference future 
ngea in the Federal law. It gave as a reason for 
this that a major objective of the legialatt're making 
a law conform to future changes in the ral lawW3s 
the attaining of uniformity. 
Although the decision in the IVIullaney case was 
later in time than any of the decisions ~hat we have noted 
in support of the opposing view, we are unmvare of anything 
in any California case decided since Mullaney indicating 
that should the question now be presented to-the California 
courts, they will go off in the same direction as Mullaney. 
2. Intergovernmental Immunity 
A revision of the California Personal Income Tax 
Law to base the tax imposed by it upon the orne subject 
to tax under the Federal income tcx law would ~~pinge upon 
the general immunity from state taxation accorded the 
Federal Government and its instrumentalities (see i'•::Culloch 
v. The State of Maryland (1819), 4 L. Ed. 579t in the 
absence of a provision-lor the exclusion from the State's 
tax of interest paid on Federal bonds (see Pollock v. The 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Company {1895), ~9 L.~9, 82U= 
E21;-and ~m~ Jur. 3~3-~ Such inserest is now exempt 
from California person3! income taxation (see 18 Cal. 
Adm. Code, Sec. 17130 lb)). 
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For similar reasons, an exclusion or exemption 
of the same kind should be incorporated in any revision 
of the corporation income tax imposed t Bank and 
Corporation Tax La\'r (R. & T.C. Sec. and following). 
Such an exclusion or exemption is unnecessary, however, 
as to the franchise tax which that law imposes (R. & T.C. 
Sec. 23151 and following) in view of a distinction between 
a tax on income, which is the nature of corporation 
income tax, and a tax measured by income, 1r1hich describes 
the franchise tax (see Pacific Compan~ v Johnson (1931), 
76 L. Ed. 893). The Bank and Corporation Tax Law presently 
provides for the inclusion of interest paid on Federal 
bonds in the measure of the franchise and for the ex-
clusion of such interest from the c tion inco~~ tax 
(R. & T.C. Sec. 24272). 
3. Income of Nonresident I!idividuals 
The California Personal Tax Law presently 
imposes a tax on the ta:-7able income nonresident indi-
viduals which is derived from sources within this State 
(R. & T.C. Sec. 17041). This is in accordance with a 
general rule which prohibits a state from taxing the income 
of a nonresident individual derived from sources outside 
ita jurisdiction (see 27 Am. Jur. 416). 
Any revision of the Personal Income Tax Law to 
base the ta.1: imposed by 1 t upon the net income subject to 
Federal income taxation should like be consistent with 
this rule. 
There is no constitutional bar to the taxation 
of the net income of resident individuals of this State 
derived from sources outside Califor~ (see Lawr~~ce v. 
State Tax Commission (1931), 76 L. • 1102; Gu~r2~ty 
Trust C0;"7'oany of New York v. Virginia ( 1938 L 23 L. Ed. 
16; andlll30 A.L:R:-11~1186), and California taxes all 
such income accordingly {R. & T.C. Sec. 17041). To the 
extent, howe•ter, that taxable income derived from sources 
in another state is taxed by that stlte without the allow-
ance of a credit for taxes paid to Cal ornia, a credit 
may presently t: taken against the latter taYes for the 
taxes paid the other state (R. & T.C. c. 18001). 
4. Income of Foreign Corporations 
A revision of the Bank and Corporation Tax La\·1 
to base ti1e ta~es imp0~ed ·by it upon net income of 
foreign corporations subject to Federal orne taxation 186 
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In its impact on a roreign corporation which 
engages in both interstate and intrastate commerce, the 
rranchise tax imposed by the law (R. & T.C. Sec. 23151) 
can be measured only by a fair proportion of the corpora-
tion's income at~ributable to business done within 
California (Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone (1948), 
93 L. Ed. 1613). The 1aw-as presently-drafted is consistent 
with this principle {R. & T.C. Sees. 23040, 23151 and 25101). 
A franchise tax cannot be imposed on a fcreign 
corporation engaged e~clusively in interstate cOtllffierce, 
e\en though measured only.by its net income from sources 
within the state, since such a tax represents an unconsti-
tutional burden on interstate commerce {Soeccor Motor 
Service, !!!.£. v. O'Connor (1951), 95 L. Ed. 571). 
In its application to a foreign corporation 
engaged exclusively in intersta~e commerce, the corporation 
income tax imposed by the law (R. & T.C. Sec. 2~501) must 
be nondiscriminatory and may relate only to pra;er!y 
apportioned net income from activities within California 
(West Publishin~ Company v. McC~lqan (1946), 27 Cal. 2d 
705, affd. 90 L. Ed. 1603; N"O"rt:~-.:2'3tern States Portland 
Cement Compan:v v. Minnesota, ar.c J. _lltams\i-:-"Stockh:lr.--:--
Valves2,!!d F1ttings, J:nc. (1959Y:-3-L. Ed. 2d Adv., -421). 
Since the decision in the two cases last cited, 
Congress has enacted legislation limiting a state's right 
to tax the income of a foreign corporation arising from 
interstate commerce. Tl:is is P1J.blic Law 86-272 (Senate 
2524, signed by the President on September 14, 1959). 
Generally speaking, it prohibits a state from imposing a 
net income tax on income derived from activities within 
the state by a foreign corporation engaged in interstate 
commerce if such activities consist only of the solicitation 
by salesmen of orders for sales of tangible personal 
property, and the "orders are sent outs ide the State for 
approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by 
shiprr:ent or delivery from a point outside the State ••• " 
This limitation must be borne in mind in the drafting of 
any revision of the California Dank and Corporation Tax 
Law to establish conformity with the Federal income tax 
law through the use of the Federal tax base. 
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5. Income of Domestic Corporations 
As in the case of resident uals, there is 
no constitutional bar to the taxation or net incorne of 
a domestic corporation derived· from sources outside 
California other than in interstate comrr~rce (see Lawr~~ 
v. State Tax Commission (1931), 76 L. Ed. 1102; Guar..: :.!I_ 
Trust Compan* of New York v. ~Vir~inia (1938), 83 L. Ed. 16; 
27 Am. Jur. 12; and 130 A.L.R. 11~3, 1186 • Neverthaless, 
the corporation income tax imposed by and Corporation 
Tax Law is currently levied only on net ome derived from 
sources within this Scate (R. & T.C. c. 23501). 
The courts have not, to our dge, been 
squarely presented with the issue or ther a state may 
tax the net income of a domes tic corpora t rived in 
interstate commerce from sources outside state. The 
Uni d States District Court in Piedmont Co. v. 
_guery (1932), 56 Fed 2d 172, 176, by way um-;-expressed 
doubt that such a tax would be constitut 1 valid, on 
the ground that it would, in effect, operty beyond 
the state's jurisdiction, and thus v te ~ue process. 
There is, on the other hand, substant 1 basis for a 
position to the contrary (see Matson Navi~~tion Companl 
v. State Board of Equalizat!2U (1935), Eo L. Ed. 791, 
rehearing cien. CO L. Ed. lOll; United Sta ~es Glue Cor..:.~anv 
v. Town of Cak Creek (1918), 247 L. Ed. 1135 and 27 Am. 
Jur -:-.32'2 -=3"2 '3'}. 
It appears that, as in the case a foreign 
corporation, a franchise tax cannot be 1 ed on a 
domestic corporation engaged exclusively in interstate 
commerce, even though measured only by 1 net income 
from sources within the state, since such a tax represents 
an unconstitutional burden on intersta comrrerce iSee 
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor (1 ), 95·L. Ed. 573); 
Philadelph:r.a-and Southern-Mail SteamshiP Comoan~ v. 
Pennsylvania TIE86), 30 L.~ 1200, 1204; and 27 Am. Jur. 
j22- 323). 
6. Retroactive Reduction of Taxes 
There are some provisions in the ral income 
tax law which, if reflected in any federal base employed 
for California tax purposes, could present a problem in 
respect to ta~es for which liability may ve accrued prior 
to t enact:-:.2nt of the legislation provid for the use 
or such base. Such a provision, fo~ example, is that found 
1n Section 17.?. of the lntern3l Revence Code of 1954, relating 
to the deduction for net ot::erating losses, \.Yhich permits the 
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carrying back of such a loss to each of the three t3xable 
years preceding the year in which it occurs, and carrying 
1 t for\..:ard to each or the five years follmJing. Insorar aa 
this provision might apply so as to cause a reduction in any 
California taxes that may have~previously vested in the 
State, there could be a violation of Section 31 of Article IV 
of the State Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature 
from making gifts of public money for private purpose3 
(see Estate of Stanford v. Widber (1899), 126 Cal. 112; 
and Allen v. Franchise!!! BO~a-(1952), 39 Cal. 2d 109). 
JGjcc 
Ralph N. Kleps 
Legislative Counsel 
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DEPUTIES 
Does the Legislature have power, by statute, to 
incorporate federal law by reference into California's 
Personal Income Tax Law? 
OPINION 
The Legislature has power, by statute, to incor-
porate existing federal law by reference into California's 
Personal Income Tax Law. However, the Legislature may not 
incorporate future federal laws into California's income 
tax structure. 
ANALYSIS 
This question raises the possibility of an improper 
delegation of legislative power. 
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The cases hold that the Legislature is vested with 
a generally nondelegable power to make laws for the State of 
California (see, for example, 13 Cal. Jur. 3d, Canst. Law, 
Sec. 104, p. 198, et seq.: and Sec. 3, Art. III, Sec. 1, 
Art. IV, Cal. Canst.}, and the courts have held that the 
Legislature is generally prohibited from providing for the 
automatic incorporation by reference of the future amend-
ments of the laws of any other jurisdiction. As the court 
stated, in Brock v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 291, 297: 
" •.• It is, of course, perfectly 
valid to adopt existing statutes, rules or 
regulations of Congress or another state, by 
reference; but the attempt to make future 
regulations of another jurisdiction part of 
the state law is generally held to be an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power. " (Emphasis added.) 
In the cases, it was frequently stressed that the 
delegation of legislative power to others would be upheld if 
the discretion of the administrative officers charged with 
administering the laws were controlled and guided by adequate 
rules or standards prescribed therefor (see, for example, 
Tar12ey v. Mcclure, 190 Cal. 593, 600). However, more recent 
cases indicate that the need is usually not for "standards" 
but for "safeguards" to protect those affected by adminis-
trative action (Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 381, 382). 
Moreover, whether the incorporation of future 
federal laws into this state's Personal Income Tax Law would 
involve an invalid delegation of legislative power must be 
determined under the terms of California's Constitution (see 
Sandstrom v. Cal. Horse Racing Board, 31 Cal. 2d 401, 412), 
and Californi~Constitution has been under a gradual 
process of revision since 1966 (see Prop. 1-a, Ballot 
Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Tuesday, Nov. 8, 1966). 
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Much of the task of recommending to the Legislature 
the necessary changes in the Constitution was delegated 
to the Constitution Revision Commission, which was created 
pursuant to an Assembly concurrent resolution in 1963 (Res. 
Ch. 181, Stats. 1963). In its report to Joint Committee 
on Legislative Organization on February 15, 1966, on the 
proposed revision of seven articles of California 
Constitution, the commission stated as follows, at page 24, 
with respect to the delegation of legislative power under 
the proposed new constitutional provisions: 
" • • • The word 'provide 1 the 
sense 'The Legislature may provide' in-
dicates a power which may be delegated. On 
the other hand the word 'prescribe,' used in 
the sense that something 'shall be prescribed' 
••• indicates a power which may not 
delegated." 
We think that the courts would give considerable 
weight to the meaning accorded to "provide 11 and "prescribe" 
by the Constitution Revision Commiss construing the 
new provisions of California's Constitution (see Van Arsdale 
v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 249; v. City of 
Oakland, 263 Cal. App. 2d 414, 421). constitutions of 
none of those states which presently incorporate current 
and future federal income tax law by reference require the 
Legislatures of the respective states to "prescribe" income 
tax laws. 
The Constitution Revision Commission was terminated, 
effective March 4, 1974 (Joint Rules Committee Resolution 
No. 57, 1973-74 Reg. Sess.}, and a new group was formed to 
study the revision of Article XIII of the State Constitution, 
the article which deals primarily with tax matters. This 
group, call the "Constitutional Revision Force on 
Article XIII," did not have the same status as the 
Constitution Revision Commission, in that the task force 
was not created pursuant to resolution or other official 
legislative action. However, the report of the task force 
was printed as an Appendix to the Senate Daily Journal for 
May 14, 1974, and in the Assembly Journal May 16, 1974, 
commencing at page 13237, to express "the intent of the 
drafters of this revision and of the Legislature in adopting 
it" Cat page 13238 of the Assembly Journal). 
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On page 13272 of the Assembly Journal, the task 
force proposed the following language with respect to 
income taxes in subdivision (a} of a new Section 26 of 
Article XIII of the State Constitution: 
11 (a) Taxes on or measured by income 
may be imposed on persons, corporations 
or other entities as prescribed by law."* 
(Emphasis added.} 
On the same page of the Assembly Journal, the task 
force provided the following comment: 
11 Sections 26(a) and 26(b} are intended 
to consolidate existing Section 11 (which 
authorizes the Legislature to impose income 
taxes) with the pertinent portion of existing 
Section 1 3/4 which exempts interest from 
State and local bonds from income taxes." 
Thus, unlike the Constitution Revision Commission, 
the task force did not speak of the distinctions to be drawn 
between "provide" and "prescribe." Instead, the task force 
merely stated that it was intended to "consolidate"--but 
not necessarily change--an existing constitutional provision. 
The language in subdivision (a) of Section 26, as 
set forth above, was subsequently approved by the voters 
without change as a part of Proposition 8 on the ballot for 
the General Election held on November 5, 1974. However, the 
precise meaning of the former constitutional provision on 
income taxes still remains somewhat obscure. 
From the time of the adoption of the Constitution 
in 1879 until its repeal in 1974, former Section 11 of Article 
XIII provided as follows: 
* 
"SEC. 11. Income taxes may be assessed 
to and collected from persons, corporations, 
joint-stock associations, or companies resi-
dent or doing business in this State, or any 
one or more of them, in such cases and amounts, 
and in such manner, as shall be prescribed by 
law." (With emphasis again being added.) 
The same material is contained in the Appendix to the 
Senate Daily Journal for May 14, 1974, which was printed 
as a separate publication. 
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The above provision was not by the 
courts to determine whether the Legis delegate 
the power to impose an income tax. However, we do note that 
constitutional amendments were twice upon the ballot 
to accomplish that purpose and were each time 
(Prop. 14, Ballot Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Nov. 8, 1966; Prop. 
4, Ballot Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Nov. 5, 8}. 
With respect to the provision income 
taxes then before the convention which Sacramento 
on September 8, 1878, some of the seemed aware of 
the general rule that the Legislature inherent 
power to impose an income tax, even a constitutional 
authorization therefor, while others were not so sure that 
a constitutional authorization would unnecessary (see 
Debates and ~oceedin<js of the Convention of 
the State of Californ1.a, • .;;..:.,=..;:;...;;;;;..;;;...;,..;;.;~~-, 9 4 7; see also 
Delaney v.Lowery, 25 Cal. 2d 561, 568; Drug, Inc. 
v. Johnson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 720, 739, a discussion 
the Legislature's inherent power to 
The convention did not reach 
a distinction was intended between 
as used in the income tax provision. 
of whether 
"prescribe, 11 
However, cases construing constitutional 
ions decided prior to the time Constitutional 
Convention met in 1878 held that "pres indicated a 
nondelegable legislative power (see Exline v. Smith, 5 Cal. 
112, 113; see also People v. Provines, • 520, 526), 
and it would generally be presumed that framers of the 
Constitution intended to use "prescribed" in this restricted 
sense (see Emery v. San Francisco Gas 28 Cal. 345, 360) • 
It has been held that the courts will to other sections 
of the Constitution in which a word is used in order to 
determine its meaning in the section at sue (Miller v. 
Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 466). 
Moreover, after the Constitution 1879 was 
adopted and prior to the commencement constitutional 
revision in 1966, the courts continued to make a distinction 
between "provide" and "prescribe" in constitutional provi-
sions (see People v. Johnson, 95 Cal. 71, 474, 4.75; Slavich 
v. Walsh, 82 Cal. App. 2d 228, 232-235). 
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Therefore, whether or not it was necessary to 
insert an authorization into the Constitution of 1879 to 
enable the Legislature to impose an income tax, the 
Constitutional Convention saw fit to insert such a pro-
vision. With respect to the original provision and the new 
provision drafted by the Constitutional Revision Task Force 
on Article XIII, we think it is the duty of the courts to 
give effect to these provisions, if reasonably possible 
(Smith v. State Board of Control, 215 Cal. 421, 429). More-
over, since the provisions of the Constitution are mandatory 
and prohibitory (Sec. 26, Art. I, Cal. Const.), it has been 
stated that when the Constitution prescribes a course to 
be followed, all statutes must be consonant therewith 
(see County of El Dorado v. Meiss, 100 Cal. 268, 274; Allen 
v$ State Board of Equalization, 43 Cal. App. 2d 90, 93). 
Therefore, it will be the duty courts to 
construe a provision authorizing an income tax, as "pre-
scribed,~~ rather than as "provided," by law, and, as noted 
earlier, these two terms are intended to have a distinct 
meaning in the Constitution of 1879 and in at least those 
portions of the newer Constitution drafted by the Constitution 
Revision Commission. We think it would be difficult for the 
courts to give these terms a different meaning in another 
of the Constitution even though the latter part was 
drafted by the Constitutional Revision Task Force on Article 
XIII. This is especially true where, as here, both drafting 
groups merely made recormnendations to ·the Legislature on 
proposed constitutional revisions, and the Legislature would 
be presumed to know the meaning placed upon "provide" and 
"prescribe" by the earlier drafting cormnission (see Rosenberg 
v. Bump, 43 Cal. App. 376, 394). 
On this basis, it is our opinion that the same 
interpretation will be placed upon "prescribed," as used in 
subdivision (a) of Section 26 of Article XIII, as is placed 
upon that term in the Constitution of 1879 and in the earlier 
revised portions of the newer Constitution. Under this 
interpretation, income tax laws enacted pursuant to this 
provision would have to be "prescribed" by the Legislature 
and could not be generally delegated to Congress with 
respect to future changes in federal laws. 
Therefore, with respect to the specific question 
presented, we think that the Legislature has power, by 
statute, to incorporate existing federal tax laws into 
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California's Personal Income Tax Law. However, since the 
Legislature must "prescribe" this state's income tax laws, 
the Legislature could not incorporate future changes in 
federal statutes. Morever, we think it would be necessary 
to amend the Constitution to implement a program to incor-
porate future federal laws into the Personal Income Tax Law. 
CJW:jm 
Very truly yours, 
Bion M. Gregory 
Legislative Counsel 
~J~~ct,W~, 
By v 
Christopher J. Wei 
Deputy Legislative Counsel 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Report I consider two related questions: Whether 
it would be constitutional for California to adopt a statute 
conforming its income tax's base to the federal tax base in an 
"open-ended" or "ongoing" way;* and whether it would be consti-
tutional for Congress to accept the invitation tendered by 
Congress in the Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972, as 
amended. One of my conclusions will be that there is a high 
probability that the California Supreme Court would affirm the 
constitutionality of an open-ended conformity statute. However, 
as for participation in the federal program, I will conclude that 
strong arguments can be advanced both in favor of and in opposition 
to constitutionality, and that there is no obvious method for 
reliably predicting which set of arguments the California Supreme 
Court would find the more persuasive. 
Most of this Report consists of a long exposition of the 
relevant case law. This exposition aspires to be as straight-
forward and "neutral" as possible, so that the reader can make 
up his own mind as to what the proper legal inferences are. To 
this extent, much of the Report is quite deliberately "dull." 
Part II consists of my own effort to utilize the law exposited 
in Part I in order to analyze the California constitutional 
questions. 
~e Report also makes clear that whatever constitutional 
*There is no doubt whatsoever that a California "date of 
enactment" conformity statute would be valid. See pp. 33-38, 
infra. California's constitution does not contain any New York-like 
prohibition against incorporation by reference. See p. 12, infra. 
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doubts there may be about either conformity or "piggybacking" 
could be cured by an appropriate amendment to the state constitu-
tion. While conformity initiatives have been defeated in 
California in the past, the voting has been reasonably close; 
and a number of states, including New York and Colorado, have 
been successful in amending their constitutions so as to 
authorize open-ended conformity. 
A final point. Part II makes reference to certain policy 
judgments which the California Legislature could plausibly render. 
It should be make clear at the outset that these are judgments 
to which I myself would not necessarily subscribe. Were I a 
legislator, I do not know how I would vote on the conformity issue. 
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I. CASE LAW EXPOSITION 
A. DELEGATION IN GENERAL: THE BANALITY OF STANDARDS AND THE 
POSSIBLE RELEVANCE OF "SCOPE" 
The typical delegation case deals with a legislature's 
delegation of authority to an administrative agency which has been 
created by the legislature. When the federal Congress engages in 
such a delegation, the question arises of whether that delegation 
is consistent with Article I of the federal Constitution, vesting 
federal lawmaking authority in Congress itself. When a state 
legislature attempts such a delegation, correlate question 
concerns the permissibility of that delegation under the state 
constitution. 
At the federal level, the relevant legal doctrines are 
relatively clear. The formal rule is that Congress can delegate 
if, but only if, it provides the agency with meaningful standards 
or an "intelligible principle" for guiding agency decisionmaking. 
See Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). In fact, 
however, in any number of cases the federal Supreme Court has found 
particular delegations constitutional even though the standards 
set forth by Congress are highly nebulous. 
Thus such standards as "just and reasonable," Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. 
United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930), "public convenience, interest, 
or necessity," Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage 
Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933), and "unfair methods of competition,'' 
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), have been held 
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standard. Given this 
pattern of court decisionmaking, scholars can fairly enough argue 
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that Congressional delegations to federal agencies are valid 
even in the absence of a clearly "intelligible11 standard. See 
K. Davis, 1 Administrativ.e Law Treatise 177 (2d ed. 1978). 
Indeed, in all of American constitutional history, there are 
only two Supreme Court cases, both of them decided in the judicially 
aggressive year of 1935, which have found particular delegations to 
federal agencies to be beyond Congress's power. Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), invalidated provisions 
of a New Deal measure authorizing the President to prohibit the 
shipment of "hot oil" in interstate commerce. In fact, the legis-
lation in question did contain standards for Presidential decision-
making the "intelligibility" of which seems clearly sufficient 
in light of both earlier and later Supreme Court decisions. For 
this reason, the Panama holding is presently understood either as 
no longer stating good law or as being severely limited to its 
particular facts. SeeK. Davis, supra, at 175. 
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), 
invalidated key provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
which had delegated to a new federal agency the authority to establish 
comprehensive codes of conduct governing all businesses subject 
to Congress's commerce clause powers. Especially since the 
Schecter Court was unanimous, the Court's holding must be taken 
somewhat seriously. In truth, the standards set forth in the Act 
(like the standards in Panama) seem to pass constitutional muster. 
What was distinctive about the Schecter delegation--and what thus dis-
tinguishes the Schecter case from other delegation cases--is the 
extensiveness or "scope" of the legislature's delegation. See 
K. Davis, supra, at 176. The federal agency was being given 
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sweeping powers to regulate wide-ranging aspects of the 
interstate economy. At least in this sense the statute did indeed 
involve "delegation running riot," 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J., 
concurring). Insofar as Schecter has not been overruled, it 
implicitly stands for the federal principle that the "scope" of 
the delegation is a variable to be taken into account in ruling on 
the delegation's constitutionality. 
~fuat about state constitutional doctrines on delegation? 
One scholar has observed that the anti-delegation rule possesses 
far more vitality within state constitutional than it does at 
the federal level. See K. Davis, supra, at 204. This observation 
does not really apply to California, however. Prior to 1939, 
California courts frequently enough intervened to invalidate the 
state legislature '·s delegations to state administrative agencies. 
See, e.g., People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624 (1881). But leading 
California Supreme Court opinions in 1939 and 1940 not only 
liberalized California delegation law, but set the stage for later 
and more drastic liberalizations. Jersey Maid Uilk Products Co. v. 
Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939), affirmed a state 
statute conferring on the state Director of Agriculture the power 
to designate marketing areas for the milk industry and to establish 
"stabilization and marketing plans" in local areas. And Ray v. 
Parker affirmed, against delegation challenge, additional aspects 
of state's anti-Depression agricultural legislation. 15 Cal. 2d 
275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940). So far as I know, in the years since. 
JerseyMaid and Ray not a single California statute delegating powers 
to an administrative agency has been held unconstitutional on grounds 
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of an insufficiency in the standards guiding the delegation. (But see 
Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., 11 Cal. 
3d 801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1974).) Illustrative of 
cases finding particular delegations permissible are Sunset 
Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 7 Cal. 3d 64, 496 P.Zd 
840, 101 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1972); City and County of San Francisco 
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 347 P.2d 294, 1 Cal. Rptr. 158 
(1959); and Stoddard v. Edelman, 4 Cal. App. 3d 544, 84 Cal. Rptr. 
443, hearing· denied (1970). As for the meaninglessness of the 
ostensible requirement that the Legislature set forth standards 
that provide meaningful guidance, consider Holloway v. Purcell, 
35 Cal. 2d 220, 217 P.2d 665 (1950), in which the Court rejected 
a challenge to a state statute delegating to the Highway Commission 
the authority to determine the location of highways running between 
termini designated by the Legislature. The only standard which 
the statute evidently set forth as to highway location was that 
the Commission make use of "such terms ancl conditions as in [the 
Commission's] opinion will best subserve the public interest." 
One cannot imagine a "standard" more vacuous than "public interest". 
Surely an agency would never be given legislative instructions 
to ignore or subvert the public interest; and obviously 
the "public interest" goal is wholly nonoperational in the "guidance" 
it 5s capable of giving. Yet the Supreme Court, in a bland opinion 
auLhored by Justice Traynor, indicated that "public interest" 
provided a "sufficiently definite primary standard" which an admin-
istrative agency could be asked by the Legislature to "specifically 
apply." (For a comparable U.S. Supreme Court holding, see Avent v. 
United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924).) 204 
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The effective bankruptcy of the "sufficient standard" aspect 
of California's trad2tional rule on the legality of delegations 
has been explicitly recognized in the California Supreme Court in 
its recent, path-breaking opinion in Kugler v. Yocum, which is 
discussed below. 
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B. DELEGATION BY CONGRESS OF FEDERAL LAWMAKING AUTHORITY TO THE 
STATES: THE RELEVANCE OF CONFORMITY AS A JUSTIFYING PRINCIPLE 
In one dramatic situation, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded 
that the federal interest in conformity between federal and state 
law can constitutionally justify a substantial delegation of 
federal lawmaking authority to the states. Under 18 U.S.C. § 13, 
any act committed on a federal territory which would violate a 
criminal statute of the state in which the territory lies is ipso 
facto a criminal offense against the United States. Section 13 
(which was enacted in 1948) thus "assimilates" even criminal 
statutes of a state which may be enacted by the state subsequent 
to 1948. In United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.,S. 286 (1958), a 
defendant was prosecuted in 1955 for certain sexual conduct on a 
federal air force base in Texas which was contrary to a Texas 
penal statute that had been enacted in 1950. The issue the United 
States Supreme Court addressed was whether § 13 His constitutional 
insofar as it makes applicable to a federal enclave a subsequently 
enacted criminal law of the state in which the enclave is situated." 
Id. at 286. By a 7-2 vote, the Court ruled in favor of constitu-
tionality. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Douglas 
and concurred in by Justice Black, highlights the difficulty of 
the delegation issue. The Douglas dissent begins by recognizing 
Congress's Article I authority to regulate federal enclaves. Justice 
Douglas then reasoned that this authority 
call[s] for the exercise of legislative judgment; 
and I do not see how that requirement can be 
satisfied by delegating the authority to the 
President, the Department of the Interior, or, as 
in this case, to the states. . . . Congress can 
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adopt as federal laws the [existing] laws of a 
state . . . Congress can, I think, adopt as 
law govern~ng an enclave, the state law 
governing speeding as it may from time to time 
be enacted. The Congress there determines what 
the basic policy is. Leaving the details to be 
filled in by a state is analogous to the scheme 
of delegated implementation of congressionally 
adopted policies with which we are familiar in 
the field of administrative law. But it is 
Congress that must determine the policy for that 
is the essence of lawmaking. Under the scheme 
now approved a State makes such federal law, 
applicable to the enclave, as it likes, and that 
law becomes federal law, for the violation of 
which a citizen is sent to prison. . . . Here 
it is a sex crime on which Congress has never 
legislated. Tomorrow it may be a blue law, a 
law governing usury, or even a law requiring 
segregation of the races on. buses and in 
restaurants. . . . [An accused] is entitled to 
the considered judgment of Congress whether the 
law applied to him fits the federal policy. That 
7 
is what federal lawmaking is. . . . There is some 
convenience in doing what the Court allows today ... 
But convenience is not material to the constitutional 
problem. 
Id. at 297-99. 
The opinion for the Court majority began by describing the 
legislative precursors of § 13. Earlier federal statutes had 
adopted as federal law for enclave purposes only those state 
statutes in effect at the time of the particular federal enactment. 
But since Congress was committed to the goal of achieving "conformity" 
between federal enclave law and state law, Congress was required 
to reenact this "assimilation" statute in 1866, 1874, 1895, 1909, 
1933, 1935, and 1944. It was against the background of this 
experience that Congress in its 1948 legislation attempted to 
incorporate or assimilate even those state statutes enacted sub-
sequent to 1948. 
The Court's reasoning made clear the laudability of the 
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licy of " 
obvious 
which Congress had been pursuing. It recog-
power to assimilate the state law, Congress 
to renew such assimilation annually or 
the law in the enclaves current with those in to 
the states. 11 at 293-94. Noting Congress's "123 years 
policy of conformi·ty," the Court then of 
cone 
thin its constitutional powers and 
legis discretion when . . . it enacts that 
[conformity] policy in its most complete and 
accurate form. Rather than being a delegation 
by Congress of its legislative authority to the 
states, it is a deliberate continuing adoption by 
Congress federal enclaves of such unpre-empted 
offenses and punishments as shall have already been 
put effect by the respective states for their 
own government. Congress retains power to exclude 
a particular state law from the assimilative effect 
of Act. This procedure is a practical accommoda-
tion of the mechanics of the legislative functions of 
state and nation in the field of police power where 
it is especially appropriate to make the federal 
regulation of local conduct conform to that already 
established by the state. 
Id. at 294. The Court then referred to several other 
federal statutes which in one way or another gave federal effect 
to whatever state criminal rules were in effect at the state level 
at the time of the statute's enactment. 
A number of post-Sharpnack lower federal court opinions 
reveal the varie of ways in which the Sharpnack holding can 
authorize a seeming delegation of federal lawmaking authority to 
the states. Wallach v. Lieberman, 366 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1966), 
involved a personal injury which occurred in a federal post 
office. 40 U.S.C. § 90 stipulates that a state's workers' compen-
sation law 1 to uries within a federal building situated 
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within that state. In Wallach the personal injury victim--who 
wi.shed to sue his employer in tort rather than merely claiming 
under workers' compensation--argued that the federal statute, 
insofar as it incorporated the state's workers' compensation law, 
entailed The Second 
Circuit, relying on Sharpnack and noting the propriety of Congress's 
policy of seeking conformity between federal and state law on all 
federal properties, rejected this challenge. 
United States v. Smeldome, 485 F.2d 1333 (lOth Cir. 1973), 
affirmed 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which provides a federal penalty for 
anybody managing or owning "an illegal gamb 
business is in turn defined as a gamb 
minimum number of people, in business for a 
business"; such a 
s employing a 
number of 
days, and in "violation of the law of a state or political sub-
division in which it is conducted . . ldome involved a 
sports betting operation taking place in Colorado in seeming 
violation of a Colorado gambling statute. The defendant argued 
that § 1955 was unconstitutional insofar as it delegated federal 
lawmaking authority to the states. The Tenth Circuit, relying on 
Sharpnack, rejected this challenge, ruling that "[i]t is well 
settled in the law that Congress may adopt as federal laws the 
laws of a state, and such is not an unconstitutional delegation 
of congressional authority." Id. at 1345. In United States v. 
Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351 (D. Colo. 1970) a district court also 
relied on a simple statement of the Sharpnack rule in affirming 
the constitutionality of§ 892(B)(l) of the Federal Consumer 
Credit Protection Act, providing that if a particular extension 
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of credit is unenforceable under state law, this is "prima 
facie evidence" that the credit extension is "extortionate" 
10 
and therefore in violation of federal law. Smeldome and Curcio 
suggest that the lower courts are giving the Sharpnack rule a 
rather broad interpretation, allowing it to be applied even when 
there has not been a convincing showing as to the federal need 
for or interest in conformity. However, in neither Smeldome nor 
Curcio did the relevant state statute in fact postdate the federal 
statute; and only in postdating situations is the problem of an 
open-ended delegation explicitly and dramatically presented. 
I should make clear that federal rules of the Sharpnack sort 
deal only with the proper interpretation of the provisions in 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, conferring lawmaking powers on 
Congress; the Sharpnack rule thus does not directly "apply" to 
California. However, both the status of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the quality of its reasoning in Sharpnack suggest that the 
Sharpnack rule would probably be treated by California courts as an 
influential out-of-state precedent. 
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C. NON-CALIFORNIA STATE LAW ON THE DELEGATION OF STATE LA-wMAKING 
AUTHORITY TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A "SOFT" PROHIBITING RULE 
In reading judicial opinions, one can easily enough identify 
a "general rule" to the effect that state legislatures may r:ot 
delegate lawmaking authority to the federal government (call this 
"the Rule"). (See Annot., 133 A.L.R. 401 (1941), annotating 
Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940), a case which 
does clearly apply the Rule to a state statute professing to 
require labeling of local fruit according to federal standards.) 
The more one reads these opinions, however, the less solid one 
understands the Rule to be. Many of the cases--including most 
of the recent cases--deal with tax conformity statutes. While 
these cases will be treated separately in next section, it 
suffices here to say that several of them reach an affirmative 
result on the constitutional question, and the single opinion 
squarely invalidating a tax conformity statute comes from a juris-
diction whose constitution contains special language. 
In recent years, many of the references to the Rule have come 
sheer dicta. See e.g .• State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wash. 2d 
259, 501 P.2d 290, 301 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973); 
State ex rel. Kirschner v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d 131, 310 P.2d 261, 
265 (1957); Calvert v. Capital Southwest CorP 441 S.W.2d 247, 264 
(Tax Ct. Civ. App. 1969); State v. Dumler, 221 Kan. 386, 391, 559 
P.2d 798, 803 (1977). For a case that blends apparent dictum with 
a very limited holding applying th~ Rule, see State v. Williams, 
119 Ariz. 595, 583 P.2d 251 (1978). 
In the non-tax context, a number of the opinions announcing 
211 
12 
the Rule likewise turn out to contain peculiar features. In 1935 
the New York Court of Appeals, divided 4-3, held unconstitutional 
a state statute which applied to the intrastate coal industry 
whatever codes were developed for interstate coal by the federal 
National Recovery Administration. Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y.290, 
196 N.E.61 (1935). The majority chiefly relied, however, on a 
particular provision in the New York state Constitution prohibiting 
the incorporation by reference even of "any existing law"; the 
purpose of this special provision, the majority indicated, is to 
prevent the New York legislature from misunderstanding laws that 
it otherwise might vote to pass. (For another New York holding 
resting on this special constitutional prohibition, see People v. 
Mazzie, 78 Misc. 2d 1014, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 307 (1974).) In Relegate 
Bros. Co. v. Bayshore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 A.672 (1938), a unanimous 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a state statute incorporating 
into Pennsylvania law whatever minimum hours might be fixed by 
future federal NRA regulations for certain industries. The Pennsyl-
vania Court was concerned not just with the Rule, however, but also 
with the inequalities which the statute's delegation would produce 
as among different classes of Pennsylvania employers. 
In recent years, the largest number of cases dealing with the 
Rule have concerned state statutes rendering it a state offense for 
individuals to possess, without prescription, drugs that have been 
given certain designations by the federal Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, exercising authority conferred on him/her by 
Congressional statutes. When these state laws were enacted, most 
of the relevant federal statutes were already in place; the federal 
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Secretary had made some designations, but others were to be made 
by him in the future. The Supreme Courts Nebraska, North Dakota, 
Georgia, and Michigan have all interpreted their statest statutes 
as applying only to federal law and designations already in effect 
when the state statutes were enacted. State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467, 
183 N.W.2d 911 (1971); State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1972); 
People v. Urban, 45 Mich. App. 255, 206 N.W. 511 (1973); Johnston 
v. State, 227 Ga. 387, 181 S.E.2d 42 (1971). While all of these 
interpretations were motivated by a desire to avoid a constitutional 
ruling, only the Michigan opinion stated out that the state 
statute, if not so interpreted, would be unconstitutional. 
, finding The Supreme Court of South Dakota 
their statutes indeed open-ended, ruled unconstitutional. 
These Courts were only partly concerned 
gation, however. Their opinions chiefly Ys~~~~7 
of due process or "fair notice." As the 
described the situation: 
question of 
about the problem 
Dakota Court 
The list of hallucinogenic drugs was constantly 
changing and at any given time it would be 
necessary to consult the regulations of the 
Secretary to determine whether or not a certain 
drug came within the prohibi of the state 
statute. 
State v. Johnson, 84 S.D. 556, 558, 173 N.W.2d 894 895 (1970). 
According to the Washington Court, "it unreasonable to expect 
an ave~age person to continually research the Federal Register 
to determine which drugs are controlled substances." State v. 
Dougall, 89 Wash. 2d 118, 570 rae. 2d 135, 138 (1977). 
Over the years, Michigan courts have been especially interested 
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in the Rule. In Lievense v. Michigan UnemploY!Ilent Gomp. Comm'n, 
335 Mich. 339, 55 N.W.2d 857 (1952), the Court considered a state 
statute imposing certain burdens on each employer who "is liable 
for any federal tax" under the federal unemployment compensation 
program. The Court indicated that if the statute applied to 
prospective federal rulings on employer liability, the Michigan Act 
would be unconstitutional on account of the Rule. It therefore 
interpreted the "is liable" clause to refer only to liability 
existing under federal law at the time the Michigan statute was 
itself enacted. In Dearborn Independent, Inc. 1 v. City of Dearborn, 
331 Mich. 447, 49 N.W.2d 370 (1951), the Court considered a state 
statute requiring that all "official publications" of Michigan 
cities be published only in newspapers "which shall have been 
admitted by the United States Post Office Department for trans-
mission as mail matter of the second class." The Court, though 
badly divided on another issue, unanimously ruled that the statute 
unconstitutionally violated the Rule. However, even in Michigan 
the Rule is less than absolute. In People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 
17 N.W.2d 193 (1945), a divided Supreme Court upheld a Detroit 
ordinance attaching a local penalty to any violation within Detroit 
of wartime federal price control rules. The Court relied both on 
the emergency created by wartime inflation and on the fact that 
the ordinance 
did not create new regulations and prohibitions 
but merely added the city's enforcement sanction 
to Federal laws and regulations which were 
already applicable to the city and its inhabitants 
during the emergency. 
310 Mich. at 319, 17 N.W.2d at 197. For a contrary holding 
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on the (in)validity of such local add-ons to federal price 
control, see City of Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 
60 N.E.2d 919 (1945). 
15 
As Sell suggests, there~ cases upholding seeming delegations 
of state authority to federal lawmakers. However, these cases too 
must be carefully read. In James v. Walker, 141 Ky. 88, 132 S.W. 
(1910), rehearing denied, 147 Ky. 647, 144 S.W. 744 (1912), the 
Kentucky Supreme Court, divided 5-2, upheld a state statute 
providing that officers of the State Guard in active service should 
receive the same pay as officers with comparable grades in the 
United States Army. The majority relied, however, on a specific 
provision in the Kentucky constitution indicating that "organiza-
tion, equipment and discipline" of the state mili shall conform 
"as nearly as practicable" to the rules governing United States 
armies. (The dissent regarded officer compensation as beyond the 
scope of "organization, equipment and disc line.") In Mason v. 
State, 12 Md. App. 655,. 280 A.2d 753 (1971) a Maryland 
Court affirmed that state's version of the drug-designation 
statutes described above; the Court focused, however, on the 
point that future designations by the federal Secretary were 
adequately controlled by the standards contained in federal 
statutes which were already in the books at the time the Maryland 
statute was enacted. A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for 
any person to carry certain weapons if, within a stated previous 
period, that person has been convicted of or has served time for 
any "burglary, arson, or a felony involving the use of force or 
violence or the use of a deadly weapon, or attempt or conspiracy 
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to commit such offenses, under the laws of the United States of 
America, the State of Colorado, or another state. 11 In People v. 
Tenorio, Colo. __ _ , 590 P. 2d 952 (1979), the Colorado Supreme 
Court saw fit to affirm the statute. The Court agreed that "only 
the Colorado General Assembly has the power to define crimes in 
Colorado," and that "a fortiori, the General Assembly cannot be 
delegated to any branch of another state's government or to the 
Congress." But the Court's assessment was that the General Assembly 
had indeed done an adequate job of defining "the crime here charged. 11 
According to the Court, the Assembly's intent, properly appreciated, 
was merely to delineate a category of 
crimes whose general nature, in the General 
Assembly's judgment, was so serious that 
perpetrators could not safely be allowed to 
possess weapons in Colorado. 
590 P.2d at 954-55. 
The above review of the case law can be easily summarized. 
In non-California decisions, delegations of lawmaking authority 
from states to the federal government do seem somewhat disfavored. 
But the case law is shaggy, full of qualifications, and lacking 
in underlying basic explanation. It is very doubtful that the 
California Supreme Court--or indeed any California court--would 
attach any significant weight to this unimpressive collection of opin-
ions. If anything, the cases strongly suggest that it is necessary to 
consider a particular delegation in the context of the state statute 
in which it is found; that is, the purpose of the particular statute 
may well bear on the acceptability of the delegation. If this is 
true, then it makes special sense to bring together those cases 
dealing with the propriety of state tax statutes conforming the 
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state's income tax base with federal income tax standards. Those 
cases are described in the next section. 
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D. NON-CALIFORNIA STATE LAW ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
DELEGATING TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE 
STATE INCOME TAX POLICY: AN INCONCLUSIVE PATTERN 
1. The Clear Efficacy of a State Constitutional Amendment 
Delegation questions generally concern the proper interpre-
tatio~ of the state constitution; there is nothing in the federal 
constitution which requires separation of powers at the state 
level or which otherwise inhibits the state legislature from 
delegating. See Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park 
Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930); Mann v. Powell, 333 F.Supp 1261, 
1266 (N.D. Ill. 1969). There are two exceptions to this generali-
zation, however. If a statute delegates power over a federally 
protected constitutional liberty--for example, the right to free 
speech, or the right to vote free of racial discrimination--the 
federal constitution can still be turned to as a protection 
against the possibility of delegation-caused arbitrariness. See 
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Niemotko v. 
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Sunset Amusement Co., v. Board of 
Police Comm'rs 7 C.3d 64, 72-73, 496 P.2d 840, 844-45, 101 Cal. 
Rptr. 768, 772-73 (1972). However: the opportunity to pay less 
rather than more taxes is obviously lacking in federal consti-
tutional statutes. Secondly, if lawmaking powers are conferred on 
private parties who in exercising those powers may well be pursu-
ing their private economic interests, a special problem arises 
as to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); State Bd. 
v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953). 
However: a delegation to Congress obviously creates no problems 
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in this respect. 
Any argument against a state's delegating its own income 
tax authority to Congress is thus grounded exclusively in the 
state~s constitution. Hence there is little doubt but that the 
state, oy amending its constitution, can authorize the state's 
adoption of an open-ended conformity policy. This is shown by 
the experience in at least four states. The Colorado Constitution 
was amended in 1962 to expressly authorize the Colorado General 
Assembly to define that income which is subject to the state 
income tax by reference to federal laws "whether retrospective 
or prospective." Art. X, § 19. There have been no court chal-
lenges to the near-complete conformity legislation which the 
Colorado General Assembly proceeded to enact. (For a general 
"chart" of state conformity measures, see P-H State & Local 
* Service ~ 1002. ) When Kansas was considering a conformity 
statute, the Kansas Attorney General released an opinion doubting 
the constitutionality of an open-ended conformity statute; in respons 
to this opinion, Kansas ratffied an amendment to the state 
Constitution explicitly endorsing an open-ended conformity practice. 
Art. XI.§ 11. The later Kansas statute providing for full 
conformity has been assumed valid. See Cordes, The Kansas 
Conformity Income Tax Act: Part I, 17 U. Kan. L Rev. 147, 149 
(1968). Under a 1959 amendment to the New York state Constitu-
tion the New York legislature, in imposing any income tax, 
*~Vhat is impressive is how many states (more than 20) have 
adopted open-ended conformity for either personal or corporate 
income tax purposes. 
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may define the income on, in respect to or by 
wnich such tax or taxes are imposed or measured, 
by reference to any provision of the laws of the 
United States as the same may be or become 
effective at any time or from time to time and 
may prescribe exceptions or modifications to any 
such provision. 
20 
Art. 3, § 22. The later New York statute defined New York gross 
income as the taxpayer's "federal adjusted income as defined in 
the laws of the United States for the taxable year, with the 
modifications specified in this Section." A New court has 
given effect to the obvious meaning of the state's constitutional 
provision by affirming an open-ended conformity enactment, 
Garlin v. Murphy, 51 Misc. 2d 477, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 374 (1966). A 
1966 amendment to the Nebraska constitution provides 
an income tax is adopted by the Legislature, the 
adopt an income tax based on the laws of the Uni 
"[w]hen 
s may 
States." 
Art. VIII, § lB. After this amendment came into effect, the 
Nebraska legislature exercised its powers by enac a state 
income tax statute which incorporated federal statutes, rules, 
and regulations "as the same may be or become effective, at any 
time or from time to time, for the taxpayer year." In Anderson v. 
Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967), the constitutionality 
of this statute was considered by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In 
noteworthy dictum, the Court indicated that absent constitu-
tional amendment, the statute would entail an unconstitutional 
delegation. But since this element of constitutionality would 
have been found only in the Constitution of the state and since 
the amendment had altered the state's Constitution in this respect, 
the Court agreed that the statute resulted in no constitutional 
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violation. But the Anderson taxpayer then asserted an ingenious 
fallback position: that the Nebraska statute's delegation 
violated the "republican form of government 11 guarantee set forth 
in the enabling legislation admitting Nebraska to the United 
States, While regarding this as a "case of first impression," 
the Court concluded that the state statute was not lacking in 
republicanness, since the statute "does not constitute a waiver 
of the sovereignty of the state nor an abdication of its functions." 
The Court's reasoning on this point weakens the force of its 
delegation dictum. 
2, In the Absence of Specific Constitutional Amendment 
Only one state court has actually invalid~,ted a state 
conformity statute on constitutional delegation grounds. A 
Minnesota statute provided that individual gross income for state 
income tax purposes "means the adjusted gross income as computed 
for federal tax purposes as defined in the laws of the United 
States for the taxable year, with the modifications specified in 
this Section." A federal law promulgated subsequent to this statute's 
amendment·permitted the exclusion from income of sick pay which an 
employee might receive, an exclusion which would not have been 
otherwise allowed by Minnesota law. In invalidating the 
Minnesota conformity statute, the Minnesota Court discussed 
general delegation doctrine. Federal adjusted gross income, it 
argued, is 
an artificial concept created solely by Federal 
statute. . . . The amounts which are to be 
included or excluded in the determination are 
numerous and subject to change. Many of these 
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are based on political and social rather 
considerations. The same political 
considerations which are of significance 
to tax policy are not necessarily of 
significance to the state's tax collection 
scheme. . . . The basic objection [to delegation] 
derives from the principle that laws should be 
made by elected representatives of the people 
responsible to the electorate for their acts. 
Wallace v. Commissioner of Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 225-26, 
4 N. 2d 88, 591 (1971). It is noteworthy, however, that 
specific language in the Minnesota Constitution, alluded 
to by the Wallace Court in the heart of its opinion, that 
seemingly takes an especially strong stand against taxation 
According to Article X, § 1, "the power of taxation 
1 never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away." 
extent to which the Wallace result was influenced by this 
explicit language cannot be reliably ascertained. 
Cheney v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 239 Ark. 870, 394 
S.W.2d 731 (1965), dealt with a state statute which appropriated 
Arkansas' income tax law--for purposes of ascertaining 
Arkansas's taxable share of the overall income of an interstate 
lroad--the.allocation formulae developed (or to be developed) by 
the United States Interstate Commerce Commission. Insofar as the 
statute sought to appropriate prospective I.C.C. formulae, the 
Court found it an unconstitutional delegation. But what seems to 
be the key to the Court's holding is its (correct) perception that 
the I.C.C., in adopting an allocation formula, does not think about 
problem of the taxation of income at all; rather, these 
fonuulae"are designated [by the I.C.C.] for use by interstate carriers 
~ 
[only] to assure uniformity in reporting for rate-fixing purposes." 
239 . at 871, 394 S.W.2d at 732. Cheney is thus by no means 
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a holding on the issue of tax conformity. 
In at least five jurisdictions, open-ended or ongoing 
conformity measures of one sort or another have been judicially 
affirmed as against delegation challenge. The earliest holding is 
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 94 Conn. 47, 108 A. 154 (1919) 
aff'd. 254 U.S. 113 (1920). At the time Connecticut imposed an 
excise tax on a corporation's (apportioned) net income--that net 
income "upon which income such company i& required to pay a tax to 
the United States." The company's precise argument was that 
Connecticut could not constitutionally compel it to disclose to 
state tax officials its federal tax return. In rejecting this 
argument, the Court discussed the delegation issue generally. 
The federal Income Tax Law . . . is a domestic 
statute. No delegation of legislative authority 
is involved in adopting its definition of net 
income. It is a matter of convenience to taxpayers 
and economy to the state not to set up a separate 
standard in another administrative establishment 
for the measurement of taxable net income. No 
constitutional privilege of corporations is 
violated by requiring the production.[by the 
plaintiff of its] return to the collector of 
internal revenue. 
94 Conn. at 64, 108 A. at 160-61. In appealing the state court's 
opinion to the United States Supreme Court, the taxpayer complained 
only about the apportionment aspect of the Connecticut tax. The 
United States Supreme Court's affirmance of the state court ruling 
therefore had no reason to discuss the delegation question. 
Underwood Typewriter was followed in First Federal Savings 
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142 Conn. 483, 115 A.2d 455 (1955). 
oration business tax imposed on certain 
a percent tax on net income derived from 
cut operations. The Connecticut Act accepted the definition 
s income as set forth "in the federal corporation net income 
enforced on 
to 
last day of the income year"; it granted 
exempt by federal law or by the regulations 
of internal revenue from the federal corporation net 
tax"; and it prescribed that in determining net income, 
tions from gross income should be allowed, with certain 
tions, in accordance with federal law in effect in the parti-
income year. The Connecticut Court regarded all of this as 
not a delegation of legislative power but an 
incorporation by reference of the federal law 
into the state law ... The state legislature .. 
and not the Congress has selected net earnings 
as the base for determining the amount of this 
tax and has fixed the rate to be paid on that 
tax base. As a matter of convenience to the 
taxpayer and economy to the state, the legislature 
has adopted some of the standards employed in the 
federal corporation net income tax law. 
Conn. at 493, 115 A.2d at 459-460. 
Maryland's 1967 income tax statute provides that the basis 
state income tax purposes is the adjusted gross income of the 
individual taxpayer under federal law, or the taxable income of a 
corporate taxpayer under federal law. (The Act then specifies 
variations on this income base and provides for a range 
of exemptions, exclusions, and deductions similar to, but 
not identical with, those in the Internal Revenue Code.) In 
Katzenberg v. Comptroller, 263 Md. 189, 282 A.2d 465 (1971), the 
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Supreme Court was asked to consider the constitutionality 
f the statute, along with a number of other issues as to the 
tatute s interpretation. On the constitutional question, 
Court, relying on Underwood Typewriter, succinctly held that 
"the state's adoption of the federal definition of income does 
not constitute a delegation of legislative authority." 263 Md. at 
200, 282 A.2d at 470. 
The language a Pennsylvania statute suggested that the 
purpose of the statute was to impose not an income tax on corpora-
tions, but rather a tax on the privilege of doing business in 
Pennsylvania. The "excise tax" which it established was measured 
in terms of the corporation's net income for the year "as returned 
to, and as ascertained by the federal government." In rejecting 
the taxpayer's delegation argument, the Court found the following 
analysis dispositive: 
Net income as ascertained is the base upon which 
the tax is measured, not the tax itself. How it 
is fixed by the federal authorities is of no concern 
to the taxing officers of the Commonwealth nor to 
its statute. The rate of the income tax may vary, 
or the method of its calculation, but as a base, it 
is unvarying. 
Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theaters, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 272, 
27 A.2d 62, 63 (1942). In a curious aside, however, the Court 
indicated that if the state's tax were an income tax rather than 
a corporation privilege tax, the delegation issue would become 
more difficult. What the explanation is for this differential 
in difficulty the Court's opinion does not make clear. 
A New Jersey tax statute "conforms" to a particular feature 
of federal income tax law. Under that statute, a "Green Acre" 
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or 
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can go to landowners who are "nonprofit 
[s] ... authorized to carry out 
[are] qualified for exemption from 
Section 50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
it happens, the New Jersey Constitution seemingly pro-
even incorporation by reference of other statutes; but 
f inion in Township of Princeton v. Bardin, 
557 3 A~2d·· 776--. (1977), a New Jersey court 
that ition runs only against the incorporation 
of other New Jersey statutes, and hence does not apply to the 
by reference of a federal statute. In discussing 
delegation question, the Court first approved of the general 
cy underlying the New Jersey measure. 
The federal statute, and the attendant regulations 
are readily accessible to those organizations which 
would be interested in seeking the ... exemption. 
Certainly, such applicant organizations have become 
familiar with (the federal statute] in their annual 
dealings with the Internal Revenue Service. It would, 
as a practical matter, be far less confusing to such 
applicant organizations to know that the term 
"nonprofit organization" means the same thing for 
purposes of both the federal income tax statute and 
our ... Act. 
N.J. Super. at 569, 371 A.2d at 782-83. The Court then 
considered and rejected the argument that the statute involved 
an improper delegation of lawmaking power to Congress, insofar as 
the statute even professed to incorporate any future changes in 
law. The Court first noted that if federal law were 
changed, the New Jersey Tax Commissioner had the power to issue 
an order temporarily "freezing" the preexisting rules, thereby 
the legislature time to reconsider the New Jersey statute's 
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feature. But the Court went on to rule that even 
possibility, the New Jersey statute was 
' 
s legislature is always free to amend 
t to reflect its desire to maintain the previous language 
f 50l(c)(3) for New Jersey purposes." 147 N.J. Super. 
571, 371 A.2d at 776. 
until last the most articulate rejection of a 
claim. In 1949 the legislature of the Alaskan territory 
enac 
to 10 percent of the total income tax that would be payable in the 
same taxab year to the United States . . . without the benefit 
of deduction of the tax payable hereunder to the territory." 
considering the delegation question, the Ninth Circuit first 
advanced this assessment: 
[E]ven if we were to hold the attempted incorporation 
by reference of amendments to the Internal Revenue 
Code to be adopted in the future were an invalid 
delegation, yet as of this day and hour appellant has 
not been affected by any such amendments, for there 
have been none. 
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805, 815 (9th Cir. 1950). 
Yet the Court went on to recognize that given the logic of the 
10 percent provision in the Alaskan Act, the Court could not avoid 
discussing the constitutionality of the ongoing delegation, since 
that delegation was essential to the logic of the legislative scheme. 
If the federal income tax requirements were changed 
substantially by future amendments, it would be 
impossible, administratively, to calculate the 
Alaskan income tax merely by dividing the tax shown 
on the federal return by 10. 
Id. at 816. 
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cuss proceeded as follows: 
c any invalid 
attempted. There are of course many 
held attempts by a legislative 
incorporate provisions into its enactments 
to future acts or amendments by other 
, to be invalid. Where it can be said 
t to make the local law conform to 
elsewhere is not a mere labor-saving 
legislature, but is undertaken in order 
uniformity which itself is an important 
proposed legislative scheme, there are 
a number of precedents for an approval of this sort 
of thing. Reciprocal and retaliatory legislation 
falls in category. . . . Similarly, the efforts 
of the states to take advantage, in their inheritance 
tax laws, of the 80 percent credit provision in the 
federal relating to the Estate Tax . . . have 
been out by simple reference to the federal 
estate tax law. . . , . Perhaps the best known 
instance of action by Congress encompassing within 
its regulation the laws of states, then or thereafter 
enacted, was the Conformity Act. . There, also, 
making a procedure in the common law action conform 
to that prevailing in the states was a prime object 
of the legislation. 
The effort the Alaska legislature to make its 
territorial income tax machinery conform to the 
federal act, and to preserve and to continue such 
conformity, makes sense. It makes for convenience 
to the taxpayer and for simplicity of administration. 
. . . A similar coordination has been recommended 
by students of income tax problems for adoption by 
the states generally. Since the attainment of this 
uniformity was in itself a major objective of the 
Alaska legislature, in enacting the local law [on 
conformity], the Alaska legislature, which alone 
could make this decision, was itself acting, and 
was not abdicating its functions, nor, in our opinion, 
making an invalid delegation to Congress. 
Id. at 816-17. (In a footnote, the Court.went on to note that 
Alaska's insistence on excluding the state income tax deduction 
which federal law itself allows serves to "somewhat impair" the 
"intended adminis 
requires each 
simplicity of the Act" insofar as it 
who itemizes deductions to recompute his 
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tax for purposes of making the final 10 percent calculation. 
. at 817 n * 15 -. ) 
the various ways in which the Mullaney Court frames the 
sue, it is a bit pointless to argue about whether Mullaney 
contains holding or merely dictum. Certainly, one can at least 
s that Mullaney includes a strong discussion supporting the 
cons ty of an ongoing delegation. At the time of 
Alaska was, of course, a federal territory, and arguably 
delegations by a federal territory to the federal Congress are 
less troublesome than delegations to the Congress by a sovereign 
state. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Wallace relied on this 
point in distinguishing Mullaney; but the text of Mullaney does not 
suggest that the Ninth Circuit regarded the point as in any way 
relevant. Of course, in the interim since Mullaney, Alaska has 
become a state whose own state court possesses final ·authority to 
exposit state constitutional law; hence the ~1ullaney opinion merely 
represents the view at one time of a court whose views are no 
longer authoritative. After statehood, however, the Alaskan 
income tax was reconsidered by that state's Supreme Court. As it 
happened, the only disputed issue in Hickel v. Stevenson, 416 P.2d 
236 (Alas. 1966), related to how the Act should be interpreted in 
particular circumstances. But in considering this question, the 
Alaskan Court indicated that the criterion for a proper interpreta-
tion was whether the interpretation would achieve the goals of the 
Alaskan statute as set forth in Mullaney--that is, the goals of 
convenience to the taxpayer and simplicity in administration. 
While Hickel does not contain an explicit constitutional review, 
by implication it endorses the Mullaney analysis. 
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Maine Court has also discussed what amounts to 
sue 
egation 
a sympathetic manner--although no precise 
was before the Court. Under the Maine income 
tax which became effective in 1969, the taxable income in 
computed on the basis of the taxpayer's "federal adjusted 
as in the laws of the United States." The 
sue Tiedemann v. Johnson, 316 A.2d 359 (Me. 1974), 
twas when a certain capital gain had been "realized." In 
s context the Court observed: 
We conclude that, by adoption of the federal adjusted 
gross income as the standard for "entire taxable 
income" of a Maine individual, the Legislature 
intended to resolve, a priori, semantic conflicts 
such as those suggested by the bare words of the 
statute. As evidence of this intent, the Legislature 
did not undertake creation of a unique or complicated 
income tax scheme. Nor did it provide the vast 
administrative machinery which would be necessary to 
supply the interpretation and investigative functions 
of the Internal Revenue Service. 
3 A.2d at 364. See also the discussion of avoiding taxpayer 
confusion in City National Bank of Clinton v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 
251 Ia. 603, 617, 102 N.W.2d 381, 389 (Iowa 1960). 
In four jurisdictions, delegation challenges to conformity 
statutes have been rejected by interpreting the statute as incorporat-
ing only federal tax laws ineffect at the time of the statute's 
enactment. 
In fact, the (proposed) statute considered by the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court in Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 540, 64 A.2d 322 
(1949), was quite explicit on this point. In affirming that the 
legislative proposal would not violate the state constitution, the 
Court found that proposal's incorporation feature "will greatly 
ilitate s of the act if passed." 95 N.H. at 
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A.2d at 323. There is no dictum in the case on the 
an ongoing delegation. 
Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922), 
e South Carolina income tax statute required persons and 
corporations to pay a state tax defined as one-third of their 
income tax. The Court evidently construed the statute 
only to federal income tax law as it existed at 
time the South Carolina tax statute was enacted. The tenor 
the language in the Court's opinion suggests that the Court 
would have had difficulty with a state statute incorporating 
federal law in an ongoing way. 
Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930), dealt 
th a 1929 Georgia income tax measure stipulating that net income 
taxable by the state should be initially equated with the taxpayers 
net income vis-a-vis the federal government; that the tax payable to 
the state would ordinarily be one-third of the tax payable to the 
ted States; but that if the taxpayer's state net income is 
modified either upwards or downwards pursuant to certain modifica-
tions provided for in the Georgia statute, the state tax should 
itself be adjusted upwards or downwards in a proportionate one-third 
way. The Court considered a number of objections to the Georgia 
statute, and rejected them all. One of the objections concerned 
delegation, insofar as the Act seemingly gave Congress power over 
the state tax matters. In rejecting this challenge, the Court 
interpreted the Georgia Act as 
in no way [undertaking] to make future federal 
legislation a part of the law of this state upon 
that subject. When a statute adopts a part or 
all of another statute, domestic or foreign, 
general or local, by specific and descriptive 
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.E. at Having interpreted the statute 
the Court concluded that the delegation objections 
merit." The Court's opinion is not clear as to what 
e "merit" of the objection would have been had the 
provided for continuing conformity. 
ThoEPe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969), dealt 
the linois income tax conformity statute, passed in 1969. 
statute provided that Illinois net income "is computed for 
by taking the adjusted gross income from the federal 
tax return," with certain adjustments, deductions and 
exemptions provided for in the state statute. Also, § 102, the 
"construction" section of the state statute, specified that 
any term used in this Act shall have the same 
meaning as when used in a comparable context 
in the United States Income Tax Revenue Code of 
1954 and other provisions of the statutes of the 
United States relating to federal income taxes 
as such Code and statutes are in effect on the 
-date of enactment of this Act. 
In considering the delegation challenge to the Illinois Act, the 
Court focused on § 102; noting that § 102 limited itself to 
federal law "in effect at the date of enactment" of the Illinois 
t, the Court found this section entirely constitutional as an 
incorporation-by-reference. But the Court also noted that "there 
some scholarly opinion, as well as case law from other 
jurisdictions, that the legislature could adopt a statute providing 
that future modifications of the Code would have consequences in 
and application of the Act." 43 Ill. 2d. at 49, 
0 A.2d at 6 It is unclear whether the Court's "date of 
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enactment" interpretation for § 102 carries over to the statute's 
conforming reference to federal adjusted gross income. The 
Court seems to assume that it does; but that latter provision's 
explicit reference to the taxpayer's actual "federal income tax 
return" makes such an interpretation difficult. 
Whatever the general advantages of interpreting statutes to 
avoid constitutional questions, the particular interpretations in 
Santee Mills, Featherstone, and Thorpe seem misguided. As for 
Thorpe, see the discussion in the paragraph above. In Santee Mills 
and Featherstone, the "one-third" provision of the state statute 
seems inconsistent with a ruling that would not allow the taxpayer 
simply to consult his federal tax return for the particular year 
in making his one-third calculation. (Compare the Ninth Circuit's 
evaluation in Mullaney.) For practical reasons of this sort, it 
may be that the "date of enactment" holding in Featherstone has 
since been ignored in Georgia. See Head v. McKenney, 61 Ga. App. 
552, 556, 6 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1939), in which the Court, in 
quoting from Featherstone, interestingly edits out its "date of 
enactment" language, and then describes the Georgia tax assessment 
process as follows: 
The State Revenue Commission, in assessing the 
tax against McKenney, merely adopted the Federal 
method of calculating his net income under the 
Federal statute as the State's method of 
accomplishing that result, and properly assessed 
the tax due to the State as one-third of the 
amount which he had paid to the United States. 
Such adoption was not a delegation to the Federal 
authorities of the State's power to tax. 
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THE DELEGATION OF STATE LAWMAKING AUTHORITY 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A THIN BUT NOT UNINTERESTING RECORD 
of legality of delegations from the state 
to the federal government, negative language can be 
two early California Supreme Court decisions. In the 
30's, however, there is a state Court of Appeal holding which 
a de In the 1940's, the Supreme Court again used 
to a delegation; but a 1960's Supreme Court 
gave emphatic application to a delegating statute without 
licitly discussing the constitutional question. There is also 
interesting inheritance tax statutory precedent. 
1. Of the two early Supreme Court opinions, the first is 
the Matter of Burke, 190 Cal. 326, 212 P. 193 (1923). Subsequent 
to Congress's enactment of the Volstead Act on prohibition, California 
voters approved by referendum the Wright Act, which professed to incor-
into California law all of the pertinent penal provisions of 
Volstead Act. In Burke, the California Supreme Court's chief 
lding was that nothing in the California constitution prohibited 
what amounted to an incorporation-by-reference. The particular 
assertion was made that the Wright Act was invalid on grounds 
it professed to include into California law any amendments to 
the Volstead Act which Congress might enact in the future. The 
responded to this assertion by saying: 
It may be conceded that this provision [of the Wright 
Act] is not valid, although we do not decide it, since 
it is not involved. The only effect of putting that 
provision into the statute would be, at most, t~at the 
provision itself would be void, leaving the remainder 
of the Act valid. It is not such a component part 
of the Act itself as would be necessary to require us to 
hold that it invalidated the entire Act. 
0 Cal. at 328 121 P. at 194. 
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(1937), 
govern-
ustment Act. The Supreme Court, having 
California legislation in other respects, reviewed 
s of Cali statute which professed to adopt 
every regulation "heretofore or hereafter made" 
of Agriculture, "when and insofar as 
standard specified in and for this Act." On the 
"heretofore" matter, the Court concluded that the state statute 
'tvas ' ct valid" insofar as it merely adopted existing federal 
continued: "But the attempt to make future regula-
tions of another jurisdiction part of the state law is generally 
ld to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers." 
documentation, the Court merely referred to Burke, a South 
opinion (Santee Mills, seep. 30 ), and a law review 
note. The Court then reasoned on as follows: 11We do not believe 
it appropriate to consider whether [this section] of the Act 
constitutes an unlawful delegation of power in this respect, for 
the reason that this section is not involved in the proceedings 
herein." (This was because under the California statute future fed-
regulations were to be given effect in California only if the 
California Agriculture Director held hearings and rendered a 
finding that any new federal regulation was consistent with 
California policy.) "The decisions upholding the so-called 
retaliatory license or tax measures, in which some foreign law 
contingency on which they become operative, are ample 
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for the present legislation." 9 C.2d at 298, 71 P.2d 
2 
By , neither the language in Burke nor that in 
up to very much. At most, the language contains 
tum rather than holding. And perhaps even the "dictum" 
ellation is excessive. Given the context of the full sentence 
appears, the "concession" in Burke seeks to be merely 
a concession arguendo--an assumption for the sake of argument. 
the Brock language does not even profess to be as an expression 
of the Brock Court's own view; rather, it merely entails that 
t's description of what a limited number of other authorities 
had previously said. 
2. Intervening between Burke and Brock is the Court of Appeal 
decision in In Re Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P. 2d 6 78 (1934). 
Lasswelldealt with provisions of California's Industrial Recovery Act 
incorporating the federal codes of regulation developed or to be devel-
oped by the federal N.R.A. The statute declared as its policy that 
"the State of California [should] cooperate "Y7ith and assist the 
national government in promoting the rehabilitation of trade in 
industry and eliminating unfair competitive practices. II 
The federal program applied to businesses operating in interstate 
commerce; the California law applied, in a complementary way, 
to that intrastate commerce which the federal legislation did not 
cover. A Court of Appeal affirmed the California statute against 
the delegation challenge. 
We have before us state and federal acts, both of 
which recognize a nation-wide business collapse 
and its resultant trail of human misery. Both state 
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attempting to rehabilitate the 
produce. . . . The incidental 
36 
the legation of code prescription 
of the United States on the ground 
state is a sovereign state 
and the President is in this state a foreign offi-
cial does not greatly impress us. The correlative 
rights of state and nation are of great importance, 
but we are a nation not an alliance of foreign 
states, our President is not a foreign poten-
tate. . If ever there could occur a state of 
facts ustifying, even demanding, co-operative 
effort tween the state and the nation, as pro-
the law under consideration here, we 
the principle underlying this case. The 
one and the patient is but one; how 
logical that the curative agents must not conflict. 
Only confusion could result if one code were fixed for 
produce entering interstate commerce and another code 
for produce entering intrastate commerce. 
1 Cal. App. 2d. at 203-04, 36 P.2d at 687. Lasswell thus sets 
forth a dramatic holding to the effect that state delegation to 
federal authorities can be constitutionally justified by the 
need for state-federal collaboration in dealing with a particular 
societal problem. In this regard, Lasswell is commended in Mermin, 
"Cooperative Federalism" Again: State and Municipal Legislation 
Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I, 
57 Yale L.J. 1, 12-13 (1942). 
The "authority" of the Lasswell holding should not be over-
stated, however. Lasswell is, of course, only a Court of Appeal 
opinion. Moreover, the Lasswell opinion is weakened by its failure 
to allude to the Supreme Court's previous discussion of the delega-
tion issue in Burke. And other aspects of the Lasswell opinion 
suggest that the Lass"~;vell Court may have insufficiently appreciated 
the integrity of the non-delegation doctrine. In another of its 
holdings, the Lasswell Court approved the statute's massive dele-
delegation of authority to an administrative agency. Yet the 
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counterpart of this state delegation was held unconsti-
tutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schecter. 
3. 1940's Supreme Court opinion is Palermo v. Stockton 
Theatres, Inc., 32 Cal. 2d 53, 195 P.2d 1 (1948). California's 
Alien Land Law of 1920 and 1923 prohibited aliens not qualifying 
for U.S. citizenship from owning or leasing land in California--
unless the aliens' rights in these respects were protected by 
treaty. A 1911 treaty between this country and Japan entitling 
Japanese to own or lease land in the United States worked to trigger 
the Land Law's treaty proviso. Particular Japanese nationals leased 
land in California in 1935 for a 10-year period. In 1940, the 1911 
treaty was abrogated by the United States, and the owners of the 
land sought to void the lease. A Court of Appeal ruled that the 
Alien Land Law referred to treaties only as they existed in 1920 
and 1923; hence the repeal of the treaty in 1940 did not deprive 
the Japanese nationals of their property rights. In reaching this 
holding, the Court indicated--citing Brock and Burke--that there 
is "grave doubt whether our legislature could constitutionally 
delegate to the treaty-making authority of the United States" the 
power to determine California law "with respect to future acts." 
The California Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of 
Appeal's holding, adopted all of that Court's opinion, including 
this delegation passage. 32 Cal. 2d at 60, 195 P.2d at 5. 
But it is clear from the paragraphs which the Supreme Court added 
(as a supplement) to the Court of Appeal opinion that the Supreme 
Court had an even stronger reason for giving the Alien Land Law 
a narrow interpretation. Unless that Law was construed as compat-
ible with the particular lease, the Supreme Court would have been 
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required to launch a full enquiry into the constitutionality of 
the Alien Land Law itself, insofar as it discriminated against 
aliens. It was chiefly to avoid this constitutional dispute that 
the Court subscribed to the "static" interpretation of the Land 
Law recommended by the Court of Appeal. (That Court's opinion, 
it can be added, relied on the precedent of the federal Assimila-
tive Crimes Act concerning federal enclaves, an Act which at the 
time the opinion was released applied only to state criminal laws 
in effect at the time the Act had been (re)enacted. But as we 
know, in 1948 Congress amended the Act to render its delegation 
open-ended in character--and this amendment was later endorsed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sharpnack. Presently, therefore, 
the federal precedent works to dispel the "doubt" to which the 
Palermo language refers.) 
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4. The 1960's case is Eden Hemorial Park Ass'n v. Department 
of Pub Works, 59 Cal. 2d 412, 380 P.2d 390, 29 Cal. Rptr. 790 
(1963), in which the California Supreme Court willingly applied a 
state statute which effectively delegated lawmaking ?owers to the 
however, in effectin~ this application, the 
Court did not explicitly discuss the statute's constitutionality. 
Federal grant-in-aid programs frequently raise problems as 
to the relationship between the powers of state and local govern-
ments under state lav1 and the requirements set forth by federal 
law for participation in the federal programs. Recognizing the 
potential for problems of this sort in the federal-aid highway 
program in the 1930's, the Ca~ifornia Legislature enacted a 
statute which, as amended, now appears as § 820 of the State and 
Highway Code. 
State Assent to Federal Statutes, Rules and 
Regulations. 
The State of California assents to the prov~s~ons 
of Title 23, United States Code, as amended 
and supplemented [and] other Acts of Congress 
relative to federal aid. . . . All work done 
under the provisions of Title 23 or said other 
Acts of Congress relative to highways shall be 
performed as required under Acts of Congress 
and the rules and regulations promulgated there-
under. Laws, rules, or regulations of this state 
inconsistent with such laws, or rules and regula-
tions of the United States, shall not apply to 
such work, to the extent of such inconsistency. 
For delegation purposes, § 820 is a very strong statute. 
It "assents" in advance to the invalidation of any state laws or 
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policies which may come into conflict with a federal highway 
program regulation, whenever that regulation is itself promulgated. 
As it happens, I am advi~ed that conflicts of this sort have been 
infrequent. But in the interesting Eden Park case, § 820 turned 
out to be decisive. Under the California Health and Safety Code 
(§ 8560, 8560.5), state and local agencies are forbidden from 
exercising eminent domain powers against cemetery property for 
purposes of constructing any street or highway. Yet in 1960, 
both federal and state highway officials determined that a 
cemetery area near Los Angeles was the best location for a freeway 
which was to be part of the federal Interstate System. Section 107 
of Title 23 of the United States Code reads as follows: 
(a) In any case in which the Secretary is 
requested by a State to acquire lands or 
interests in lands . . . required by such 
State for right-of-way or other purposes in 
connection with the prosecution of any project 
for the construction . . . of any section of 
the Interstate System, the Secretary is 
authorized, in the name of the United 
States ... to acquire, enter into, and take 
possession of such lands or interests in lands 
by purchase, donation, condemnation, or other-
wise in accordance with the laws of the United 
States . . . if 
(1) the Secretary has determined either that 
the State is unable to acquire necessary lands 
or interest in lands, or is unable to acquire 
such lands or interest in lands with sufficient 
promptness; and 
(2) the State has agreed with the Secretary to 
pay, at such time as may be specified by the 
Secretary an amount equal to ten percent of 
the costs incurred by the Secretary, in acquiring 
such lands . . . 
(c) The Secretary is further authorized and 
directed by proper deed . . . to convey any 
lands or interest in lands acquired in any 
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State under the prov~s~ons of this statute . . 
to the State highway department of such State 
or such political subdivision as its laws may 
60 the California Highway Commission attempted to 
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the Eden Park property. But a state Court, relying on 
statutes referred to above, enjoined this state condemnation 
State Highway Engineer then "requested" the 
government to condemn the property on its own pursuant 
to§ 107. Under that section, the Secretary of Commerce proceeded 
to condemn the land through federal proceedings and to deed it 
back to the state. But state highway officials were then sued 
state court to enjoin them from constructing the freeway 
through the cemetery property. 
In its opinion the California Supreme Court first affirmed 
constitutionality of the federal § 107, concluding that it 
seeks a reasonable balance between local and national needs with 
respect to the interstate system,." and that it "does protect local 
interests by requiring that the state request any action by the 
Secretary pursuant to its terms." 59 Cal. 2d at 418, 380 P.2d at 
394, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 794. But at this point the Court was 
required to consider a second challenge: that given the state's 
own cemetery statutes, the State Highway Engineer had no authority 
under state law to'requese'federal action which would result in 
a circumvention of those statutes. The Supreme Court seemingly 
agreed that the statutes could be interpreted as forbidding the 
Engineer from making this request. But the Court then concluded 
that this implied prohibition was itself overridden by § 820. 
That is, since § 820 intended to "abrogate inconsistent state 
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laws" for purposes of "planning and constructing federally 
assisted state highways," § 820 superseded the state law 
prohibition which would otherwise prevent the State Highway 
Engineer from requesting federal intervention. 59 Cal. 2d at 
419, 380 P.2d at 394-95, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95. 
That the state-law provision which § 820 was allowed to 
override was no more than "implicit" in character weakens the 
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drama of Eden Park; and I should note again that the Court, in 
applying § 820, did not explicitly consider its constitutionality. 
Nevertheless, the Eden Park opinion surely suggests the Supreme 
Court's sympathy with the California Legislature's conclusion 
that the maintenance of state prerogatives (as expressed in 
existing state laws and regulations) can properly be subordinated 
to the need to comply with federal norms in order to secure 
certain benefits available from federal sources. 
It is noteworthy, by the way, that § 820 contains a useful 
procedural mechanism. 
Any major conflicts between the laws, rules, 
or regulations of this state and any such 
federal law, rules, and regulations which 
have been resolved under this Section during 
a calendar year shall be described in a 
report which the department shall submit to 
the Legislature no later than January 30 of 
the succeeding California year. 
With this information collected in the annual report, the Legislature 
is in a position intelligently to consider how well the § 820 process 
of collaboration is working, and to modify or create exceptions in 
that section to the extent that the results it produces seem 
unsatisfactory. 243 
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s "precedent" on California-to-federal 
the Revenue and Taxation Code. 
tance tax is described and imposed in 
§§ 1. Sections 13441-13443 provide for an 
tax." According to § 13441: 
a Federal Estate Tax is 
United States in a case 
tance tax payable to this 
than the maximum state tax 
by the Federal State Tax 
, a tax equal to the difference between 
the maximum credit and the inheritance tax 
payable hereby imposed. 
logic of § 13441 to its logical extreme: 
If no inheritance tax is payable to the state 
a case where a federal estate tax is payable 
to the United States, a tax equal to the maximum 
state tax credit allowed by the Federal Estate 
Tax law hereby imposed. 
These provisions, which date back to 1943, have been explained 
as follows (in R. Bock, 1980 Guidebook to California Taxes, at 359): 
It is c 
de 
the provis 
have never 
The estate tax (sometimes called "pickup tax") is 
imposed order to obtain for the state the 
maximum benefit from the federal credit for state 
inheritance tax. . . . The state thus collects a 
tax which would otherwise go to the federal government, 
and the combined state and federal tax is not 
increased since the additional state tax is offset 
by the tional credit against the federal tax. 
j 
gic and purpose of these provisions that 
des for is of an "ongoing" sort. Though 
been part of California law since 1943, they 
ly challenged on grounds that they entail 
an impermiss gation. Of course, the provisions are in a 
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way rendered invulnerable by the nature of their operation: 
they do not subject any California estate to even a penny of 
additional aggregate taxation. (For that matter, they do not 
result in any California estate paying even a penny less in 
aggregate taxation.) Under §§ 13441-43, the basic "winner" is 
the state of California, which receives higher tax revenues than 
it otherwise would receive; the basic "loser" is the federal 
treasury, which can receive somewhat less revenue from an 
individual estate than it otherwise would receive. And federal 
lawmaking authorities have made no effort to contest the state 
strategy which the California provisions manifest. 
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THE DELEGATION OF LAWMAKING AUTHORITY 
TO ANOTHER: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF KUGLER 
_ __,__ ______ ............ ___ .;..___. ________ ____;_> 5 c . 3d 4~ 0 , 
tr. 553 (1971), dealt with the Tahoe 
p , to which the California Legislature had 
powers to comprehensively regulate land use in the Lake 
cons the constitutionality of the delegation, 
Court simply held that the "standards" in 
were sufficient to provide guidance to 
Agency in carrying out its land use responsibilities. For 
sent es, 
is a bi-state 
is interesting about the Agency is that 
authorized by a Congressional interstate 
act. The Agency s board consists of ten members, five chosen 
ifornia officials, but the other five by Nevada officials. 
approving the Cal1fornia Legislature's delegation, the Court 
not advert to the fact that a full half of the Agency's 
s were representatives of another jurisdiction. But 
ecially insofar as ElDorado can be regarded in.the·e~ntext. 
f·Kugler v. Yoeum (see below), implicit in the silence of the 
Dorado opinion is the following three-step logic: An interstate 
is an appropriate way--if not the only way--for dealing 
problem at hand; bi-state membership is essential to 
an interstate undertaking; the nature of the problem to be 
o thus jus es California's extra-jurisdictional delegation. 
po 
conferring Cali 
s 
c i 0 
es on reciprocity. In return for California's 
lawmaking powers on Nevada officials, the 
agreed to lodge Nevada lawmaking authority 
s. This further emphasizes the extent to 
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which the mutuality of the problem warrants a mutual solution, 
with the whole of the Agency's effective powers being greater 
than the sum its California and Nevada parts. 
Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 445 P.2d 303, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
687 (1968), contains the most recent discussion by the California 
Supreme Court on the specific subject of inter-jurisdictional 
delegations. Indeed, given its reasoning, Kugler stands as the 
most important case in California law on the general question of 
legislative delegations of all sorts. Kugler dealt with a City 
* of Alhambra ordinance which provided that in all future years 
Alhambra firemen should be paid salaries comparable to firemen 
salaries in the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles. 
In understanding the reasoning of the Kugler majority, it is 
useful to begin with the position taken by the Kugler dissent. 
Justice Burke, joined by Justice McComb, would have found 
an invalid delegation, insofar as the ordinance 
would strip from Alhambra's city council its 
discretion to determine one end of the wage 
scale (the minimum), and delegate that discretion 
to the governing bodies of two outside public 
agencies which are entirely without responsibility 
to the City of Alhambra, its employees, voters, 
or taxpayers. This seems to me to offend democratic 
principles in addition to the basic requirements 
of the City's charter. 
69 C.2d at 385, 445 P.2d at 312, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 696. 
The majority's reasoning can be broken down into several 
*I simplify here somewhat. The ordinance was a proposed 
initiative which had received the needed number of signatures 
but which the City had refused to place on the ballot on grounds 
of the alleged illegality of its delegation. 
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delegation doctrine really requires is that 
resolve the truly fundamental issues." 
elution" will take the form of "standards" 
the lature to guide decisions rendered by others. 
"fundamental issues" can be resolved even 
setting. 
fundamental issue? To a large extent, 
on legislature chooses to perceive or 
t the problem at hand. The Alhambra lawmakers had 
as "fundamental" the "issue" of parity 
tween Alhambra s and Los Angeles wages. So long as this 
be regarded as the fundamental issue, then Alhambra's 
have indeed decided it, and later events in Los Angeles 
County which actually determine particular wage levels 
regarded as mere matters of application. 
(3) Alhambra's designation of parity as the fundamental 
sue quite reasonable. Alhambra lawmakers may recognize 
will be unable to recruit firemen if their wages are 
than those in Los Angeles. Also, Alhambra officials may 
eciate that Los Angeles officials may "possess a superior 
lity" to review firemen wages in other jurisdictions and to 
the resear needed for an appropriate salary determina-
necessi 
legation doctrine should take into account the "practical 
s" of governmental processes. For example, smaller 
te c 
c 
1 Alhambra face serious problems in gathering the 
appropriate for the formulating of proper 
S, 248 
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(5) What the delegation doctrine calls for is not "standards" 
as such but "safeguards." And an enlightened delegation 
concerned with 'the degree of protection doctrine 
against arbitrariness." nrf an external private or governmental 
body is involved in the application of the legislative scheme, 
it must be an agency that the legislature can expect will reason-
ably perform its function." 69 Cal. 2d at 382, 445 P.2d at 310, 
71 Cal, Rptr, at 694. Alhambra lawmakers can reasonably assume 
that Los Angeles ty and County have no interest in paying 
their firemen excessive or unnecessarily high wages. This 
assumption provides the necessary "safeguard" and the assurance 
of ''reasonable performance." 
(6) The Court's general delegation philosophy is set forth 
in an eloquent concluding paragraph. 
Doctrinaire legal concepts should not be invoked 
to impede the reasonable exercise of legislative 
power properly designed to frustrate abuse. Only 
in the event of a total abdication of that power 
through failure either to render basic policy 
decisions or to assure that they are implemented 
as made will this Court intrude on legislative 
enactment because it is an "unlawful delegation," 
and then only to preserve the representative 
character of the process of reaching legislative 
decision, 
69 Cal, 2d at 384, 445 P.2d at 311, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 695. 
While Kugler itself dealt with a local ordinance, its 
discussion of the delegation problem operates at a very general 
level; it is clear, therefore, that Kugler principles apply to 
delegations by the state legislature as well as delegations by 
local governments. For a case so holding, see Martin v. County of 
Contra Costa, 8 Cal. App. 3d 856, 87 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970). In 
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tin a state statute provided that employees of the Municipal 
:.=;;;;;,..;;;.= 
t Contra ts (for whose salaries the state is responsible) 
receive same remuneration as the County chooses to pay its 
own employees in comparable positions. The Court of Appeal, 
applying Kugler, concluded that the statute was plainly constitu-
tional. The Court interpreted the Martin statute as contemplating 
review of the implementation of the statute by the 
lature. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 862, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 890. This 
review afforded a "safeguard" in the Kugler sense. 
Given the level of generality of Kugler's discussion of the 
delegation question, there should be no question but that Kugler 
applied, at least in a general way, to delegations by the state 
to federal officials. This is proven rather conclusively by an 
example of a lawful delegation which the Kugler opinion volunteers: 
If [a California] statute provides that salaries 
are to be adjusted to future changes in the cost 
of living, the legislature must designate a body, 
such as the United States Department of Labor, 
which may be expected to reasonably perform the 
function of ascertaining the cost of living. 
69 Cal. 2d at 382, 445 P.2d at 310, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 694. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. OF THE DELEGATION 
Any choice by the California Legislature to adopt a general 
rule of complete open-ended conformity, or to participate in the 
Federal-State Tax Collection Act (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6361-65), 
would entail a very substantial delegation. First of all, either 
choice would involve a decision to conform the state's income tax 
to federal income tax norms. At least four sorts of decisions 
ordinarily go into the calculation of taxable income. 
The first set of decisions rests on what can be called pure 
tax logic. An example: if long-term capital gains merit special 
tax treatment, this is partly because inflation would otherwise 
overstate the taxpayer's true gain, and partly because without 
special treatment a gain that has materialized over a considerable 
period of time would be unfairly and excessively taxed in one 
year only. While federal law provides that one year of ownership 
of capital gain for special long-term treatment, California law-
makers have concluded that only five years of ownership merits 
full long-term treatment (Revenue & Taxation Code§ 18162.5). 
California's opportunity to render its own decisions on pure tax 
matters of this sort would be eliminated if it opted for complete 
conformity.* 
*I use existing California tax rules to illustrate the 
differences between U.S. and California tax perspectives. Using 
existing rules as illustrations is, however, an imperfect enter-
prise. After all, existing California rules could be overridden 
by a mere incorporation-by-reference (not just by an open-ended 
delegation). Conversely, even in an open-ended conformity regime, 
existing California rules could be protected by attaching specific 
modifications to the conformity rule. See page 64, infra. 
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Tax rules are o designed to either stimulate or 
mo general Thus the special treatment of 
c gains may so be intended to encourage the process 
of tal formation. The state perspective on the control of 
general economy may well be different from that of the 
perspective. (Indeed, the economic literature emphasizes 
macroeconomic planning is best or at least most frequently 
at the national level.) If a state does accept 
lete conformity, it would be depriving itself of the oppor-
ty of influencing macroeconomic policy by way of any state 
income tax rules it might enact or amend. 
Many income tax rules amount to so-called "tax expenditures." 
is, rules on credits, deductions, and the non-taxability of 
rms of income may well be intended by the Legislature to serve 
as subsidies to various classes of persons and to various focms 
of activities; these subsidies are often designed to achieve a 
certain allocative effect. Thus the solar energy credit introduced 
into California law in 1976 and then revised in 1977 and 1978 
(Revenue & Taxation Code §§ 17052.5, 17055) is obviously intended 
to encourage property owners' investment in solar energy projects. 
The charitable contribution deduction in both state (Revenue & 
Taxation Code § 17214) and federal law is evidently designed, at 
least in part, to encourage donations to approved charities. 
However, California's maximum for charitable contributions (20% 
of adjusted gross income) (Revenue & Taxation Code § 17215) is 
much less than the federal 50% maximum; California has thus chosen 
to place meaningful limits on the extent of its subsidy to 
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charitable giving. California's opportunity to make up its 
own mind on matters of this sort would be eliminated by a 
camp conformiEy policy. 
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Finally, income tax law is designed to achieve the goal of 
equity among taxpayers--"horizontal equity," to use standard tax 
parlance. The renters' credit provided for in California law 
(Revenue & Taxation Code § 17053.5) can easily be understood in 
equity terms. Whatever the justifications may be for allowing 
income tax deductions for property taxes and interest payments, 
the truth remains that these deductions provide homeowners with 
enormous tax benefits. The renters' credit is designed to at 
least alleviate the inequality between owners and renters that 
the tax rules otherwise engender. California's opportunity to 
render equity judgments of this sort would be expunged were it 
to elect full conformity. 
To be sure, the state could attach certain "modifications" 
even to an open-ended conformity statute; and the federal Act 
recognizes state interests in a limited number of areas where it 
was obvious to Congress that the state's perspective differs 
from the federal perspective. But limited exceptions of this 
sort apart, modifications and open-ended conformity would require 
state lawmakers to abandon the enterprise of state income-tax 
policymaking. The "social" as well as the "economic" aspects 
of this policymaking were referred to in Wallace in invalidating 
Hinnesota's conform~ty statute. 
Even if the state does decide to conform or to participate 
in the federal program, however, important state prerogatives 
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would be preserved. Under piggybacking, 
2(a)(2) options it elects, the participat-
state would retain full authority to set the general level 
of the state income tax burden. The extent of this burden is 
one of the most important features of income tax policymaking. 
so by choosing option§ 6362(a)(2)(A) rather than§ 6362(a)(2)(B), 
state would retain full authority over the state income tax 
rate structure. If the state does retain this power, then it 
reserves for itself the authority to determine the progressivity 
of the state income tax--that is, the extent to which the tax 
attempts to achieve the so-called goal of "vertical equity." 
And under conformity without piggybacking, the statute obviously 
retains full control both over tax burden and over progressivity. 
In these respects, however, California presently stands in 
a rather special situation, given the pendency of Proposition 9. 
In the absence of Proposition 9, the above comments on the pre-
servation of state authority over tax burden and rate structure 
are accurate. If Proposition 9 passes, however, the California 
Constitution would prevent the California Legislature from raising 
any tax rate above 50 percent of what that rate is now. Under 
Proposition 9, therefore, the only power the state Legislature 
would retain over the level of tax burden is the power to reduce 
that burden to less than 50 percent of its present level; and the 
Legislature could affect the progressivity of the state income 
tax only by reducing particular rates to less than 50 percent of 
their current levels--not by raising any rates to above that 
point. Proposition 9, by vastly curtailing the discretion which 
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the state Legislature would otherwise possess under the federal 
enhances the extent to which the adoption 
would work a state-to-federal delegation. 
another way, however, Proposition 9 diminishes the 
legation. By reducing tax rates to no more than 50 percent 
of their present levels, Proposition 9 would proportionately 
monetary effects of all tax rules on includability 
and deductability, decision-making power over which the Act 
would exclusively assign to the federal government. By depriving 
these rules of at least half of their practical impact, 
Proposition 9 would to some extent mollify the delegation 
objection.) 
Discussed above is the extent to which a decision in favor 
of full conformity would delegate state lawmaking powers. But 
if California chooses not only to conform but also to participate 
in the federal program, this latter choice would seemingly enhance 
the delegation in a dramatic way. For under the Act, administra-
tion of the income tax would become exclusively (or almost exclu-
sively) a federal responsibility. In the first instance, the 
basic responsibility for auditing taxpayer returns would rest with 
the federal government. (Note, however, the observation by 
Professor Stoltz that, while a "cursory reading of the statute 
might result in the . . . conclusion that the law prohibits 
supplemental state audit activity," this reading is "mistaken"; 
"it is clear from the legislative history that Congress did not 
intend to prohibit supplemental state auditing efforts. Thus a 
state with a high level of audit activity could continue such 
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to the federal effort." See Stoltz & 
of State Income Taxes, 1977 Duke L.J. 
However, even under Stoltz's view of the Act, any state 
would be wholly "supplemental" or advisory in nature.) 
the Act all decisions as to whether to initiate 
proceedings would evidently be rendered by federal 
tax litigation, either initiated by the govern-
ment or by the taxpayer in seeking a refund, would take place in 
court rather than in state court. Section 636l(b). 
officials, and those officials alone, would have the 
power and responsibility "to represent state interests" in all 
administrative and judicial proceedings. Section 636l(d)(l)(a). 
securing enforcement, only those civil and criminal penalties 
provided for by federal law could be resorted to. Section 636l(a). 
Any penalties which state law might profess to provide for taxpayer 
lations of the state tax would be regarded as an impermissible 
form of "double jeopardy." Section 6362(f)(6). 
The federalization of the administration of the state income 
tax which these various provisions would affect suggests that a 
state's decision to participate in the federal program would 
amount to a colossal delegation of a sort unprecedented (so far 
as I know) in American federal history. Not only state legislative 
power, but state executive and judicial power, would all be 
transferred to the federal government. (Note, however, that the 
special constitutional rules on the delegation of state judicial 
power all pertain to statutes which remand seemingly judicial 
matters to administrative agencies for primary decisionmaking. 
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Under the Act, matters which are presently decided by 
state would be submitted tead to the judiciary 
of government. There is thus no abandonment of the 
taxpayer's right to a judicial decision--the right which those 
special rules seek to vindicate. While the delegation of state 
judicial powers to the federal government should certainly 
II assessing the extent and the implications of the 
overall delegation, it does not seem to raise any independent 
delegation question.) 
The above paragraphs have attempted to evaluate the character 
of the delegation which full conformity or piggybacking would 
constitute. But enormous benefits would also result from decisions 
* to conform or to piggyback. Many of those benefits would accrue 
to individual taxpayers. Under conformity, taxpayers would secure 
welcome advantages in terms of the reduced time (or monetary cost) 
involved in preparing state income tax returns. And in addition 
to tax preparation savings, the process of tax planning would also 
be simplified, insofar as this planning would now need to reckon 
with only one set of income tax rules. 
State government also would reap substantial savings. A 
conformity policy would greatly reduce that administrative burden 
on the state bureaucracy which is presently engendered by the 
differential between state and federal tax rules. Moreover, given 
the provisions in the federal Act as amended, participation in the 
Act would enable the state to achieve further savings by way of 
*These benefits are well described in the general literature 
on conformity, and I describe them only briefly here. 
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the elimination of the costly state personal income tax 
administrative apparatus. 
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Benefits would also be achieved by way of conserving the 
resources of the state Legislature itself. Since the Legislature 
has in the past recognized the obvious advantages of conformity, 
substantial amounts of legislative effort have been expended in 
reviewing changes in federal income tax law and in determining 
which of those changes the state, in the name of conformity, should 
choose to adopt. Adoption of an open-ended conformity rule would 
liberate the state Legislature from this burden on its energies. 
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B. TF~ CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DELEGATION 
tances of this sort, where a delegation achieves 
enormous benefits but also deprives the state of important author-
ity, how should the California analyst think about the constitu-
tional question? 
My basic assumption here is that Kugler v. Yokum is the 
relevant judicial authority. While Kugler immediately deals with 
a municipal ordinance, the Kugler discussion of delegation is 
deliberately couched at a level of generality which makes it 
seemingly relevant to delegations of every sort. That Kugler 
principles apply to delegations by the state is thus obvious 
enough from the Kugler opinion itself, and has since been verified 
by Martin. Those Kugler principles are explicitly concerned with 
the problem of inter-jurisdictional delegations; and an example 
which the Kugler opinion explicitly advances (a state statute 
giving effect to future changes in the cost of living as determined 
by the federal Department of Labor) makes it sufficiently clear 
that Kugler can be applied to delegations from the state to the 
federal government. To this extent Kugler takes precedence over the 
language in Burke and Brock--language which was, after all, no more 
than dictum (if that), and which was challenged from an early date 
by the strong Court of Appeal holding in Lasswell. In any event, 
the Rule that state delegations to the federal government are per 
se invalid seems to be exactly the kind of "doctrinaire" delegation 
concept which the Kugler opinion inveighs against. 
Assuming that Kugler applies, what results does it suggest? 
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are two alternatives to consider: an open-ended 
statute; and participation in the federal program. 
the important tial point is that each of these alterna-
seems to comply with the Kugler criteria for a valid dele-
Kugler allows the legislative body to determine what 
the "fundamental issue" is and then endorses whatever delegations 
result the legislature's resolution of that issue. In 
reviewing both the general advantages of conformity and the addi-
advantages of piggybacking, the California Legislature 
c_ould reasonably conclude that the "fundamental issue" for per-
sonal income tax purposes is whether the state should approve of 
conformity and accept the federal invitation--whether the multi-
ple advantages of conformity justify the reduction in state 
authority. In Kugler itself, the Court agreed that Alhambra could 
characterize the "fundamental issue" in terms of whether the 
advantages of compensation parity outweighed the corresponding 
loss of city discretion. Especially if the Legislature's vote 
rests on the basis of an adequate deliberation (a good legislative 
record would be helpful in this regard), the Legislature will have 
rendered decision on the fundamental issue and to that extent 
discharged its Kugler obligations. 
Kugler does suggest that a legislature's resolution of the 
fundamental issue must meet minimum standards of reasonableness 
or responsibility. But certainly the advantages of conformity 
and also of piggybacking are substantial enough to confirm the 
plausibility of a legislative decision which seeks to obtain them. 
Kugler requires that if an "external governmental body" is implicated 
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in a legislative scheme, the legislature must be able to expect 
that 11 reasonably perform its function." Certainly 
the Legislature could possess this expectation vis-a-vis the 
federal government. If Alhambra can reasonably assume that Los 
Angeles City and County will not pay their firemen excessively, 
so California can reasonably assume that federal authorities 
have no incentive either to develop oppressive income or deduction 
* rules or to foolishly fritter away the income tax base. If 
Alhambra can recognize the greater information-gathering resources 
of Los Angeles City and County, so the California Legislature could 
reasonably place confidence in the general income-tax sophistication 
of Congress and the Internal Revenue Service. 
As noted in Part I-D, there are a number of judicial decisions 
upholding open-ended state tax conformity statutes. These decisions 
validated conformity because of the benefits they perceived conform-
ity as achieving: "convenience to the taxpayer" and "economy to 
the state" (or "simplicity of administration"). The recognition 
of these benefits in this cluster of cases provides support for 
the Kugler idea that· the Legislature, if it votes in favor of 
open-ended conformity, will have rendered a responsible judgment 
on the fundamental issue. (The only complication is found in 
Mullaney's suggestion that "labor saving" on the part of the 
Legislature should not count as a legitimate benefit. On this 
complication, see the discussion of Sharpnack below.) As for the 
*Compare Cheney, p. 22, in which a state legislature sought 
to utilize--for income tax purposes--a formula worked out by the 
I.C.C. for quite different rate regulation purposes. 
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of tate costs which would if 
imp Streets and 
8 Supreme 's Eden Park opinion is 
it may well be sensible for the state to forsake some 
i to secure the benefits available from 
States Court's decision in Sharpnack 
Kugler argument in favor of open-ended conformity. 
--~~---holds, in with Kugler, that the advantages of con-
or parity can justify an open-ended inter-jurisdictional 
In there had been a longstanding Congres-
policy of conforming federal enclave law with the law of 
state in which the enclave was located. Given all its experi-
ence th incorporation-by-reference measures, Congress could 
(according to the Court) reasonably take the small additional leap 
involved in approving an ongoing delegation. In like manner, the 
ifornia Legislature has long displayed a strong interest in 
conforming the state's income tax laws with those of the federal 
government. Russell Bock's 1980 Guidebook to California Taxes is 
lpful in revealing the extent of that interest. The text of 
that Guidebook reveals that most existing California personal 
income tax rules do indeed conform (or at least adequately "compare") 
to federal tax rules. And Bock's SUliiiD.ary of 1979 California income 
tax legislation (at pages 7-9) verifies that the clear majority 
of all the income tax measures which the Legislature enacted in a 
seemingly typical year were motivated by the Legislature's general 
concern conformi 
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The Sharpnack analogy contains one complication, however. 
The Congressional experience described in Sharpnack revealed an 
undeviating practice of past conformity. But with respect to 
income tax law, the California Legislature, while it has usually 
chosen to conform to the federal model, in any number of signifi-
cant particulars has declined to conform (either by failing to 
act or by acting in a nonconforming way). As for this complica-
tion, however, the state Legislature is clearly entitled to 
reflect, in a retrospective and comprehensive way, upon the 
lessons of its experience. And as it considers the state's 
income tax in its existing whole--as it reviews the pattern of 
state-federal deviations which its individual decisions (or 
indecisions) have produced--the Legislature could plausibly conclude 
that the process of state lawmaking has not been successful in 
producing benefits commensurate with that process's taxpayer and 
institutional costs. If the Legislature's resulting decision to 
conserve on its own labor (by way of open-ended conformity) rests 
on a reasonable finding that its labor has not been productively 
expended in the past, then the goal of "labor saving"--that is, 
of deploying the Legislature's scarce resources to their maximum 
public advantage--seems commendable rather than illicit in 
character. 
For all of these reasons, however, a Kugler analysis, 
reinforced by Sharpnack, seemingly supports the legality of an 
open-ended delegation, and even of piggybacking. There are, 
however, two objections to consider. 
The first concerns the possibility of state legislative 
oversight. Oversight is certainly one form of "safeguard" for 
a delegation; and Kugler makes clear that safeguards are essential 
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Under "mere" ongoing conformity, the 
undoub should) set up a formal 
e i e significant changes federal 
tax and to develop a policy analysis of each of those 
the of the information and analyses which this 
contribute, the Legislature would be in a good 
to cons 
are 
"safeguard" 
whether any modifications of its conformity 
(See the discussion above of the report-
Streets & Highways Code § 820 and of the 
statute in Martin.) But the situation is very different if 
es to participate in the federal piggybacking pro-
As a matter of formal law, a decision by a state like 
ifornia to participate woulci. be reversible, so long as the 
state makes up its mind within the deadline which the federal 
t stipulates. Practically speaking, however, such a decision 
to participate may well be irreversible. Once a state, in joining 
the federal program, dismantles its personal income tax bureaucracy, 
would be extremely difficult for the state legislature to with-
draw from the program if the legislature should undergo any change 
of heart. Thus a state's acceptance of the federal piggybacking 
invitation may well be effectively permanent in character. Kugler 
requires courts to consider the "practical necessities" of 
governmental processes. Here, a "practical" evaluation suggests 
that the state Legislature may have little ability to act should 
it later determine that a particular new federal tax rule is 
obnoxious to state policy or that its original decision to 
ticipate in the federal program seems no longer supportable. 
From a delegation perspective, all of this is disturbing. 
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The second objection concerns the "scope" or extensiveness 
of the delegation question. Is "scope" relevant at all in 
le law? is uncertain. The extreme breadth of the 
Schecter statute seemingly influenced the Schecter Court in its 
ruling of unconstitutionality. Yet, faced with a statute of 
moderate breadth in Sharpnack, the Supreme Court simply ignored 
concern for scope expressed in Justice Douglas's dissenting 
opinion. Kugler is the fountainhead of contemporary California 
law, and Kugler, in stating delegation standards, pays no heed 
to scope. But the actual ordinance which was before the Kugler 
Court--dealing only with firemen compensation--was obviously 
rather narrow in scope. Perhaps it is best to assume that if 
the scope of a delegation is sufficiently extreme, then scope has 
at least some bearing on the constitutional question. 
The scope of the delegation under an open-ended conformity 
statute is doubtless broad. Yet it does not seem at all extreme 
when compared to the federal NRA, ruled on in Schecter. Note, 
however, that a piggybacking delegation contains additional and 
distinctive elements of breadth. Piggybacking, like conformity, 
would transfer tax-law policymaking to the federal government; but 
piggybacking, unlike conformity, would also transfer near-complete 
authority over the administration of the state's income tax. 
("Administration" in this context includes prosecutorial authority, 
judicial authority, and the authority to establish a schedule of 
sanctions and penalties.) 
Even as for the transfer of tax-law policymaking, there is an 
additional important point to make--which is that under ongoing 
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not under piggybacking) there would be a meaningful 
state control on the absoluteness of 
the record in other jurisdictions shows, a 
California could easily combine a general rule of ongoing 
with at least a limited number of "modifications" which 
le of taking strong interests into account. Modifi-
sort could, for example, enable California to adhere 
its t policy on the solar energy credit, on the renter's 
* t, on the low ceiling on charitable contributions. Of 
course, the power to modify would also provide a legislative outlet 
ongoing policy reviews of new federal tax rules, as described 
at page 63. The modification feature of an open-ended conformity 
statute thus enables the state to qualify its delegation of policy-
power in a way that confirms the assessment that this delegation 
something less than extreme. A state would possess no similar 
modifying ability, however, should it undertake to piggyback. 
The assessment of the two objections thus leads to the 
llowing conclusions. There is very good reason to believe that 
an open-ended conformity statute would be held constitutional £y 
the California Supreme Court. Open-ended conformity fully complies 
th the Kugler criteria, and the delegation, while much wider in 
scope than the delegations ruled on and described in Kugler, could 
effectively safeguarded by a formalized process of legislative 
, and kept under control by a legislative willingness to 
*It would be not easy--though perhaps not impossible--to handle 
California's differential treatment of capital gains by way of a 
c ty modification. 
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consider at least a limited number of modifications. A piggybacking 
decision could also be supported by Kugler. But here the "scope" 
of the delegation seems more extreme, insofar as it both excludes 
the state's power to "modify" and remits full judicial, adminis-
trative, and sanction-setting authority to the federal government. 
Also, a Kugler consideration of the "practical necessities" of 
governmental operations suggests the probable absence of the 
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legislative review of the continuing 
legislative decision. In these 
prediction that can claim to be candid 
one recognizes that the Supreme Court could easily rule 
on piggybacking--either extending Kugler to affirm the 
s participation in the federal program, or interpreting 
and thereby invalidating that participation. 
added uncertainty concerns the character of the "scrutiny" 
ch the Supreme Court would give to any California decision to 
iggyback. For purposes of applying Kugler, should piggybacking 
e compared to the present California situation, or should it be 
ared instead to the intermediate possibility of open-ended 
conformity without piggybacking. The calculation of the benefits 
of piggybacking--as well as the calculation of the delegation 
triments--importantly depends on what the basis for comparison 
Yet I find little in Kugler that offers guidance as to how 
undertainty should be resolved. Of course, since no state 
yet chosen to participate in the federal program, there has 
been no opportunity to secure any judicial views on delegation 
doctrine in this vexing application. By contrast, as Part l-D 
has shown, we do have case law on open-ended conformity statutes. 
While the courts' opinions have hardly been uniform, neither have 
they been unsympathetic to the conformity cause. Several have ruled 
favor of the constitutionality of ongoing conformity; and the 
only contrary holding may have rested on that state's peculiarly 
restrictive constitutional language.) 
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C. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
of cone ions, reported above, is that it very 
that the California Supreme Court would find constitutional 
an open-ended tax conformity rule adopted by the state Legislature. 
reaching this conclusion, I am mindful of a contrary prediction 
expres in an Opinion of the Office of Legislative Counsel, dated 
19 1959. 
I am right recognizing the 1968 Kugler as the outstand-
ing California authority on the delegation question, then it 
follows that the Legislative Counsel's 1959 Opinion has simply been 
superseded by later judicial developments. It also may be proper 
to mention that the Legislative Counsel's Opinion seems rather 
selective in its methodology. In discussing California law, for 
example, that Opinion refers to the Supreme Court's language in 
Brock, Burke, and Palermo; but it does not mention the strong 
Court of Appeal holding in Lasswell. As for out-of-state law, 
it refers to early opinions like Santee Mills and Featherstone, 
which had indicated doubts on the delegation question; but it does 
not mention an early case like Underwood Typewriter, which had 
sustained an open-ended conformity statute. The Opinion disparages 
the Ninth Circuit's sympathetic discussion of delegation in 
Mullaney on grounds that the discussion was mere dictum. Yet in 
referring to the California Supreme Court's more negative language 
in Brock, Burke, and Palermo, the Opinion fails to indicate the 
quite limited role which that language played in those three 
Court opinions. Moreover, the Opinion does not even mention the 
U.S. Supreme Court's Sharpnack decision, even though that decision 
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even 
0 
raises a state 
too c se to call. By 
t of unconstitutionality, this 
o sume Congress 
supplement to the existing federal 
of s supplementary 
a revenue-sharing manner) back to the 
gives to the state 
taxing and spending features 
statute 
co laboration by 
1 fully activities requiring 
state, nothing in a state 1 s constitution 
f 
no 
on 's lity. sume now that Congress 
rule a state becomes entitled to its 
tax supplement only if the state agrees to 
tax of its own--only if the state repeals, for 
ting state laws providing for such a tax. Possibly, 
sional s 
sible 
would "coerce" the states in a manner that 
federal Constitution. Compare Steward 
3 1 U.S. 5 (1937), with National League 
U.S. 833 (1976), Brown v. EPA, 431 U.S. 
tax, s 
tax in question would remain a genuinely 
e the only action which the state legislature 
to take 
to secure 
be to its own existing tax statute 
advantages), I cannot see how 
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program, even as so revised, creates any problems 
's constitution. 
---
contemplated by the Federal-State Income Tax 
llection Act possesses important elements of similarity with 
the programs hypothesized above. Nevertheless, under that Act 
the tax in question is emphatically a state tax. It is conceived 
as a state tax by the entire text of the Act itself; the 
state retains the authority to determine the tax's overall burden 
perhaps even the tax rate structure; and of course the Act 
gives the states full choice as to whether to participate in the 
program in the first place. The state thus possesses much more 
authority under the Act than it would possess under the revised 
hypothetical program; and exactly because of the extent of that 
authority, a state constitutional question arises as to the extent 
to which the state has relieved itself of other authority. There 
is irony in this of course--but it is irony of the sort that 
recurs in constitutional reasoning, especially in this complex era 
of Cooperative Federalism. 
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APPENDIX I 
PROPOSITION 14 ON THE NOVEMBER 8, 1966 STATEWIDE BALLOT 
PERSONAL INCOM!!_TAXES .. Legillative Constitutioul Amendment. 
14 thorizes Legislaturt- to providP for rPporting and p~r;onal .ineomt> taxes b~· ref~rence to provisions of tht' Umtt•d States and may prescribe exceptions and modifications 
(This amendment -proposed by Assembly Con-
stitutional 'Amendment .No. 18; 1965-· Regular 
Session, d6es not expressly amend, any existing 
section of the Constitution, but adds a: new sec-
tion thereto; therefore, the provisions thereof are 
printed in BLACK-FACEO TYPE to indicate 
that they are NEW.) 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 
. ARTICLE XIII 
. he.. li}. The Legi.sla.ture may simplify the 
nportinjr a.nd . collection of Califonaia pei"'IOIal 
General .&:na:J.ysfl by the Legislative Counsel 
.A "Yes"vote on this measure is a' vote to author-
ize the r~egi.~lature to incorporate federal ]a\\"S 
which ruay be l'nacted in the futl:u.'t', as well as i.'t-
istin:g federal laW!!, into California's law in the reo. 
porting and collection of California personal in· 
eo me ta.:x:es; and to permit the amount of income 
tax compuW under federal law to be used i.u. re-
:pc.rting a.ncl collecting California personal income 
taxe11. 
A "No" vote is a vote to dell;y the Legislature 
this authority. 
For further details see below. 
Deta.il.ed Analysis by the Legislative Counsel 
This measure, if approved by the voters, would 
add Section 11~ to Article XIII to perll!it the Legis-
lature, in the rep<Jrting and collection of the state 
personal income tax, to incorporate provisioilfl of 
the federal law as they may be enacted or amended 
in the future, as well as to incorporate existing 
provisions o! federal law, so as to make any of those 
provision3 apply to the reporting and collection of 
state Income taxes. The federal law so incorporated 
would be made subject to exceptions or mooifiea-
_tion.~. if any, that the Legislature may prescribe. 
The measure would specifi•!ally permit the ineln-
aion of a reference to the amount of any federal tax 
on, in respect to, o!' measure by, personal ineome 
which is computed under any provision of federal 
law. This would permit the amonnt of ineome tar 
computed under federal law to be used in report-
in~r and collecting California personal income 
taxes. 
Argument in Favor o! Proposition :No.l4 
At last! Here is a proposal to make our income 
tax easier to figure out. ', 
A YES vote on this proposition will allo\Y the 
Legislature to adopt federal income tax laws as 
much as practical !or our own state income tax· 
purposes. This means we will be able to use the 
talculations made for federal tax purposes in ou 
state tax form. We would not accept. the higbe 
!eJPral tax rates. -
Under present Ia'v we make all the at1Jition 
and subtraction8 nece~sary for the feJeral. .ta·· 
form and then go through the same proee;;s a! 
over again for the state tax return. 
There are now 54 differences 
eral law· and the state law-this 
make the two laws the same. m''""'"''l 
iatration can be achieved without 
tiona! costs as returm will be easier 
Terify. Furthermore, it will be 
those who are not reporting 
Th6 vast majority of tbe 
law and the state income tax 
now-but the few differences 
the problem area we seek to 
eonstitutional amendment. 
We are not giving away our 
neeessal')" chang~s in our tax 
We simply say tl:!at the present 
eomputing ineome .is. 
be incorporated in our 
the future the Legislature 
particular n~w ft>tlt>ral law 
our state tinRncial structure and 
that change. Thus our own 
retain the power to write oHr 
will truly rdh:ct the economy 
her taxpayers. Every year the 
time and effort prc,cessing- bill~ 
most recent changes iD. federal 
California. 
Th~ State Assembly conducted a 
of our tax structure ana tllis 
the recommendations they 
already adopted the system and 
State Bar Association Committees 
this action. 
Vote YES for simplicity. 
MILTON MARKS, 
.Assembly Committee 
ment Organization 
NICHOU.S C. PETRIS, Ll'VHrlfllifi 
Assembly Committee 
and Taxation 
Argument Against Proposition 
A ''No" vote on Proposition 14 
r~sponsibility on the part 
officials. 
<Pr•Jposition 14 would authorize th€ 
T~~lature-made up of your elected 
tives in Sacramento--to ab<lieate 
th<>ir responsibility for 
the income tax ~ must pay to 
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Of the Ab>ie!!Wicy 
47th District 
California Legislatur'!l 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 
ARTICLE XIII 
Sec. 11%,. (a) Except as urrnmxom 
division (e), the Legislature may simplify 
reporting and collecting of California 
personal income taxes, notwithstanding 
ether provision of this Constitution, by 
present law we 
subtractions, and computations nP<'P•,~rv 
the federal tax form and 
entirely different process 
return. For those who hire 
prepare their forms, this 
There are now 
the federal law and 
posal will ease administration 
as returns will be easier to 
This will simplify the 
mize on the size of the form. 
The,vast m•m,av 
federal income 
tax law are similar nnw-~rmr 
ferences that do exist are 
we seek to simplify with 
amendment. 
We are not giving a,;ay 
to make n~sary changes 
in the future. We simply 
3 
• 
APPENDIX I (continued) 
PROP. 4 (1968) 
Arrument Agalnst PropoaiUon No . .f. 
California voten should vote NO on Prop-
osition 4 for the following rea&Ollll: 
Proposition 4 benefits the rich at the ex-
pense of middle and lower income families. 
Under the guise of conformity, federal ex-
emptions, which are much lower than the 
State's could easily be adopted resulting in a 
major downward shift of the tax burden 
from the wealthy to the middle and lower 
income groups. In addition, with full con-
formity to federal law, Proposition 4 would 
mean an automatic tax windfall of up to 
$100 for persons owning stock. 
Proposition 4 discriminates against vet-
erans and military personnel. Proposition 4 
would remove the California tax law which 
now provides that the first $1,000 of military 
pay (active duty, reserve duty, and retired 
persons) is exempt from the state income 
tax. All of these citizens would lose that 
benefit if California conforms to federal tax 
laws. 
Proposition 4 would mean that federal tax 
law would automatically become state law. 
Why should California taxpayers shift the 
responsibility for enactment of state tax laws 
to the federal government f Only 38 out of 
435 members of the House of Representatives 
and only 2 of the 100 members of the Senate 
are elected by Californians. The practice of 
adopting federal law "by reference" as this 
measure proposes, could spread from tax 
laws to automatic state adoption of many 
other federal laws. 
Californians would be giving up most of 
the responsibility of the state government. 
Dilution of accountability for tax legisla-
lation will not best serve California's tax-
payers. Rt>sponsibility for increases in your 
state income tax should not be divided be-
tween Sacramento and Washington. The 
legislative body spending the tax dollar 
should be solely answerable to the electorate 
for levying the tax. This is the best assurance 
that your elected representatives will care-
fully balance the interests of taxpayers and 
the beneficiaries of state appropriations. 
A NO vote on Proposition 4 will protect 
the spendable wages of the lower income 
families living and working in California. 
A NO vote on Proposition 4 will protect 
the tax right of veterans and military per-
sonnel living and working in California. 
A NO vote on Proposition 4 will assure 
all Californians that our tax laws will be 
made by California legislators, not by elected 
representatives from other states. 
We do not see how this proposal will do 
anything for the ordinary taxpayer. Its im-
plications are too serious to be put into our 
Constitution. I urge all Californians to vote 
NO on Proposition 4. 
RICHARD J. DOL WIG 
California State Senator 
12th Senate District 
JOHN J. MILLER 
California State Assemblyman 
17th Assembly District 
274 
Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 31 
Introduced by Senator Mills ' 
January 23, 1980 
Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 31-A resolution to 
propose to the people of the State of California an 
. amendment to the Constitution of the state, by adding 
Section 26.6 to Article XIII thereof, relating to taxation. 
LEGISLATIVE; COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SCA 31, as introduced, Mills. Income tax. 
The existing California Constitution provides that the 
California Legislature may impose income taxes. 
N . This measur.e would authorize the Legislature to simplify 
--.J the reporting and collecting of state personal income taxes by 
U1 incorporating federal law into state law. 
Vote: %. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
1 Resolved by the 
2 the Legislature 
3 Regular Session 
4 1978~ 
5 each of the two houses 
6 hereby proposes to people of the State 
7 that the Constitution of the state be amended by adding 
8 Section 26.6 to Article XIII thereof, to 
9 26.6. Notwithstanding anv 
10 Constitution, 
11 
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C.'.LlFUH:"-:1:\. LEClSLATUflE-b79-3U REGuLAR SESSION 
Assembly Constitutional Arnendment No. 42 
Introduced by Assemblyman Naylor 
March 29, 1979 
HEFERRED TO COMMI'ITEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION 
Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 42-A resolution 
to propose to the people of the State of California an 
amendment to the Constitution of the state, by , adding 
1\.) Section 26.5 to· Article XIII t~e~eof, relating to taxation. 
~ . 
0'\ 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
ACA 42, as introduced, Naylor (Rev. & Tax.). State taxes. 
Existing provisions of the California Constitution provide 
for state taxes on, or measured income which be 
States. 
on persons, or 
by law, 
taxes. 
upon taxes 
This measure would the Legislature may 
for the imposition of taxes based upon taxes imposed 
the government of the States provide 
it shall not be an improper 
for to 
taxes subsequent 
21 
13· no. 
• 
ACA 42 ·-2-
1 Resolved by the Assembly, the Senate concurririg, That 
2 the Legislature of the State of California at its 1979-80 
3 Regular Session commencing on the fourth day of 
4 December, 1978, two-thirds of the members elected to 
5 each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor, 
6 hereby proposes to the people of the State of Cdifornia 
7 that the Constitution of the state be amended by adding 
8 Section 26.5 to Article XIII, to read: 
9 SEC. 26.5. The Legislature may provide for the 
10 imposition of taxes based upon taxes imposed by the 
11 government of the United States. It shall not be an 
12 improper delegation of the legislative power for the 
13 Legislature to prospectively incorporate into such taxes · 
14 subsequent amendments to the federal tax. 
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CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-l97HO REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1445 
Introduced by Assemblyman Naylor 
March 29, 1979 
REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION 
An act to add Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 17041) 
tu, to add Section 19252.5 to, to repeal Chapter 2, 
(commencing with Section 17041), Chapter 2.1 (commencing' 
with Section 17062), Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 
17071), Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 17321), Chapter 
~ 5 (commencing with Section 17051), Chapter 8 (commencing 
~ with Section 17681), Chapter 9 (commencing with Section · 
17731), Chapter 10 (commencing with· Section 17931), 
Chapter 13 (commencing with Section 18031), Chapter 14 
(commencing with Section 18151), Chapter 15,( commencing 
Section 18241), and Chapter 16 (commencing with 
18351) of, Part of Division 2 of and 
ion Code, to taxation, to take 
mediately, tax levy. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 1445, as introduced, Naylor (Rev. & Tax.). Personal ' 
income taxes. 
Existing provisions of the Personal Income Law impose 
a tax on taxable income derived from sources California at 
rates, authorized 
• 
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tr.1 § 
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t"1 
as a tax its 
its effective 
Fiscal 
of the of do enact as follows: 
ll 
14 
as a such household, of-
or stepdaughter of 
of a son or daughter of 
but if son, stepson, 
or descendant i~ married at close of 
taxpayer's taxable year, only if taxpaxer is entitled to 
16 a credit the taxable year for such under 
17054; or 
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AB 1445 
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ll 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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19 
w ut cunsntute an 
emergency to by reducing 
revenues to an amount insufficient to meet authorized 
state expenditures, the Franchise Tax Board shaH adjust 
the rate in Section 17041, subject to subdivision (b)., 
(b) The Franchise Tax Board shall adjust the tax rate 
in Section 17041 by an amount which would result in a 
rate from which revenues shall be derived in an amount 
which is sufficient to provide funds for approved state 
appropriations. Such adjustment shaq be applied equ3:lly 
to all income groups. ) 
(c) The Franchise Tax Board shall make no changes to 
credits authorized by this part. 
(d) Any rate adjustment under this section shall apply 
only with, regard to taxable years commencing in the 
calendar year in which changes to the federal Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 occur. 
17045. the case of a joint retur-n of a husband and 
under Section 18402, the tax imposed by Section 
l shall be twice which would 
income were cut 
a 
• 
_-5- AB 1445 
3 spouse: 
4 I) the tai'payer remarried at any time before 
5 close of the taxable year; or 
6 ( 2)' Unless, for the taxpayer's taxable year during 
7 which his spouse died, a joint return could have been 
8 made under the provis~ons of this part (without regard to 
9 subdivision (c) of Section 18402). 
17053.5. (a) For taxable ·years beginning after 
December 31,.1975, in the case of qualified renters, there 
shall be allo'wed G,redits against the tax computed under 
this part, minus all other credits provided for in this part 
except the credit provided in Section 18551.1 (relating to 
withholding credit) and the credit provided in ~ection 
17061 (relating to excess tax credit). The credit shall be 
in the amount of thirty-seven dollars ( $37). 
Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this section a 
husbai1d and wife shall receive but one credit under this 
section. If the hu:;band and wife file separate returns, 
mav be taken or equally divided between 
10 
II 
12 
13 
l A 
l ~ 
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7 
18 
19 
term ''qualified does not mcmae an 
whose principal of residence is with any 
person who claimed such individual as a dependent 
for income tax purposes. 
The term "·qualified renter" does· not include an 
individual who has heen granted or whose spouse has 1 
granted the homeowners' property tax exemption -
durl·:g: the taxahle yt'ar. This paragraph shall not apply in ~ 
case of an individual whose spouse has been, granted 
homeowners' property tax exemption if each spouse 
maintained a separate residence for the entire taxable 
is a nonresident for any 
claim the set forth 
8-
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I 
( i) changes made to ( 2) of subdivision 
(c) of this section by the 1977-78 Legislature shall 
applied· with. respeCt to taxable years beginning on 
January 1, 1979, and thereafter .. 
SEC. .3. Chapter 2.1 (commencing with Section 
17062) of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and 
Taxation Code is repealed.' · 
SEC. 4. Chapter.3 (commencing with Section 17071) 
of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code 
is repealed. 
SEC. 5. Chapter, 4 (commencing with Section 17321) 
10 ofDivision·2 the .Revenue and Code 
is · -. 
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16 
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18241) of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and 
Taxation Code is repealed. 
SEC. 13. Chapter 16 (commencing. wlth Section 
l 8351) of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and 
Taxation Code is repealed. _ 
SEC. 14. Section 19252.5 is added to the Revenue and 
Taxation Code, to read: 
19252.5. The Franchise Tax Board shall prescribe 
returns for the computation of taxes under this par~ 
which incorporate the federal income taxes of the 
taxpayer as the first stage of such computations. 
SEC. 15. This act provides for a tax levy within the 
meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into . 
immediate effect However, the provisions of this act ' 
shall be applied in the computation of taxes for taxable 
years beginning on or after the first day of the calendar 
year in which this act becomes effective provided the 
effective date is more than 90 days prior to the last day 
of the calendar year. If the effective date is 90 days or less 
prior to the last day of the calendar· year, the provisions 
of this act shall apply in the computation of taxes for 
taxable years beginning on or after the first day of the 
calendar year following the effective date. 
0 
• 
CXl 
by Assemblymen Naylor, 
Bergeson, Brown, Filante, Frazee, 
Kelley, Moorhead, Nestande, Nolan, 
ing, and Wyman 
(Coauthors: 
Nejedly, 
Beverly, Craven, 
Robbins, and 
March 11, 1980 
HEFEHRED TO COMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION 
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SEC. 2 L Section 2 this act shall become 
if Proposition 9 on ballot the .......... .,.,.,. 
on June 3, 1980 is adopted by the people 
6 state. 
22. This act provides for a tax levy within the 
meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go 
9 immediate effect. However, the provisions of this act 
lO shaH be applied in the computation of taxes for taxable 
11 years beginning on and after January 1, 1980. 
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CALIFOHNIA LEGISLATUHE-1979-80 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL --revised-- No. 3209 
Introduced by Assemblymen Naylor, Johnson, Imbrecht, 
Hallett, Bergeson, Dennis Brown, Filante, Frazee, Hayden, 
Ivers, Kelley, Moorhead, Nestande, Nolan, Statham, 
Stirling, and Wyman 
(Coauthors: Senators Ayala, Beverly, Craven, Johnson, 
Maddy, Nejedly, Nielsen, Rains, Robbins, and Speraw) 
March 11, 1980 
REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION 
An act to amend Sections 17041 , 17054, and 17063 of, to add 
Section 17039 to, to repeal Sections 17063.1, 17063.2, 17063.3, 
17064, 17064.5, 17064.6, and 17064.7 of, and to repeal Chapter 
3 (commencing with Section 17071), Chapter 4.5 
(commencing with Section 17490), Chapter 5 (commencing 
with Section 17501), Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 
17681), Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 17731), Chapter 
10 (commencing with Section 17931), Chapter 13 
(commencing with Section 18031), Chapter 14 (commencing 
•vlth Section 181.1)1), ChBpter 15 (commencing with Section 
18241), and Chapter 16 (commencing with Section.l8351) of, 
the Revenue and Taxation Code, relating to taxation, to take 
effect immediately, tax levy. · 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 3209, as Naylor ( & Tax.). Personal 
income tax. 
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1954: 
( 1) Less any amount of interest received with 
to obligations the ,United States Government, 
included in taxable income as computed for purposes 
the federal income tax, 
( 2) Less 
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23 the extent poss 
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l 18351) of 10 Division 2 the 
2 Tax at ion Code is repealed. 
3 SEC. 21. Section 2 of this act shall become opmalive 
4 only it Proposition 9 on the ballot for the statewide 
5 election on June 8, 1980 i., adopted by the people of this 
6 4a+e 
7 SEC. 22. This act provides for a tax levy within the 
8 meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into 
9 immediate effect. However, the provisions o.f this act 
10 shall be applied in the computation of taxes for taxable 
11 years beginning on and after January 1, 1980. 
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APPENDIX N (continued) 
ndum 
FRANCHISE TAX BOARD FISCAL 
ANALYSIS OF AB 3209-revised 
Franchise Tax Board 
Hon. Robert W. Naylor 
Member of the Assembly 
State Capitol, Room 4160 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Date July 25, 1980 
William G. Mackey 
AB 3209-Request for Information 
File No.: 114 :AND :jlb 
Telephone: (-8-) 438-0144 
(916) 355-0144 
This is in response to your request for a revised financial analysis of 
AB 3209, based on the printed bill, the proposed amendments attached to 
your letter, and discussions with Dan Nauman and James Patterson. 
The revised revenue effect of the bill, by detail of significant differences, 
is shown on Table 1. 
The estimated net change in tax liabilities is shown on Table 2. 
Questions concerning these tables should be directed to Allan Desin, 
Director of our Research and Statistics Bureau, at (916) 355-0144. 
p~~ 
Acting Executive Officer 
Attachments 
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TABLE 1 
AB 3209 - Financial Analysis 
(Data in Millions) 
Income Year Change in 
Tax Liability in 1981 Dollars 
1981 1982 1983 
Interest & Div}dend Exclusion -$77 -$77 -$77 
CA.pital Gains.l -97 -153 -204 
Capital Gains from Regulated Invest. Cos. -20 -20 -20 
Sub-Chapter "S" -20 -20 -20 
Net Operating Loss Carryover~/ 0 -25 -50 
¥Jlitary Exclusion +4 +4 +4 
Political Contribution +2 +2 +2 
Gas Tax +29 +29 +29 
Charitable Contribution -25 -25 -25 
Income Averaging -26 -26 -26 
Preference Tax Exclusion -20 -20 -20 
Subtotal -$250 -$331 -$407 
Interaction -5 -4 -3 
Total -$255 -$335 -$410 
On a fiscal year basis, the estimated revenue effect of the bill in 1981 dollars 
is as follows: 
1981-821_/ 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
-$340 Million 
-355 II II 
-410 " " 
-410 " " 
~/ Capital Gains phase-in schedule: 1981 income year - the 1-5 year holding 
period is eliminated and $3,000 loss limitation is allowed. The 1982 
income year exclusion is raised to 55%, the 1983 income year exclusion raised 
to 60%. 
~/ Net operating loss carryover has $50 million in accrued losses for 1981 
income year. We do not know how long it will take for the full $50 million 
loss to be realized. The two-year phase-in is conjectural. 
1_/ Assume 100% of 1981 income year effect felt in 1981-82 and 25% of 1982 
income year effect also felt in 1981-82. 
294 
FTB/R£,S 7/25/80 
AB - Distribution Tax Burden 
Income Year - Constant Dollars 
(Data in Millions) .. · 
Current Law AB 3209 Effect 
Total/ Distribution Tax Mode} Other I Total 
AGI Class Tax..!. of Burden Effect~ Effectg-1 Effect 
---
Under $5,000 $3 
- $1 * $1 $5,000 - 10,000 71 1.0% -1 -$2 -3 . 
10,000 - 20,000 576 7.8 . -12 -5 -17 
20,000 - 30,000 1,012 13.8 -24 -9 -33 
30,000 - 40,000 1,039 14.2 -32 -8 -40 
40,000 - 50,000 831 11.3 -33 -8 -41 
50,000 - 100,000 1,701 23.2 -94 -22 -116 
100,000 And Over 2,101 28.7 -126 -35 -161 
Totals $7,334, 100.0% -$321 -$89 ..,$41Q_ 
= 
rv 
\.0 
Ul 
* 
Less than $.5 million. 
~/ Based on 1978 income year data aged to 1981. Includes variable growth rates for different 
sources of income and deductions, based on historical trends adjusted for current law. 
(As an example, deductions for property taxes were adjusted to reflect the effect of 
Proposition 13.) Estimates of future CPI changes for indexing of brackets, exemptions and 
standard deductions were provided by the Department of Finance. 
I ~ Copy of complete Tax Model output attached. 
Tax 
$4 
68 
559 
979 
999 
790 
1,585 
_h940 
i§, 924 
I ~ Based on federal data. Includes Capital Gains from Regulated Investment Companies, Net Operating 
!' 
Loss Carryover, and Net Operating Losses for Sub-Chapter "S" corporations. Analysis of federal 
data indicate that 39% of Sub-Chapter "S" net loss tax benefits accrue to taxpayer with 
adjusted gross income greater than $100,000 after offsetting other income by this 
Sub-Chapter "S" loss. 
FTB/R&S 7/25/80 
of Burden 
.1% 
1.0 
8.1 
14.1 
14.4 
11.4 
22.9 
28.0 
100.0% 
N 
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AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 9, 1980 
AMENDED IN SENATE APRIL 14, 1980 
SENATE BILL No. 1931 
''-~----'- -------·--- --'0""~-=============== 
Introduced by Senator Marz Garcia 
(Principal coauthor: Assemblyman Naylor) 
(Coauthors: Senators Ayal~ Beverly, Craven, Johnson, 
Maddy, Nejedly, Nielsen, Nimmo, Rains, Robbins, and 
Speraw) 
(Coauthors: Assemblymen Dennis Brown, Filante, Frazee, 
Hallett, Hayden, Imbrecht, Ivers, Johnson, Kelley, 
Moorhead, Nestande, Nolan, Statham, Stirling, and 
Wyman) 
March ll, 1980 
An act to amend Sections 17054 and 17063 of, to add Section 
1?039 to, to repeal Sections 17063.1, 17063.2, 17063.3, 17064, 
17064.5, 17064.6, and 17064.7 of, and to repeal Chapter 3 
(commencing with Section 17071), Chapter 4.5 (commencing 
with Section 17 490), Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 
17501), Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 17681), Chapter 
9 (commencing with Section 17731), Chapter lO 
(commencing with Section 17931), Chapter 13 (commencing 
with Section 18031), Chapter 14 (commencing with Section 
18151), Chapter 15 (commencing with Section 18241), and 
Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 18351) of, the 
Revenue and Taxation Code, relating to taxation, to take 
effect immediately, tax levy. 
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sources wltnm thls state. 
relating to the computation of taxable 
would revise the Personal Income Tax 
fine taxable income to mean, with 
taxable income as computed for purposes 
income tax repeal various provisions 
to the computation taxable income. 
would also create an income tax credit, as 
semor citizens. 
bill would take effect immediately as a tax levy, but it 
be applied in the computation of taxes for taxable 
on and after January 1, 1980. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
N 
1.0 T1w people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
-.] 
6 
1\' 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
14 which 
required pursuant to ( 3) and 
16 (a), and shall prepare the tax return in sucn a manner 
17 that the taxpayer need not make such adjustments 
18 by reference to the appropriate table or .,._.,,u ..... 
19 SEC. 2. Section 17054 of the Revenue 
20 Code is amended to read: 
21 17054. In the case of individuals computing their 
22 under Section 17041 or Section 17048, the following 
23 credits for personal exemption may be deducted from the 
24 tax imposed. 
25 (a) In the case of a single individual, or a 
26 indi.vidual making a separate return a credit of 
27 twenty-five dollars ( $25). 
28 (b) In the case of a head of household, a 
29 spouse (as defined in Section 17046), or a uu."u"'" 
30 wife making a joint a credit of 
one spouse was a resident for the 
32 other spouse was a nonresident 
the 
portion 
Uhut:a 
•
 
4, 
is 
5. 
Code is repealed. 
2 
6. Hevenue and 
i Code is 
7. and ~ 
Code is repealed. 
8. Section 17064.5 of the Revenue and Taxation 
28 Code is repealed. 
29 SEC. 9. Section 17064.6 of the Revenue and Taxation 
30 Code is repealed. 
31 SEC. 10. Section 17064.7 of the Revenue and Taxation 
32 Code is repealed. 
33 SEC. ll. 3 (commencing with Section 17071) 1 
of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code J 
35 is repealed. 
SEC Chapter 
37 17490) of 
5( 
(commencing with Section 
2 of the Revenue and 
\ 
8 
9 
ll 
18 
21 Part 
22 Code is repealed. 
act 
24 meaning Article 
immediate effect 
26 applied the computation taxes 
27 years beginning on and after January 1, 
Sec. 
APPENDIX P 
SUBCHAPTER E-COLLECTION OF STATE XNDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAXES 
6361. General ru lea. Sec. 6363. State :t,greernents; other proce-
dure~~ 6362. Quallfled State Individual Income 
taxes. 
1911 Amendm~nt. Pub.L. 92.{112, Title 
111 I 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, 56 Stat. 936, 
aaded subchapter E. 
§ 6861. General rules 
63M. Rt>gulaUiln!l. 
636:5. Definition~ and special rules. 
(ft.) Collection and .sdmlnlstratfon.--·Jn !.he <~a.!<e o• &.ny Statu wl1ld1 hart 
in ~:ttect h.ll «1\reem<:nt with the SecJ~tary <mlc;r.c) lPto nndn r,cr.tlc•n 63\.:1, 
the ~ecretary or his delegate shall collect and administer the qualified 
Stale individual Income taxes of such State. AH provisions of this sub· 
title, subtitle G, and chapter 24 relating to the C(•lle.ctlon and Rdmlnlstra-
Uon of the taxes imposed by chapter 1 on the incomes ot individuals (and 
all clvU and criminal sanctions provided by this subUtle or by title 18 
ot the United States Code with respect to such coll<CcUon and adminis-
tration) P.hall apply to the collect.lou and ail mlnl~l cation (lr qua.U£Jed 
St11.te individual Income taxes as If such taxes were ho posed by c\•apter l, 
except to the extent that their application is modified by the Secretary 
or his delegate by regulations necessary or appropriate to reflect the provi-
sions of this subchapter, or to re!lect differences in the taxes or differ-
ences In the situations in which llabllity for such taxes arises. 
(b) Civil proceedlngs.-Any person shall have, with respect to a quali-
fied State individual Income tax (Including the t:urrent collection thereof), 
the same right to bring or contest a civil action and obtain review thereof, 
In the same court or courts and subject to the same requirements and pro-
cedures, as he would have under chapter 76, and under title 28 of the 
United States Code, If the tax were imposed by section 1 (or were for the 
current collection of the tax imposed by section 1). To the extent that 
the preceding sentence provides judicial procedures (Including re\·lew pro-
cedures) with respect to any matter, such procedures shall replace judi-
cial procedures under State law, except that nothing in this subchapter 
shall be construed in any way to affect the right or power of a State 
court to pass on matters involving the constltutiou of that State. 
(c) Transfers to States.-
(1) Prompt transfers.-Any amount collected under this gub· 
chapter which Is apportioned to a qualifif:d State lndh·ldual Income 
tax shall be promptly transferred to the State on the basis ot esti-
mates by the Secretary or his delegate. In the case of amounts col-
lected under chapter 24, the estimated amount due the State shall 
be transferred to the State not later than the close of the tl1ird busi-
ness day after the amount Is deposited In a Federal Reserve bank. In 
the case of amounts collected pursuant to a return, a declaration of 
estimated tax, an amendment of such a declaration, or otherwise, the 
estimated amount due the State shall be transferred to the State not 
later than the close of the 30th day after the amount is received by 
the Secretary or his delegate. 
(2) Adjustments.-Not less often than once each fiscal year 
the difference between collections (adjusted for credits and refunds) 
made under this subchapter during the preceding fiscal year and the 
transfers to the States made on account of estimates of such col-
lections shall be determined, and such difference shall be a charge 
against, or an addition to, the amounts otherwise payable. 
(d) Speclnl rules.-
( 1) United States to represent State interest.-
( A) Ceneral rule.-In all administrative proceedings, and in 
all judicial proceedings (whether civil or criminal). relating to 
the administration and collection of a StatP. quallCied Individual 
Income tax the Interests of the State Imposing such tax shall be 
represented by the United States in the same manner in which 
the Interests of the United States are represented in correspond-
Ing proceedings involving the taxes Imposed by chapter 1. 
(B) Exceptions.-,.-Subparagraph (A) shaH not apply t~ 
{1) proceedings in a State court involving the constitu-
tion of that State, and 
(11) proceedings involving the relaUonshfp between the 
United States and the State. 
300 
(2) Allocation or overpayments and underpayments.-If the com-
bined aroou:nt collected In respect of a qualified State Individual ln-
. come tax for any period and the taxes imposed by chapter 1 for such 
period with respect to the Income or any individual Is greater or less 
than thH. corablned amount required to be paid for such period the 
collected amount shall be divided between the accounts for 'such 
taxes on~ the ·basis of the respective amounts required to be paid. 
(S) 1• fns.Uty ot ad.mlnistratll'e determlnations.-Admin!stratlve 
determinations or the Secretary or his delegate as to tax llabllltles 
ot, or rerunds owing to, individuals with respect to quallfled State in-
dividual lnco.me taxes shall not be reviewed by or enforced by any 
oftlcer or employee or any State or political subdivision or a State. 
Added Pub.I,. !12- 512, Title II, f 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 936. 
I 6362. Qall.litied State individual income taxes 
(a) Quall1ied State individual income taxes defined.-For purpOSE!S o[ 
this subchapter·--. . 
(1) In gcneral.-The term "quallfied State indivldu.allncome tax" 
means--
(A) a quautied resident lax. and 
(D) a qualified nonresident tax. 
(2) Qualified resident tax.-The term "quautied resident tax" 
means a tax Imposed by a State on the income of individuals who are 
residents ot such State which is elther-
(A) a. tax based on taxable Income which meets the require-
ments of subsection (b), or 
(B) a tax which is a percentage ot the Federal tax which 
meets the requirements of subsection (c), 
and which. in addition, meets the requirements or subsections (e) 
and (f). . 
(S) Qualified nonresident tru~:.-The term "qualified nonresident 
tax" means a tax which is Imposed by a State on the wage and other 
business Income of individuals who are not residents of such State 
and which meets the requirements or subsections (d), (e), and (f). 
(b) Qualirled resident tax based on taxable lncome.-
(1) In general.-A tax meets the requirements of this subsection 
only It it is Imposed on an amount equal to the Individual's taxable 
Income (as defined In section 63) for the taxable year, adjusted-
(A) by subtracting an amount equal to the amount of his 
interest on obligations of the United States which was included 
In his gross Income for the year, 
(B) by adding an amount equal to his net State income tax 
deduction for the year, and 
(C) by adding an amount equal to hls nel tax-exempt Jn. 
come for the year. 
(2) Pennitted adjustments.-A tax which otherwise meets the 
requirements of paragraph (1) shall not be deemed to fall to meet 
such requirements solely because It provides for one or more ol the 
following adjustments: 
(A) There Is Imposed a tax on the amount taxed under sec-
tion 56 (relating to the minimum tax for tax preferences). 
(B) A credit determined under rules prescribed by the Secre-
tary or his delegate Is allowed against such tax for income tax 
paid to another State or a political subdivision thereof. 
(S) Net State income tax deductlon.-For purposes of this sub-
section and subsection (c), the term "net State income tax deduc-
tion" means the excess (if any) of (A) the amount deducted from 
income under section 164(a) (3) as taxes paid to a State or a politi-
cal subdivision thereof, over (B) amounts Included In income as 
recoveries or prior Income taxes paid to a State or a political subdivi-
sion thereof which had • been deducted under section 16 4 (a) ( 3). 
(4) Net tax-exempt income.-For purposes of this subsection and 
subsection (c), the term "net tax-exempt income" means the excess 
(l! any) o[-
(A) the interest on obligations described in section 103 (a) 
( 1) other than obligations or the State and its political subdivi-
sions, and 
(B) the interest on obligations described in such section or 
the State and its political subdivision which under the law or the 
State Is subject to the individual income tax Imposed by the 
State, over 
the sum or the amount o! deductions allocable to such interest which 
ls disallowed by application of section 265, and the amount of the 
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proper adjustment to basis Rllocable to such obligations which Is 
required to be made for the ta.xable year under sectlon 1016(a) (5) 
or (6). 
(c) Qunllfled rt>sfdent tax whittt Is a percentage of the Fede:rnl tro::.-
(1) In general.-A tax me.:!ls the requirements of this subsection 
only If It Is Imposed as a specified percentage of the excess of the 
taxes imposed by chapter 1 over the sum of the credits allowable 
under part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 (other than the credits 
allowable by sections 31 and ~3). 
(:Z} Required adjustment ·A fl1)' meets Uw ~c~ulrPmcnt~ <•f lhlr-
subsectlon only if the JiabllHr lo•· tax is decrcr,:.;cci. by <lle d{<cH·a~;r. In 
such liability which would result from excluding from gross income 
an amount equal to the Interest. on obligations or the United States 
which was Included in gross Income for such year. 
(8) Permitted adjustment:J.--A tax which otherwise meets the 
requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not be deemed to fall 
to meet such requircmentll solely because It pJ·ovJdes for both of the 
following adjustments: · 
(A) the liabUity for tax In Increased by the Increase In such 
liability which would. result from Including as an item of gross 
Income an amount equal to the net tax-exempt income for the 
year, and 
(B) tb& llab1Uty for tax Is increased by the Increase in such 
liability which would result from Including as an item of gross 
Income an amount equal to the net State income tax deduction 
for the year. 
(4) Further pennitted adjustment.-A tax which otherwise meets 
the requirements ot paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not be deemed to 
fall to meet such requirements solely because a credlt determined 
under rules prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate is allowed 
against such tax for income tax paid to another State or a political 
subdivision thereof. 
(d) Qualified nonresident tru:.-
(1) In general.-A tax Imposed by a State meets the requirements 
of this subsection only if It has the following characterlstics-
(A) such tax is Imposed by the State on the wage and other 
business Income of Individuals who are not residents of such 
State, 
(B) such tax applies only with respect to wage and other 
business ln~me derived trom sources within such State, 
(C) such tax a.ppliea (lnly ff 25 percent or more of the lu-
dlvldual's wage and other business Income for the taxable year 
Is derived from sources within such State, 
(D) the amount of such tax Imposed with respect to any In-
dividual who Is not a resident does not exceed the amount of tax 
for which he would be liable under such State's qualified resi-
dent tax If he were a resident of such State and it his .taxable 
Income were an amount equal to the excess of-
(1) the amount of his wage and other business income 
derived from sources within such State, over 
(li) that portion ot the nonbusiness deductions taken 
into account for purposes of the State's qualified resident tax 
which bears the same ratio lo the amount of such deduc-
tions as the Income referred to ln clause (1) bears to his 
adjusted gross income, and 
(E) the State has in effect for the same period a qualified 
resident tax. 
(2) Wage and other business income.-The term "wage and 
other business income" mean&-
(A) wages, as defined In section 3401 (a). 
302 
(B) net earnings from self-employment (within the mean-
ing of section 140 2 (a)), and 
(C) the distributive share or Income or any trade or business 
carried on by a trust, estate, or electing small business corpora-
tion (within the meaning of section 1371 (a)) to the extent such 
share (I) Is Includible in the gross income or the individual for 
the taxable year, and (U) would constitute net earnings from 
self-employment (within the meaning of section 1402(a)) if 
such trade or busln~s were carried on by a partnership. 
(e) Requh-ements relating to residence.-A tax Imposed by a State 
meets the requirements of this subsection only if for purposes ot such 
tax-
(1) Resident lndirldw\1.--An Individual (other than a trust 01' 
estate) Is treated as a resident of such State with respect to a tax-
able year only ff-
(A) his principal place of residence has been within such 
State for a period of at least 135 consecutive days and at least 
30. days or such period are in such taxable year, or 
(B) In the case of a citizen or resident of the United States 
who Is not a resident (determined in the manner provided In sub-
paragraph {A)) of any State with respect to such taxable year, 
such Individual Is domiciled in such State for at least 30 days 
during sue}). taxable year. 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to require or authorize 
the treatment of a Senator, Representative, Delegate, or Resident 
Commissioner as a resident of a State other than the State which 
he represents in Congress. 
(2) Esta.te.-An estate of an lndlv.1dual is treated as a resident 
of the last State of which such Individual was a resident (within 
the meaning of paragraph ( 1) ) before his death. 
(3} Trusta-
(A) Testamentary tru.st.-A trust with respect to which a 
deceased individual is the principal contributor by reason of 
property passing on his death Is treated as a resident of the 
last State of which such Individual was a resident (within the 
meaning of paragraph ( 1)) before his death. 
(B) Nontestamentary trust.-A trust (other than a trust 
described In subparagraph (A)) is treated as a resident ot such 
State with respect to a taxable year. only if the principal con·-
trlbutor to the trust, during the 3-year period endlng on tho 
date of the creation of the trust, resided in the State for an 
aggregate J:!Umber of days longer than the aggregate number ot 
days be reSided In any other State. 
{C) Special nlles.-For purposes or this paragraph-
(1) IC on any day before the close of the taxable year an 
existing trust received assets having a value greater than 
the aggregate value or all assets theretofore contributed to 
the trust, such trust shall be treated as created on such 
day. For purposes of this subparagraph, the value or any 
asset taken into account shall be its fair market value on 
the day 1t is contributed to the trust. 
(li) The principal contributor to the trustee is the in-
dividual who contributed more (In value) of the assets con-
tributed on the date of the creation of the trust (determined 
after applying clause (i)) than any other individual. 
(Hi) If the foregoing rules would create more than one 
State of residence (or no State of residence) for a trust, 
such trust shall be treated as a resident of the State deter-
mined under similar principles prescribed by the Secretary 
or his delegate by regulations. 
(4) Liablllty for ta."C on change of resldence.-With respect to 
a taxable year, In the case of an individual (other than an Individual 
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who comes Into being or ceases to exl'!t) who becomes a resident, 
or ceases to be a resident, of the State, his liability to such State 
for the resident tax Is determined by multiplying the amount which 
would be his llablllty for tax (after the nonrefundable credits al-
lowed against such ta.x) It he had been a resident of such State for 
the entire taxable year by a fraction the numerator of which Is the 
number of days he was a resident of such State and the denomina-
tor of which Is the total number of days In the taxable year. In the 
case of an Individual who is treated as a resident of a State with 
respect to a taxable year by reason of paragraph (1) (B), the pre· 
ceding sentence shall be appJicd t•v ~nbstltutiug da)'~< of o(l)llldle 
tor dayc of residence. 
(5) Current collection of tax.-In applying chapter 24 (relating 
to withholding) and section 6015 and other provisions relating to dec-
larations of estimated Income (and amendments thereto)-
(A) In the case of a resident tax, an individual Is treated 
as subject to the tax 1f he reasonably expects to reside in the 
State for 30 days or more or ff such Individual Is a resident. ot 
the State (wfthlll. the meaning of paragraph (1), ( 2). or ( 3)), 
and 
· (B) In the case of a nonresident tax, an Individual 1s treated 
as subject to the tax If be reasonably expects to :receive wage and 
other business income (within the meaning of subsection (d) 
( 2)) for 30 days or more during the taxable year. 
(f) Additional requlrements.-A tax imposed by a State shall meet the 
requirements of this subsection only if-
( 1) State agreement must ba In effect for period conce:med.-A 
State agreement entered Into under section 6363 !s In effect with 
respect to such tax for the taxable period In question. 
(2) State Jaws must contain certain provisions.-Under the laws 
ol such State--
(A) the provisions of this subchapter (and of the regulations 
prescribed thereunder) as In effect from Ume to time are made 
applicable for the period for which the State agreement is Jn 
effect, and 
(B) any change made by the State in the tax imposed by the 
State wm not apply to taxable years beginning In any calendar 
year for wbfch the State agreement is in effect unless such 
cbange is enacted before November 1 of such calendar year. 
(8) State laws tu'ing Income of individuals can only be of certain 
kinds.-The State does ·not impose any tax on the Income of in-
dividuals other than- · 
(A) a qualified resld.ent tax, 
(B) a quallfted nonresident tax, and 
(C) a separate tax on income which Is not wage and other 
business Income and which Is received or accrued by individuals 
who are domiciled In the State but who are not residents of the 
State within the meaning of subsection (e) {1). 
(4) Taxable )'ears must colncfde.-The taxable years of individuals 
under such tax coincide with taxable years for purposes ol the taxes 
imposed by chapter 1. 
(5} 1\larried indtrlduals.-A married individual (within the mean-
Ing or section 143)- · 
(A) who files a joint return for purposes of the taxes im· 
posed by chapter 1 shall not file a separate return for purposes 
of such State tax, and 
(B) who files a separate return for purposes of the taxes Jm-
posed by chapter 1. shall not file a joint return for purposes 
of such State tax. 
(6) No double jeopardy under State Jaw.-The laws of such 
State do not provide criminal or civll sanctions for an act (or omis-
sion to act) with respect to a qualified resident tax or quaH!ied non-
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resident tax other than the criminal or clvll sanctions to which an 
Individual is subjected by reason of section 6361. 
(7) Partnerships, trusts, subchapter S corporatloiut, and other con• 
duJt entittes.-Under the State Jaw the tax treatment of-
(A) partnerships and partners, 
(B) trusts and their ben'eficiarles, 
(C) estates and their beneficiaries, 
(D) electing small business corporations (within the mean-
ing of section 137l(a)) and their shareholders, and 
(E) any other entity and the individuals having beneficial 
lnteretlls therein, to the extent that such entity is .treated as a 
conduit for purposes of the taxes imposed l.ty chapter 1, 
shall correspond to the tax treatment provided therefor in the case 
of the taxes Imposed by chapter 1. 
(8) Members of Armed Forces.-The relief provided to any mem-
ber of the Armed Forces of the United States by section 514 of the 
Soldiers' and Sailors' Clvll Rellef Act (50 U.S.C.App. sec. 574) is in 
no way diminished, 
(0) \Vithholdlng on compvnsatlon of employ~ of rallroads, motor 
carriers, airlines, and water cnrrlers.-There is no contravention of 
the provisions of section 26, 226A, or 324 of the Interstate Commerce 
Act or of section 1112 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 with re-
spect to the withholding of compensation to which such sections 
apply for purposes or the nonresident tax. 
Added Pub.L. 92-512, Title II, § 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 938. 
fi 6363. State agreements; other procedures 
(a) State agreement.-If a State elects to enter into an agreement 
with the United States to have its individual income taxes collected and 
administered as provided in this subchapter, 1t shall me notice of such 
election In such manner and with such supporting Information as the 
Secretary or his delegate may prescribe by regulations. The Secretary 
shall enter into an agreement with such State unless the Secretary notifies 
the Governor of the State within 90 days after the date or the filing of 
the notice of the election that the State does not have a qualified State 
individual income tax (determined without regard to section G362(f) (1)). 
The provisions of this subchapter shall apply on and after the date (not 
earlier than the first January 1 which is more than 6 months after the 
date of the notice) specified for this purpose in the agreement. 
(b) With<lrn.wal.- . 
(1) By notificntlon.-If a State wishes to withdraw from the 
agreement, it shall notify the Secretary or his delegate of its Intention 
to withdraw in such manner as the Secretary or his delegate may pre-
scribe by regulations. The provisions of this subchapter (other 
than this section) shall not apply on or after the date specified for 
this purpose in the notification. Except as provided In regulations, 
the date so specified shall not be earlier than the first January 1 
which Is more than 6 months after the date on whlch the Secretary 
or his delegate is so notified. 
(2) Dy change in state law.-Any change tn State law which 
would (but for this subchapter) have the effect of causing a tax to 
cease to be a qualified State Individual income tax shall be treated 
as an intention to withdraw from the agreement. Notification by 
the Secretary to the Governor of such state that the change In State 
law will be treated as an Intention to withdraw shall be made by the 
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Secretary In such manner as the Secretary or llls delegate shall by 
regulations prescribe. Such notification shall have the same effect 
as a notice under paragraph (1) of an Intention to withdraw from 
the agreement received on the etrectlve date c;f the change in State 
law. 
(c) Trllll.Sitlon years.-
(1) Subchapter ceases to apply during ta.xpayf:r's year.-If the 
provisions of this subchapter cease to apply on 11 day other than 
the last day of the taxpayer's taxable year, tll~n amounts previously 
paid to the United States on account of the state's qualified In-
dividual Income tax for that taxable year (whdher paid by withhold-
Ing, estimated tax, credit in lieu of rr.fnnd. or (•therwlse) shall br. 
treated as ha.ving been paid on ac<:OUJJt of the State's Individual ln-
come tax law for that taxable year. Such amounts shall be trans-
ferred to the State as though the State had not withdrawn from the 
agreement. Returns, applications, elections, and other torms pre-
viously flied with the Secretary or his delegate for that taxable year, 
which are thereafter required to be filed with thll appropriate State 
official shall be treated as having been filed wHb. tho appropriate 
State Clf!lclal. 
(2) Prevention of unintended ha.rdshlps or bentJfits.-The State 
may by law provide for the· transition to a quaUfled State individual 
lncoiDe tax or froiD such a tax to the extent nec~ssary to prevent 
double taxation or other unintended hardships, or prevent unin-
tended benefits under State law. 
(8) Adnllnlstratlon of snbsectlon.-The provisions of this subsec-
tion shall be administered by the Secretary or his delegate, by the 
State, or jointly, to the extent provided In regula! Ions prescribed by 
the Secretary or his delegate. 
(d) Judicial revlew.-
(1) In general.-Whenever under this section the Secretary or 
his delegate determines that a State does not have a qualified State 
individual Income tax, such State may, within 60 days after the 
Governor of the State has been noti!led of such acUon, ftle with 
the United States court of appeals for the circuit which such 
State is located, or with the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, a petition for review of copy of 
the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by ot the court 
to the Secretary or bls delegate. The Secretary or his delegate 
thereupon shall file In the court the record of on 
which he based his action as provided in section 2112 o£ title 28, 
United States Code. 
(2) Jurisdiction of court; revlew.-The court have jurisdic-
tion to affirm the action of the Secretary or h!a delegate or to set H 
aside In whole or In part and to Issue such as may be 
appropriate with regard to taxable years which Include any part of 
the period of lltJgatlon. The judgment of the shaH be subject 
to review by the Supreme Court of the United upon certiorari 
or certification as provided in section 1254 of United States 
Code. 
(8) Stay of decislon.-
(A) If judgment on a petition to :review determination 
under subsection {a) Includes a determination that the State 
has a Qualified State Individual income tax, then the provision& 
of this subchapter shall apply on and after the first January 1 
which Is more than 6 tnonths after the date the judgment. 
·(B) If judgment on a petition to review determination by 
the Secretary under subsection (b) (2) includes a determina-
tion that the State does not have a qualified State individual 
Income tax. then the provisions of this subchapter (other than 
this section) shall not apply on and aft~r the first January 1 
which Js more than 6 IDonths after the date of the judgtnent. 
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(4) Preference--Any judicial proceedings u:r:der tllls section shall 
be entitled to, and, upon request of the Secretary t)r the St3.te, shall 
. receive a preference and shall be heard and determined as ex-
peditiously as possible. . 
Added Pub.L. 92-512, Title II, I 202(a), Oct. 20, 1372, 86 Stat. 942. 
I 6864. RegulatlODIJ 
The Secretary or hls delegate shall prescribe such regulations as u1a.y 
be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. 
Added Pub.L. 92-512, Title II, I 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 944. 
§ 6365. Definitions and special rules 
(a) State.-For purposes of this subchapter, the term "State" Includes 
the District of Columbia. 
(b) Governor.-For purposes of this subchapter, the te;:m "Governor" 
Includes the Commissioner of the District of Columbia. 
(c) Application of snbchapter.-Whenever thls subchapter begins to 
apply, or ceases to apply, to any State ta."t on any January 1---, 
(1) except as provided In paragraph (2), such cha.nge shall apply 
to taxable years beginning on or after such date, and 
(2) tor purposes of chapter 24, such change shall apply to wages 
paid on or after such date. 
Added Pub.L. 92-512, Title II, § 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, So Stat. 944. 
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APPENDIX Q 
WITHHOLDING EXEMPTION (W-4 OR DE4) FORMS 
ISSUE 
The Franchise Tax Board has adopted a regulation (18811) 
that requires employers to send to FTB their employees' with-
holding exemption forms (DE4, W-4 forms}, under certain condi 
Does this regulation impose an unreasonable burden on California 
employers? 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
After review of the arguments for and against this 
regulation, the policy alternatives available to the Committee 
appear to be: 
1. Do nothing--let the regulation stand. 
2. Request the FTB to reconsider this issue. 
3. Amend the regulation, by statute, to federal 
conformity. 
4. Repeal the regulation by statute. 
BACKGROUND 
A study by the Internal Revenue ce uncove 
growing number of taxpayers who submit false W-4 forms to 
In one case a person claimed 99 dependents. 
This has the effect of undermining the withholding sys 
and causing a cash flow loss of revenue. 
According to the Franchise Tax Board, information was 
received as to the filing of 8,000 W-4's in 1978-79 that 
claimed an exemption from withholding or appeared to c 
excessive number of withholding allowances. Of these, 
mately 5,800 were fraudulent. 
In an attempt to combat the filing of fraudulent wi 
exemptions, both the Internal Revenue Service and the Franchise 
Tax Board have adopted regulations requiring employers to 
information to the appropriate tax agencies when the exemptions 
claimed exceed certain levels. 
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Employers are required to furnish copies of the W-4 and/or 
DE4 to the respective agencies under the following conditions: 
Form DE4 (State) 
l. an employee claims 20 or more exemptions or any 
smaller number the employer has reason to believe 
is excessive 
2. a full-time employee claims to be exempt from 
withholding and the employee's salary computed 
on a bi-weekly basis, exceeds $625 
3. an employee makes material alterations on the form 
such as deleting language, defacing the certificate, 
or providing information 'other than that requested 
4. an employee files a withholding allowance certiticate 
which the employee admits is false 
Form W-4 (Federal) 
1. an employee claims more than n,tne withholding exemptions or 
2. an employee claims exemption from income tax withholding 
and his/her wages are more than $200 a week at the 
time the employer receives their Forms W-4 
Some employers have objected to these on the 
basis that they will erode positive relationsh 
management and employees. Further, the State ations are 
criticized on the grounds that they are different than the 
federal ones and particularly that the language " ... any smaller 
number the employer has reason to believe is excessive" puts 
the employer in the position of "judging" employees, which 
they assert is an invasion of privacy of the employee and a 
task which they find objectionable on the grounds that employers 
are not equipped and should not be investigating the financial 
affairs of their employees. 
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